

Violence and Growth. The Protection of Long-Distance Trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650.¹

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Introduction

Violence was a major threat to the growth of international trade in late medieval and early modern Europe.² Merchants traveling over land to distant markets were confronted with theft, robbery, or even outright warfare. At sea pirates and privateers preyed on richly laden ships.³ Upon their arrival in foreign territory traders could be confronted with crime, corruption, arbitrary confiscations, social unrest, religious persecution, and civil war. Yet, despite these violent threats international trade grew, especially during the Commercial Revolution of the 11th and 12th century, and again in the long sixteenth century between 1450 and 1650. To explain this combination of violence and growth, economic historians have argued that European merchants developed better means to protect their trade.⁴

The simplest way for merchants to prevent violence is to carry arms and accompany their merchandise.⁵ However, this individual defense severely limited the scope of trade, while it is effective against minor threats only. To remedy these shortcomings long-distance traders traveled together in convoys and caravans, and at least from the eleventh century onwards they participated in merchant guilds.⁶ These collective bodies of traders from a particular town or region negotiated safeconducts and other protective measures with foreign rulers. Besides they could credibly threaten to leave collectively in case any one of their members was assaulted. Often

these merchant guilds were supported by their home government that enforced the internal cohesion of the guilds, negotiated on their behalf, and even organized convoys to secure the safe arrival of merchants and their goods.⁷

Alien merchants and their rulers were not the only ones interested in the protection of medieval and early modern trade, however. To stimulate their local economy monasteries, noblemen, and especially towns organized periodic fairs, where merchants from different parts of Europe could safely gather and exchange goods. In the course of time several of the urban fairs developed into permanent markets supervised and policed by the town magistrate.⁸ However, with the notable exception of Italian city-states, local authorities could not guarantee the safety of merchants beyond their city walls. Central governments could solve this problem – and more than that.⁹ In early modern Europe states strengthened their territorial control, they deployed navy vessels to escort merchantmen, and they developed legal systems to punish piracy and regulate privateering.¹⁰

Besides defense and deterrence, protection also implied the ability of traders to get compensation if their person and goods are damaged. In medieval Europe merchant guilds took to collective action, often with the support of their home government, to claim damages from host rulers.¹¹ Soon enough host rulers set up a court system to allow local and foreign traders to recoup losses from privateering, wrongful arrests, corruption, and commercial disputes. The courts also enforced a growing variety of debt and equity contracts that allowed merchants to better partition or transfer their risks.¹² Especially the rise of maritime insurance and joint stock companies in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries improved risk management in long-distance trade. Finally, local and central authorities supported the growth of

permanent markets that enabled individual traders to diversify their trade and compensate for losses within their own businesses.

Many economic historians have argued that government intervention, and in particular early modern state formation, improved the protection of Europe's long-distance trade.¹³ The presumed benefit is captured in Frederic Lane's concept of *protection rent* – the difference in cost between protection organized by a collective body and by individual traders.¹⁴ However, as Lane also realized, the process of state formation led to warfare and privateering that damaged the subjects of the warring parties as well as neutral traders.¹⁵ What is more, even rulers who refrained from warfare could abuse their monopoly of violence to exact more payment from merchants than strictly necessary to organize protection.¹⁶ This then raises the question if early modern merchants under the protection of strong rulers were really better off than their medieval predecessors who relied on fairs and merchant guilds.¹⁷

Answering this question is difficult. For one, measuring the actual costs of different institutions to protect trade is impossible. There is simply not enough information on membership fees of merchant guilds, expenses for naval escorts, success rates of legal claims against privateers, or even insurance premiums to warrant a comparative cost analysis. One might instead apply game or contract theory to the available data, and model the functioning of one particular institution or contractual mechanism. Yet, although such historical-institutional analysis has greatly increased our understanding of individual institutions, it does not address what is perhaps the most salient feature of late medieval and early modern trade: merchants often used a combination of guilds, governments, and markets to solve their problems.¹⁸ To analyse this complementarity of institutions, and the contribution it

could make to a more efficient protection of trade, this paper adopts a comparative approach.

The paper analyzes how foreign merchants in Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam between 1250 and 1650 tried to prevent assaults on their person and goods, and how they compensated damages in case they were harmed.¹⁹ Bruges emerged as an international market upon its insertion in the cycle of Flemish fairs in 1200. At the height of its commercial success in the fourteenth century the city boasted a permanent market with more than a dozen *foreign nations* – more or less formal associations of alien traders – present. In the fifteenth century Bruges increasingly felt the competition of the Brabant fairs held in Antwerp and Bergen op Zoom. After the Flemish port fell out with the Burgundian rulers of the Netherlands in 1488, most foreign nations relocated in Antwerp. In the sixteenth century the fairs of the Scheldt port also evolved into a year-round market. When the Dutch Revolt split the Netherlands in two in the 1580s, Amsterdam took over Antwerp's leading role in international trade.

The paper continues as follows. The first three sections are concerned with the various ways in which merchants and rulers tried to prevent damage to foreign trade. Section I analyzes the creation of local monopolies of violence by the magistrates of Bruges, Antwerp, And Amsterdam. Section II explores how local and central authorities tried to improve the safety on rivers and roads in the Low Countries. Section III looks at the contribution of foreign merchants, their home governments, and the rulers of the Low Countries to the prevention of war damages. The last two sections of the paper focus on compensation. Section IV analyzes what merchants could do to make those who damaged their property pay for it, while section V

explores their use of market solutions to manage the risks of violence. Conclusions follow.

I.

A first requirement for merchants sojourning in foreign ports was a safe place to spend the night. In the Middle Ages port towns around the Mediterranean set up separate residences for merchants to stay in, store their merchandise, and exchange money and goods with other traders.²⁰ The *fondaco* – or *funduq*, as it was called in the Islamic world – protected merchants while it allowed host towns to supervise transactions, tax trade, and (especially in the case of Christian traders in Muslim markets) segregate local and foreign communities. One of the best-known examples is the *Fondaco dei Tedeschi* in Venice, which between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries housed merchants from the Holy Roman Empire.²¹

Similar residences for foreign merchants existed in some parts of Northern Europe. In the late sixteenth century merchants from England and the Low Countries set up their own compound in the new port of Archangel and northern Russia.²² The German Hansa occupied fenced premises in Novgorod (Peterhof), Bergen (Die Brücke), and London (Steelyard) already since the fourteenth century.²³ And before that, in 1252, merchants from Lübeck had already asked the Countess of Flanders permission to establish a trading post with separate jurisdiction near Damme, just outside Bruges. But the Countess was weary of such an extraterritorial settlement and did not allow the construction of *Neudamme*.²⁴

The housing of visiting merchants in Bruges was a private business, with local authorities supervising at a distance.²⁵ Most alien traders rented rooms in local hostels

for the duration of their stay.²⁶ The hostellers also provided room to store and display merchandise.²⁷ The public warehouses and vendinghalls in the city remained the domain of local producers and retailers.²⁸ Very few merchants, Castilians and Genoese mostly, rented or bought houses in Bruges.²⁹ Between 1370 and 1420 German, Italian, and German merchants did put up *nation houses* in the town centre but these served administrative and representative purposes only.³⁰ Admittedly, in 1458 the town magistrate allowed the Hansa to build a prestigious residence for its members to meet, sleep, and store their merchandise.³¹ But this was a strategic decision, intended to secure the prolonged presence of the Germans. However, upon the completion of the splendid *Oosterlingenhuis* in 1481 the vast majority of Hanseatic traders had already taken up residence in Antwerp.³²

The Scheldt port did not build fenced premises for its foreign merchant communities either. Besides the nation houses given to German and Portuguese merchants, only the Company of Merchant Adventurers occupied extensive warehouses.³³ The alien traders that arrived from Bruges, after that city revolted against Maximilian of Austria in the 1480s used hostels to lodge and store their goods or rented housing.³⁴ Like in Bruges, the local authorities supervised the rental market. In fact as early as 1296, the town magistrate and the bailiff – the local representative of the duke of Brabant – had promised English merchants to secure reasonable rents that would not be raised during a visitor's stay.³⁵ In 1582 a more elaborate protection of tenants, applicable to all inhabitants, was laid down in the local customs.³⁶

In the mid-sixteenth century Antwerp suddenly stepped up its investment in the accommodation of foreign visitors. In 1550 the town gave Merchant Adventurers an extensive set of warehouses in the northern part of the town to store and sell their cloth.³⁷ In 1553 the magistrate reached an agreement with the aldermen of the Hansa

in Bruges about the removal of their Kontor to Antwerp, where it was to be housed in ****. At about the same time Amsterdam merchants started trading leather and hides in the *Groote Leghuyl*, a number of houses and warehouses situated around an interior court.³⁸ Finally, in 1564 the *Hessenhuis* was completed. This building – sometimes wrongly identified as the premises of the German Hansa – was a combined lading station and accommodation for the South-German operators of *Hessenwagen*.

The magistrate did not grant these premises for the foreigners' safety, however. The city obliged the Merchant Adventurers because they boosted employment for local cloth finishers, and because their previous hall was to become a vending location for the growing number of local jewelers.³⁹ Both the establishment of the Hanseatic Kontor and the new facilities for Dutch merchants were meant to counter Amsterdam's rapid rise as the principal market for Baltic products, after the Dutch port had gained unrestricted access to the Baltic in the Peace of Speyer (1544).⁴⁰ Finally, German transportation services lubricated the exchange of English textiles for a variety of high-value goods from Germany and Italy.⁴¹

The growing number of German and Flemish merchants trading grain, hides, timber, and herring in Amsterdam led to a marked increase in the number of hostels in the mid-sixteenth century.⁴² For the time being Amsterdam did not offer any premises to foreign merchants, however. This changed when the city's siding with the Dutch Revolt left extensive catholic properties vacant. In 1586 and again in 1598 the city proposed defunct convents to accommodate the Court of Merchant Adventurers.⁴³ However, because at the same time Amsterdam refused to bar interloping English textile merchants from the local market, the Courtmasters of the Merchant Adventurers declined on both occasions. In later years no more attempts were made to lure foreign traders with houses or warehouses.

In the seventeenth century Portuguese Jews, English interlopers, Flemish and German merchants all lived in private houses, bought or rented from private proprietors. Hostels had lost much of their attraction because most traders stayed in Amsterdam on a permanent basis. For storage they used either lofts in their own houses, rented space in one of the many hundred purpose-built warehouses, or bought their own warehouse.⁴⁴ The only communal spaces granted to immigrants were church buildings. By 1650 the city counted, besides Dutch protestant churches, two synagogues, two English churches, a church for Walloon immigrants, one for a small Armenian community, and one for Lutherans.

Besides a safe place to live, meet, and store their merchandise, alien traders also wanted protection against violence in the streets and in the market place. Initially it must have been difficult for local authorities to commit to this, for until the sixteenth century foreigners were allowed to carry arms inside the town walls.⁴⁵ As late as 1466 Castilian merchants got permission from Bruges' magistrate to close off the street that they, and other merchants and citizens, used for the display and storage of merchandise. This measure should prevent "indecent girls and other rabble from loitering about, as they have been doing for so long."⁴⁶ Only in 1491 the Flemish port forbade the carrying of all arms, concealed or open, except for knives with blades shorter than three palms.⁴⁷ In 1545 it was laid down in Antwerp's customs that all visitors had to lay down the weapons they were carrying upon their arrival in town.⁴⁸ In Amsterdam aliens were no longer allowed to carry arms since the first half of the sixteenth century.⁴⁹

Restrictions on the use of violence were set much earlier, however. In the twelfth century several Flemish towns barred weapons from the market place

already.⁵⁰ In Bruges a local police force supervised trade. From 1334 the *Scaerwettters* could be found in a guardhouse at the central market place. The next year the town paid a gratuity to the bailiff ‘and his company’ for supervising the fair day and night.⁵¹ Also the entry of the bourse - basically the intersection of two streets surrounded by foreign nation houses - was guarded by a warden. [*add data on comparable measures in Antwerp (M. Jacob) and Amsterdam*]

The monopoly of violence pursued by Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam also implied the persecution and punishment of criminals. Admittedly for a long time running in criminals remained the responsibility of baillifs named by the central ruler, but since the thirteenth century the cities’ aldermen punished the perpetrators.⁵² Only under exceptional circumstances – notably trespassing and self-defence – citizens and foreigners retained the right to use violence against criminals.⁵³ In all other cases, it was for the proper authorities to take action. Thus, when a German merchant was gruesomely hurt and mutilated in Bruges in 1413 or 1414, the attacker was arrested by the bailiff and his men and tried in the local court.⁵⁴ In 1577 the States of Holland required exemplary punishment of the men who had murdered an English merchant and thrown his body in the Meuse.⁵⁵ In criminal matters the same rules applied to locals and aliens, so that foreign merchants could also be persecuted for theft, maltreatment, or worse.⁵⁶ Indeed the privileges of many foreign nations explicitly stated that if a merchant was implicated in a crime, the local court would decide on his fate.⁵⁷

Still, one should be cautious to describe the ports of the Low Countries as absolutely secure for foreign merchants. In the early years of its commercial expansion Bruges itself violated the rights of alien traders. In 1280 the city refused to apply the toll and weighage tariffs agreed upon between the Count of Flanders and

German and Spanish traders. In 1307 German traders complained about the local monetary regime. On both occasions it took a temporary removal to neighboring Aardenburg, supported by the Count, to force the city to comply with the comital privileges.⁵⁸ But never again Bruges willingly went against the privileges of the foreign nations, and neither did the magistrates of Antwerp and Amsterdam.⁵⁹

The three ports had their share of food riots and popular revolts against the local political elite.⁶⁰ However, these violent outburst never seem to have harmed foreign merchants.⁶¹ In urban revolts only the property of a small number of token-victims was deliberately damaged.⁶² Towns were particularly keen on putting down food riots to prevent attacks on merchants. For example, when increases in excise duties on foodstuffs and the granting of a beer monopoly to a local businessman outraged Antwerp's population in 1554, the city quickly repealed the monopoly and made German soldiers restore order.⁶³ [*add reaction to grain speculation in Amsterdam in 1556*]

The privileges extended to foreign nations suggest misbehaving public officials must have been a bigger threat to the foreign merchant communities. The Hanseatic and Castilian privileges in the 1360s contained clauses about the disciplining of local carriers, pilots, weighers, crane operators, pawnbrokers, hostellers, brokers, and legal officers.⁶⁴ The Venetian nation was promised that an officer who wrongfully arrested one of its members, would be suspended and condemned to pay damages.⁶⁵ In an attempt to stop requests for individual letters of safeconducts in 1456, the Four Members asked Philip the Good to issue a warning to all his baillifs and other legal officers to observe the rights of foreign merchants.⁶⁶ In the sixteenth and seventeenth century Antwerp and Amsterdam published general rules for town clerks, legal officers, dockers, skippers, and many other workers, in order to protect the merchant

community at large.⁶⁷ Amsterdam even rented the bailiff's office from the sovereign lord to prevent corruption by this officer whose income depended on revenues from fines.⁶⁸

These measures would not be taken if cheating and corruption never occurred. In 1400 and 1401, for example, ducal officials in Sluis tried to exact too high payments from merchants from Holland and Denmark.⁶⁹ Thirty years later the Hansa complained that a jailer, again in Sluis, maltreated its members and tried to extort them.⁷⁰ In 1397, and again in 1430 and 1438, the Hansa even negotiated compensation from Bruges for damage local money changers and hostellers did to German merchants.⁷¹ Alternatively, at least from the mid-fifteenth century onwards, merchants could go to court. However, a review of all sentences of the Great Council of Malines between 1470 and 1550, and of the sentences of the Court of Holland involving Flemish and English merchants between 1580 and 1632, reveals very few protests of alien traders about their treatment by public officials.⁷² This suggests that Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam were able to control their officers, or at least repair damages in their local courts.⁷³

II.

Even though Bruges ignored the comital privileges of German and Spanish merchants twice in 1280 and in 1307, after that it consistently respected the property of foreign merchants – as did Antwerp and Amsterdam. From the fourteenth century onward all three ports were committed to policing the local market, persecuting criminals, and disciplining public officials to prevent corruption. Due to this creation of a local monopoly of violence alien merchants did not need fenced premises to protect their

person and goods. They bought or rented such accommodation instead. But even if the ports of the Low Countries curbed local crime and corruption, visiting traders still had to worry about violence on their way to them.⁷⁴

To protect themselves in the Low Countries foreign merchants carried arms and traveled in groups.⁷⁵ Besides, Bruges and Antwerp offered some protection outside their city walls through the prorogation of the freedom of the fairs. This implied that the towns threatened to arrest the subjects of the city, domain, or state in which theft, robbery, or arbitrary confiscations had occurred.⁷⁶ Since artisans and traders from around the Low Countries were regular visitors of the fairs of Brabant and Flanders many rulers felt the pressure of their local business communities to respect the property of traveling merchants. If necessary, the town magistrates sent letters or envoys to force lords or towns to refrain from confiscations or track down known criminals.⁷⁷

Yet the freedom of the fairs did not suffice to guarantee the safety of visitors.⁷⁸ At times the violent threat was so great that merchants did not dare to travel.⁷⁹ One way to protect them was for the ports to organize escorts. For example, in 1392 and 1404 Antwerp sent ships with armed men to Bruges to escort visitors to the Brabant fairs.⁸⁰ In 1400 Bruges paid 80% of the costs of a garrison of 100 soldiers and three ships in the harbour of Sluis to prevent raids on merchantmen by privateers from England and Zeeland. When the violence did not stop in 1402 more troops were sent, while Sluis' waterbailiff and his aides began to travel the coast to punish wrongdoers.⁸¹ But military escorts were a makeshift, too expensive to maintain on a permanent basis. Merchants in Bruges and Antwerp increasingly traded outside the fairs, however, and therefore required the year-round protection of their person and goods.

One obvious solution was for the rulers of Flanders, Brabant, and Holland to offer additional protection.⁸² This promise was made easily and eagerly. In 1243 – ten years earlier than in Flanders – merchants from Lübeck and Hamburg already received letters of safe-conduct from the Count of Holland, who hoped they would use Dutch inland waterways to reach Bruges.⁸³ A further stimulus for the rulers of Holland, Brabant, and Flanders was the promise of a similar protection of their own subjects by foreign rulers.⁸⁴ These expected benefits also explain why the Four Members of Flanders lobbied for foreign privileges.⁸⁵ Indeed, virtually every foreign merchant community in the Low Countries was guaranteed a free passage and safeguarding against arbitrary confiscations and arrests.⁸⁶ Particularly important was the ruler's cession of his right of wreck.⁸⁷ This implied that merchants were entitled to all the goods that washed ashore after a shipwreck on the coast of the Low Countries, provided they could prove their ownership. Local wreckers would only receive a monetary reward for the goods they salvaged.


In practice, the sovereign had great difficulty meeting these obligations.⁸⁸ The rulers of Flanders, Brabant, and Holland did appoint bailiffs in towns and countryside to persecute criminals but they lacked the resources to effectively police roads and rivers.⁸⁹ In the mid-fourteenth century German merchants deemed the security risks in Flanders big enough to claim the right to apprehend robbers themselves. After long deliberations the Count and the Four Members accepted, and the article was added to the privileges of 1360.⁹⁰ Unhappy with this breach of his monopoly of violence, the Duke of Burgundy tried to regain lost territory in the German privileges of 1392. He then authorised his officers “to seize the goods and merchandise of individual towns and castles offering protection to thieves or murderers”.⁹¹ Crucial for the successful application of this rule was the collaboration of the Flemish towns that promised to

compensate any damage done to the Germans. Indeed in 1405 Bruges promised to pay German merchants 730 pounds for English wool taken from them by pirates from Nieuwpoort in April of the previous year.⁹²

Besides crime, the safety of merchants traveling in the Low Countries was compromised several times by internal dissension. Urban revolts, pitching towns against the central government, were a recurrent threat from the thirteenth century onwards (Figure 2).⁹³ In 1279 and 1280 Spanish, German, and probably French merchants moved to Aerdenburg, following dissension between Bruges and Flanders. In 1356 Louis of Male confiscated German vessels to carry out an attack on Antwerp and submit the city to his rule.⁹⁴ Over the next half-century alien traders in Bruges were forbidden to visit the fairs of Brabant. Those who did travel to Antwerp or Bergen op Zoom were liable to fines.⁹⁵ In 1382 the Count ordered all foreigners to leave Bruges to try and break the revolt of Flemish towns.⁹⁶

In the fifteenth century urban revolts also disrupted trade. In 1452 alien merchants sent delegates to the Duke of Burgundy to ask for a six months' truce in his struggle with Ghent.⁹⁷ Particularly eventful was the death of Charles the Bold in 1477, and the ensuing regency of first Mary of Burgundy, and then her husband Maximilian of Habsburg in 1483. Bruges revolt against Maximilian I, led him to expel all foreign nations. First in 1484 and again in 1488 they had to take their businesses to Antwerp. Even if the consuls of most nations returned to Bruges afterwards, the bulk of the foreign merchants stayed behind in the Scheldt port.

Figure 1. Number of years per quarter century in which internal conflicts in the Low Countries damaged the property of one or more communities of foreign merchants in Bruges, Antwerp, or Amsterdam, 1250-1650.



Source: Appendix A

Internal strife was not limited to the southern part of the Netherlands. Since the late fourteenth century Holland and Friesland engaged in privateering on the Zuiderzee.⁹⁸ Frisian privateers were a threat to Amsterdam’s overseas beer imports from Hamburg, while the city’s inland trade with Germany was disturbed by armed conflicts with Deventer, Dodrecht, and Guelders on several occasions.⁹⁹ The danger subsided in the 1520s when imperial troops, assisted by a Dutch warfleet, brought Utrecht and Overijssel under Habsburg rule.¹⁰⁰ The one remaining internal threat was the fight the duke of Guelders put up against Charles V. Only months before his final submission in 1543, imminent looting by Guelders’ troops led Antwerp to fortify its city walls “for the security of the alien merchants [and] to retain their trade”.¹⁰¹

While unification ended interior warfare, Charles V’s attempts to root out protestantism posed a new threat to foreign merchant communities. On April 29, 1550, the Emperor issued his Eternal Edict that required all immigrants in the Low Countries to submit a certificate of orthodoxy signed by their parish priest.¹⁰² Alien traders threatened to leave Antwerp if this would happen. The town magistrate, that had already opposed a ban on the immigration of New Christians issued in 1548, was

quick to respond to the worries of the foreign merchants.¹⁰³ The burgomasters and aldermen rallied the support of other towns and the Council of Brabant, they wrote to, and visited Mary of Hungary, and managed to convince her to ask her brother to change his ordinance. In September 1550 Charles V expressly stated it was not his intention “to hinder in any way the course of trade and contracts between alien merchants and our subjects, nor to prevent them from disposing of their goods the way the rights and customs of the city specify”.¹⁰⁴ He issued a new ordinance that no longer required alien merchants to prove their orthodoxy, but merely expected them not to give offence.¹⁰⁵

While security risks in the Low Countries declined during the reign of Charles V, the violent threat rose again under Philip II. In 1568 economic crisis, increased taxation, and religious dissent led to what later became known as the Dutch Revolt. The foreign nations in Antwerp suffered a series of blows. Between 1568 and 1576 privateers from England and Zeeland threatened merchantmen at the mouth of the river Scheldt.¹⁰⁶ In 1574 an emergency loan from local and foreign merchants could still prevent ransacking by unpaid Spanish troops, but two years later nothing could stop the *Spanish Fury* that left many houses burned and merchants robbed.¹⁰⁷ After 1579 Spanish military operations frustrated trade with Antwerp’s immediate hinterland. Meanwhile, the rebel forces did not shy away from attacks on the ships and merchandise of foreigners either.¹⁰⁸ By the time a *French Fury* hit the city in 1583 most foreigners had already left. The siege laid on Antwerp in the Spring of 1584, and the city’s surrender in August 1585, sealed the fate of what had been Europe’s leading port for almost a century.

Most foreign merchants left Antwerp. They returned either home or moved to German towns like Hamburg, Emden, Cologne, or Frankfurt. Initially Amsterdam was

not an option because the city had chosen to support Philip II in 1572. This led to a blockade of the river Y by rebel forces, which even forced Dutch and German merchants to leave town. When Amsterdam changed sides in 1578 the military situation was still insecure. Spanish troops made rapid advances in Flanders and Brabant, and after the Fall of Antwerp in 1585 they moved to occupy the Habsburg provinces on the German frontier. Attempts to occupy Holland failed, however, and by 1590 Amsterdam was already deemed safe enough by some 200 merchants from the Southern Netherlands.¹⁰⁹ Since 1586 English and German merchants talked with the city council about their settlement. In 1595 the first Portuguese Jews settled in Amsterdam.

The Spanish retreat from the eastern provinces in the early 1590s ended the direct military threat to the coastal provinces. Traveling east and south remained hazardous, however.¹¹⁰ Besides pressuring local and foreign authorities to secure rivers and roads¹¹¹, the central government deployed naval craft and cavalry to escort merchants on the way to Germany and the Spanish ruled territories.¹¹² The deployment of these troops mirrors the leverage the ports of Holland had in the decisions on the country's military operations.¹¹³ In 1605, for example, merchants from Amsterdam and other Dutch cities trading with Frankfurt, Nuremberg, Augsburg, and Cologne asked and received additional protection. During a trial period of eight to ten weeks the States General promised "six horsemen to escort, two by two, the wagons of the petitioners".¹¹⁴

To be sure, the state's military efforts on the rivers and roads to Germany and the Spanish Netherlands did not just serve commercial purposes. The States General also put surveillance on rivers and roads to control military supplies to the enemy. In 1625 it was even decided to block all traffic on the rivers to Germany. The river

blockade lasted until 1630 but it mostly applied to foodstuffs and military supplies, and it was seldom enforced throughout the year.¹¹⁵ The blockade may have harmed some merchants in Amsterdam but it also created new opportunities, especially for Germans traders who now shipped supplies from Holland, via Bremen and Hamburg, to the south of Germany.¹¹⁶

III.

The town magistrates of Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam could not stop crime outside the city walls. The freedom of the fairs of Flanders and Brabant stimulated rulers around the country to crack down on robbers and thieves but foreign merchants nevertheless clung to their arms while traveling. Crime was not the biggest threat to alien traders in the Low Countries either. Revolts of towns and provinces against the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers caused far greater disruptions, and probably worse were the wars fought by the rulers of the Low Countries. This section takes up the latter issue and explores the efforts made by foreign merchants, their home governments, and the rulers of the Netherlands to prevent war damage.

Between 1250 and 1650 armed conflicts between England, France, Spain, and many other European countries were rife. Land routes were made unsafe by military campaigns and pillaging troops, while overseas trade was threatened by naval warfare, in particular privateering raids.¹¹⁷ The involvement of the rulers of the Low Countries in many of these wars created additional safety risks for foreign merchants in Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam. The danger of confiscation and naval attacks was biggest for merchants whose governments fought with the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers – and after 1580, the Dutch Republic – but even neutral traders were not safe from privateering.¹¹⁸


To reduce risks on the land routes to Germany, France, and Italy merchants often traveled in groups, with or without armed escorts.¹¹⁹ To counter violence at sea merchants from Italy, Catalunya, Castile, France, and the Baltic area sailed in convoy to the Netherlands.¹²⁰ From the thirteenth century onward these convoys were sometimes organized by the home government.¹²¹ Venice is the most notable example for it built its own galleys, equipped them, determined the routes to take, and then sold cargo space to individual merchants.¹²² In Genoa the authorities did not own any ships but they did appoint an admiral to supervise the galleys' and carracks' operations at sea. In the fifteenth century Florentine merchants used communal fleets modeled on the Venetian example, although they also shipped merchandise in private galleys to Flanders and England.¹²³ The Spanish wool fleets were financed and organized by the *Consulados* of Bilbao and Burgos, and their representatives in Bruges had the legal powers to discipline the shipmasters and their crew.¹²⁴

The importance of coordination by the home government is very clear from the attempts of the Hansa to fight the *Vitalienbrüder* in the late fourteenth century.¹²⁵ These privateers, first recruited by the duke of Mecklenburg to fight the king of Denmark in 1376, posed a major threat to fishing and shipping in the Baltic up until 1398. A first attempt to equip *Friedeschiffe* failed in 1379 but in following years warships paid for by the Hansa towns did escort convoys of merchantmen on various occasions.¹²⁶ Yet a plan to put a stop to the menace with a warfleet of 40 ships fell apart in 1394, because the Prussian quarter – with Amsterdam in its wake – refused to contribute its share.¹²⁷ Only in 1398, after a truce had been negotiated between the warring parties, the Hansa, once again united, chased the *Vitalienbrüder* off Gotland, robbing them of an operational basis and an outlet for their bounty. Still it took two

more naval expeditions, and another four years, to apprehend the remaining pirates on the North Sea.¹²⁸

The operations of the *Vitalienbrüder* marked the beginning of a secular rise in privateering in the North Sea. From about 1380 onwards, warfare between France and England, Hanseatic exploits to further its commercial interests, and especially the involvement of the Burgundian dukes in international politics compromised the safety of merchantmen sailing to and from the Low Countries. In a world without standing navies privateering was the principal means to wage war – and a most destructive one at that.¹²⁹ Figure 2 shows that between 1375 and 1500 privateers from various countries, including the Burgundian Netherlands, almost every other year captured one or more ships from alien traders in Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam.¹³⁰ Single ships were obviously most vulnerable but even convoys were at risk. For example, in 1449 an English fleet captured more than 100 Dutch and Hanseatic merchantmen off the coast of France.¹³¹

Figure 2. Number of years per quarter century in which privateers damaged the property of one or more communities of foreign merchants in Bruges, Antwerp, or Amsterdam, 1250-1650.



Source: Appendix A

To stop reprisals back and forth alien merchants in Bruges relied on diplomatic efforts of their home rulers and the intervention of the towns of Flanders. As early as 1285 the English king and the Count of Holland reached an agreement to stop privateering and settle previous damages – a deal sealed by a marriage between their respective daughter and son.¹³² Between 1400 and 1415 England and Burgundy were engaged in almost continuous talks to stop mutual attacks. Repeated Flemish boycotts of English cloth imports after 1425 also led to intensive diplomatic exchange, and agreement to stop the hostilities.¹³³

Diplomatic exchange also curbed violence against Iberian merchants. A Castilian attack on German and Flemish ships in 1417 left Castilian ships exposed to Flemish privateers in subsequent years.¹³⁴ To stop these reprisals the Castilian king wanted the merchants to withdraw from Bruges but this was obviously not in their interest. Instead, after intensive talks in Spain and Flanders, they settled for a 5% levy on all sales of merchandise from Galicia, Asturia, Old Castile, and Biscay.¹³⁵ The Four Members of Flanders were to use the revenues to pay the costs of their diplomatic efforts, and award damages to individual victims of the corsairs.¹³⁶ In the 1440s Aragonese merchants accepted a similar scheme to compensate for the seizure of Flemish ships in the Mediterranean in 1436 and 1440.¹³⁷ The obvious attraction of these financial solutions was the equal distribution of the burden over all traders, and the possibility to shift at least part of it to their customers. Yet, once the Spaniards thought they had paid enough, they pushed for cancellation. In 1428 the Castilian levy was abolished after their king ordered his subjects to leave Flanders.¹³⁸ Protests by Bruges and merchants from Catalunya, Aragon, Venice, Genoa, Florence, Pisa, and Milan led to withdrawal of the Aragonese levy in January 1450.¹³⁹

The towns of the Low Countries were particularly keen on the stoppage of warfare. When in 1336 Louis of Nevers' support of France led the English king to forbid wool export to Flanders, the Count in turn seized English goods in Bruges. To prevent any further damage to trade and manufacturing the towns of Flanders pushed for a neutral course and forced Louis of Nevers to leave the county.¹⁴⁰ His successor, Louis of Male, stayed out of international trouble for most of his reign. In the first half of the fifteenth century the position of the Flemish towns was at least as strong.¹⁴¹ The Four Members of Flanders maintained strong diplomatic ties with England, Castile, and the German Hansa – the countries whose merchants suffered most from privateering between 1375 and 1450.¹⁴² Talks with the Hansa about the cessation of hostilities, or compensation for them, always involved the States of Flanders.¹⁴³ It was Bruges in 1400 that initiated the talks that led to a truce between England and Burgundy.¹⁴⁴

The Burgundian rulers were willing to exercise restraint because the departure of merchants would reduce taxable commercial traffic, and jeopardize the financial support from the Four Members.¹⁴⁵ Besides indulgence in diplomatic exchange, two measures stand out. First, the rulers committed to the safe departure of enemy subjects in case of war. Already in 1307 German merchants had been promised 40 days to leave with all their belongings in case a conflict arose between Flanders and the Holy Roman Emperor or any of the *Reichsfürsten*.¹⁴⁶ In addition Louis of Male (r. 1346-1384) committed to a safe departure of English and Castilian merchants in case of violent threats.¹⁴⁷ Philip the Bold and his successors confirmed these privileges and created a similar possibility for merchants from Aragon, Portugal, Genoa, and Venice.¹⁴⁸ Second, to protect neutral traders, from the early fifteenth century onwards,

they issued letters of marque that required privateers to limit their attacks to enemy ships.¹⁴⁹ In the words of the Great Privilege of 1477: “it is prohibited to stop merchantmen on the pretext of letters of marque, countermarque, seizure, or reprisal, except the accused, and in no way the innocent and guiltless”.¹⁵⁰

The restraint on privateers and the exit option for enemy subjects were not cast in iron, however. The Burgundian government was unable to monopolize the commissioning of privateers in the fifteenth century. Individual towns and provinces continued to issue their own letters of marque.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, for strategic reasons, the Burgundians confiscated foreign property on various occasions.¹⁵² Between 1390 and 1450 English¹⁵³, Scottish¹⁵⁴, German¹⁵⁵, and Aragonese¹⁵⁶ goods were attached to counter privateering raids. Merchants from Genoa were arrested in 1409, and again in 1476, after Genoese attacks on the Burgundian military.¹⁵⁷ Release followed quickly in most cases, however, either because the merchants for their part threatened to leave Bruges, or because the Flemish towns demanded it.¹⁵⁸

In the first half of the sixteenth century safety on the sea routes to the Low Countries increased considerably (Figure 2). It is true Charles V engaged in prolonged warfare with the House of Valois, but the battles were mostly fought in southern Europe. Besides, the Emperor was able to monopolize the issue of letters of marque.¹⁵⁹ The internal balance of power within the Low Countries contributed to the restraint of the central government. Antwerp, for example, had sufficient financial leverage to keep Charles V from executing threats to confiscate French property.¹⁶⁰ In 1545 the ruler’s restraint was even formalized in the city’s local customs which specified that when war broke out with a foreign ruler, the merchants from the latter’s realm would be free to continue their trade unless the sovereign forbade it. In that case

foreign merchants would be given three months to leave the city taking all their belongings with them.¹⁶¹

Only once economic considerations could not keep the Habsburg rulers from confiscation. In 1467 Philip II seized the goods of the Merchant Adventurers in Antwerp, following the English capture of a Genoese fleet. Not surprisingly the merchant chose to leave the city. However, the Genoese ships had been carrying Spanish silver worth 4 million guilders (!). During the civil war that followed the property of foreign merchants was never seized, and after the Duke of Parma took Antwerp in 1585, merchants who wanted to leave were given four years to liquidate their affairs and go. In Amsterdam war related confiscations of merchant property have not been recorded either. Admittedly, few Spanish merchants dared to come to the Dutch Republic, but the Thirty Years War or the Anglo-Dutch wars, did not lead to infractions upon German or English property either.¹⁶²

Besides the exercise of restraint the central government attempted to provide naval protection to ships sailing to and from the Low Countries. In the fourteenth century, the Count of Flanders failed to make Flemish shipmasters sail in convoy to France.¹⁶³ Then, in 1440, the towns of Holland managed to equip a fleet of 40 merchantmen-turned-warships to break through the Hanseatic blockade of the Sound and secure their trading interests in the Baltic area.¹⁶⁴ The Dutch ability to raise money to counter violent threats to its merchant marine was proven time and again in later years. In April 1478, for example, Amsterdam levied a *pontgeld* to pay for the protection of merchants and fishermen against the French king.¹⁶⁵ In 1505 Amsterdam levied a *lastgeld* for similar purposes.¹⁶⁶ Not surprisingly, Holland defied the Ordinance of the Admiralty of 1488, that put the protection of merchantmen in all coastal provinces in

the hands of a state-appointed admiral. Unless violence loomed large, Holland did not want to force individual traders to arm their ships or sail in admiralty.¹⁶⁷

It was not before 1550 that Charles V's Maritime Ordinance ordered all merchants from the Low Countries carrying high value commodities to arm their ships.¹⁶⁸ In addition westbound ships had to sail in convoys escorted by navy vessels. Initially foreign merchants were exempted from the former obligation, but a revised ordinance issued in 1551 required their compliance as well.¹⁶⁹ At first sight, this would seem an important step towards naval protection of visiting merchants organized. However, alien traders were not interested, and a first attempt to equip a convoy failed in 1551. Notably the Castilian nation was content with the way it organized its wool fleets, including the use of maritime insurance to cover risks. Besides, animosity between merchants from Burgos still residing in Bruges and other Spanish traders in Antwerp, prevented adequate registration of their trade and thus thwarted Charles V's plan to tax commercial transactions to pay for the fleet. Other foreigners and locals also objected to this funding strategy, and preferred to continue business as before.¹⁷⁰

The Emperor persevered, however, and in 1552 and 1553 imperial convoys did sail to the Iberian Peninsula.¹⁷¹ Crucial for the equipment of these fleets was the support of Antwerp's town magistrate that decided to advance two thirds of the total cost of the convoys. The local authorities did so because they feared a shortage of Spanish silver that would jeopardize the repayment of Habsburg loans to Antwerp financiers, and upset trade in general. The silver crisis, in conjunction with French naval operations on the searoute to Spain, led Antwerp merchants to go along and accept a 2% tax on trade to pay for their escort. To win over the Castilians Charles V allowed two of them to oversee fleet preparations. It proved a Pyrrhic victory. The

return of the first convoy was delayed by bad weather, angry crowds in the port of Cadiz, and Portuguese and Castilian authorities unwilling to load their spices, silver, and wool in the ships. Despite the high costs incurred, a second convoy sailed in 1553 but this time expedition was haunted by confiscation of some ships and the early return of others, due to arrears in sailors' pay. After these two failures the central government stopped organizing convoys. It did contribute two warships to a squadron of eight that escorted two grainfleets in 1557. However, the States of Holland paid the other six vessels.¹⁷² Instead of organizing convoys, in a new edict in 1563 Philip II merely set rules for the armament, accompaniment, admiralty, and insurance of merchantmen.¹⁷³

The Dutch Republic proved far more successful in the creation of a standing navy. From the 1580s the United Provinces had a fleet of several dozens of warships at its disposal, which could be used for offensive and defensive warfare, as well as the protection of the merchantmen and the fishing fleet.¹⁷⁴ Customs revenues, payable by local and foreign merchants, were earmarked to cover the expenses. Even Amsterdam agreed to this principle when it negotiated its defection to William of Orange in 1577. Initially the parties had agreed to "free and unhampered exercise of navigation and trade", as had always been the case. William of Orange changed his mind, however, and forced the city to accept import- and export duties payable by all merchants. He guaranteed that *convooien en licenten* would only be used to pay for the protection of the merchant navy.¹⁷⁵ This would be the guiding principle for the protection of trade in the Low Countries – not even foreigners were allowed exemptions from customs duties.¹⁷⁶

In the Dutch Republic the central government decided on all naval affairs but their resolutions followed the advice of five local Admiralties, responsible for the

building, repairing, manning, and deploying of warships. Written reports of the admiralties allowed the States General to closely monitor the naval operations of rival states and the operations of pirates around Europe. Based on the perceived threats to Dutch merchantmen the government dispatched a varying numbers of navy vessels to Russia, the coasts of Germany, the North Sea fishing grounds, the Channel, the Atlantic coasts of Europe and Africa, the Strait of Gibraltar, and eventually also the Mediterranean.¹⁷⁷ In 1618 the United Provinces even managed to equip a joint fleet with England, France and Venice to fight the Barbarian pirates.¹⁷⁸ In later years the States General delegated the authority to arm ships and organize fleets to three *Directies* in Amsterdam – elected bodies of merchants that coordinated protection in the Mediterranean (1625), the Baltic (1697?), and Russia (17??).

Yet one should be careful to acclaim Dutch naval power too highly. For one thing, sailing in admiralty – together, but without navy escorts – remained a very important strategy to reduce the risk of attacks.¹⁷⁹ For another, Dutch privateering was a menace to many. Between 1568 and 1576 alien traders in Bruges and Antwerp suffered from repeated attacks by Sea Beggars. Shorter surges of privateering followed in 1586 and 1587, and between 1604 and 1606.¹⁸⁰ After the resumption of the Eighty Years War in 1621 attacks on Spanish and Portuguese merchantmen by both the navy and privateers continued unabatedly until 1648.¹⁸¹ Besides, there was the reaction of the Spanish warfleet and manifold attacks from corsairs from Dunkirque and Barbary. Alien merchants were as vulnerable as Dutch merchants because they mostly used ships from the United Provinces to carry their goods.¹⁸²


The States General did try to prevent privateering against alien traders. While the struggle for independence was still underway the rebel provinces already formally committed to the safety of Portuguese (1577), Spanish (1578), English (1586), and

French (1596) merchants.¹⁸³ The government put out warnings about known threats, and prohibited sailing in certain areas or time periods.¹⁸⁴ Also diplomacy was used to secure the friendship, or at least the neutrality, of other states.¹⁸⁵ To discipline Dutch privateers William of Orange adopted rules similar to those issued by Charles V and Philip II.¹⁸⁶ In 1606 international protests led the States General to clamp down on corsairs even further.¹⁸⁷ To render repairs of wrongful attacks easier, a deposit of no less than 20,000 guilders was required to obtain a letter of marque.¹⁸⁸ From 1625 onwards Dutch privateers were offered pecuniary rewards for the capture of ships from Dunkirque and Spain. And yet the most eloquent expression of the integrity of neutral traders – that of Hugo Grotius' *Freedom of the Seas* (1609) – was used by the States General to justify naval attacks on Spain and Portugal in the Indian Ocean.¹⁸⁹

IV.

Despite security measures taken by alien merchants, their home governments, and the authorities of the Low Countries, foreign traders did suffer from violence on many occasions. Due to the incomplete historical record it is impossible to estimate the damage done to traders between 1250 and 1650, but we can calculate the number of years in which alien merchants trading with the Low Countries were confronted with local crime and corruption, social unrest and civil war, confiscations, piracy and privateering, or other violence directed against their trade (Figure 1). If this incidence of violence is any measure to go by, the years between 1375 and 1500, and the years between 1575 and 1650 posed the greatest threat to foreign merchant communities.¹⁹⁰ This high incidence of violence put a premium on devices to secure compensation for damage done.

Figure 3. Number of years per quarter century in which one or more communities of foreign merchants in Bruges, Antwerp, or Amsterdam were confronted with infringements on their property, 1250-1650.



Source: Appendix A.

One possibility for merchants to obtain compensation for acts of violence was to repossess the property of any member of the community held responsible for the assaults.^{191 192} The problem with such reprisals, however, was that it hit traders who had not caused the initial damage. In 1488 the Amsterdam magistrate took hostage several Englishmen in response to a request by local merchants whose ships and goods had been seized by English warships near Calais.¹⁹³ In 1510 the Habsburg rulers allowed Dutch merchants to capture whatever Wendish ship they could to compensate for damage done by a Lübeck warfleet.¹⁹⁴ Protection against such reprisals was provided the privileges granted to foreign merchants and in the freedom of the fairs of Flanders and Brabant.¹⁹⁵ From the mid-fifteenth century onwards the foreign nations could go to court to enforce these special rights in case their property was attached for damages done by their fellow countrymen.¹⁹⁶

The collective organization of merchants offered another means to get compensation for damages, and that was through collective action. If host rulers highly valued the presence of foreign merchants their threat to boycott trade or leave

could secure the payment of damages. Notably the German Hansa relied on this strategy between 1250 and 1500, though it did not always come to a collective departure (Appendix B). Sometimes Bruges gave in fairly quickly, especially when it involved compensation for the misbehaviour of local officials. If Bruges did not feel responsible for German grievances talks could be inconclusive.¹⁹⁷ Given the high cost of a collective departure – e.g. the physical removal of merchants and their goods, the administrative burden, the income lost for not being in the most favorable location – also prevented too rash decisions on the German side.¹⁹⁸ When damages were relatively small, as with the English capture of a German ship in 1351, the German merchants let go themselves.¹⁹⁹

Table 1. Pecuniary compensation paid to German merchants in Bruges (1358-1498)

Date	Motivation	Pound Flemish
1360	Various complaints	4,111
1392	Confiscation of German goods	11,100
1397	Damage done in local hostel	107
1405	Attack by pirates from Nieuwpoort	703
1430	Damage done by local moneychanger	267
1431-2	Attack by pirates from Scotland	2,151
1438	Murder of Germans in Sluis (a)	8,000
1438	Attack of two German hostellers	108
1457	Various complaints	2,000
1498	Piracy & damages to Florentine merchant	18,000

Source: Appendix B; (a) money was never paid

When German merchants did leave collectively, financial compensation was not the only purpose. The removal to Aardenburg in 1280 and 1307 concerned Bruges' refusal to apply comital privileges. The *Claghe der Oosterlingen* submitted in 1358 counted nine pages with complaints about English and Spanish privateers, but also about local tolls and weighage facilities.²⁰⁰ The subsequent removal to Dordrecht led to 4,100 pounds in damages, and new privileges. The second removal to Dordrecht (1388-1392) was primarily about earlier arrests and privateering, and the Hanse

received a record amount of 11,000 pounds, and a public penance by Bruges' citizens.²⁰¹ In the fifteenth century collective boycotts yielded considerably less. In 1438 damages of 8,000 pounds for the murder of 80 Germans in Sluis were promised but never paid.²⁰² In 1457 and 1498 damages amounted to 2,000 pounds only.

The German success at securing compensation through collective action was never matched by other foreign nations. English, Castilian, Genoese, Venetian, and Scottish merchants in Bruges were confronted with violence, and they did leave the city on several occasions, but this collective action rarely led to the payment of damages.²⁰³ In fact, Castilian and Aragonese merchants were made to pay for damages inflicted by their home governments in the 1420s and 1440s (cf. supra). In 1462 Genoese merchants also paid 1,435 pounds to the captain of a Burgundian warship that had been captured by Genoa in 1445 (!).²⁰⁴ On other occasions mutual claims were simply cancelled out. In 1414 a treaty signed between Burgundy and then still independent Holland and Zeeland stipulated that damages before October 24th, 1412, were considered not to have been inflicted, that damages since then had to be compensated within the next year, and that only future damage would be severely punished.²⁰⁵

It is tempting to argue that the German success hinged on the ability of the Hansa, and Lübeck in particular, to coordinate collective action, especially after the formal recognition of the *Kontor* in 1356.²⁰⁶ Once German merchants in Bruges had informed its home rulers about their complaints, the *Hansetag* decided what action to take, and left it to special envoys to lead negotiations with the host rulers. Once an agreement about damages was reached it was left to the alderman of the *Kontor* to distribute the money between individual traders in Bruges.²⁰⁷ To be sure, the leading role of outside officials does not necessarily imply a conflict of interest within the

Hansa. The delegates to the *Hansetage* in Lübeck sometimes had considerable commercial interests in Flanders in the fourteenth century.²⁰⁸

However, a strong internal organization only goes so far in explaining the success of collective action. For other foreign nations were also able to discipline their members, and they did leave collectively as well. A better explanation for the success of German merchants in obtaining compensation lies in their role as principal suppliers of Baltic grain, and their access to an extensive market for Flemish and English textiles, and other luxury products from the rest of Europe. Imminent grain shortage in 1360, for example, led Bruges to comply with demands for new privileges and hefty compensation.²⁰⁹ The Germans were all too aware of this comparative advantage. In 1436 they threatened to stop grain imports to get permission to move to Antwerp, and in 1438 they promised Prussian grain to facilitate their return.²¹⁰ In 1457 the Spanish, Catalan, Florentine, Genoese and Lucchese merchants asked Bruges to secure the return of the German Hansa – presumably to secure their sales.²¹¹

The exceptional bargaining power of the Hansa is also apparent from their outright refusal in 1496 to follow an order by the Great Council to pay damages to the owners of a Florentine galley captured by a German privateer in 1473 (sic!). The predicament Bruges was in after most foreign merchants had moved to Antwerp created extraordinary leverage for the *Kontor*. In exchange for their promise to return to the Flemish port the aldermen forced Bruges to pay no less than 16,000 pounds to the Florentines.²¹² Indeed, the one time the Castilian nation was rewarded a 2,000 pounds indemnification was in 1498 when Bruges tried to win back its wool trade, so crucial to the Flemish weavers. In the sixteenth century, when merchants from the Low Countries increasingly controlled Baltic imports and exports, the Hansa lost its

comparative advantage, and consequently failed to negotiate any more compensation.²¹³

Instead of acting collectively merchants damaged by privateers could also go to court to claim damages. In Flanders already in the thirteenth century the *scabini Flandriae* – a jury constituted by the aldermen from the five major cities – ruled in cases of damages inflicted on merchants and shipmasters.²¹⁴ As early as 1303 the Count of Flanders and these five towns named auditors to establish the damage done to foreign merchants.²¹⁵ Little is known about litigation before the establishment of the Great Council of Malines in the middle of the fifteenth century but scattered references suggest that already before merchants and shipmasters from Denmark²¹⁶, Danzig²¹⁷, Britany²¹⁸, England, and Italy²¹⁹ could go to court to claim damages.

From 1488 onwards all prizes taken by Burgundian privateers had to be brought before the court of the Admiralty to establish their lawfulness. From then on the Admiralty Court in Veere, and its subsidiary in Dunkirque, acted as court of first instance for neutral traders suffering from privateering in Zeeland and Flanders.²²⁰ Following legal procedures similar to that of the Great Council, the justices of the admiralty inspected the shipping documents, testimonies of both parties, and any letters of marque or countermark, to establish the righteousness of the capture.²²¹ In case of disagreement appealed to the Great Council remained possible, though the number of cases dealt with by the central court (21 between 1470 and 1550) suggests this was seldom necessary.²²² The possibilities to litigate were only slightly different in Holland, where the provincial court dealt with privateering cases in first instance.

²²³ However, soon after the Dutch Republic gained its independence, the admiralty

courts adjudicated all prize cases – with the High Council of Holland and Zeeland acting as court of appeal.²²⁴

The legal solution only went so far, however. For one thing court proceedings were time consuming. Thus, “pour éviter longueur de process et despens, et entre tenir paix et amour entre eux”, the Great Council in 1467 asked Bruges to arbitrate in a conflict between the aldermen of the *Kontor* and the officers of Spanish warships who had taken an English ship with cloth that partly belonged to German merchants.²²⁵ To speed up matters the authorities in the Dutch Republic occasionally allowed the immediate treatment of a case by the High Court – a favour that could be extended to local merchants and foreigners alike.²²⁶ At least once the States General officially asked the High Court to speed up proceedings in a case involving London merchants.²²⁷

Furthermore, there was not always a counterparty to sue in case of privateering.²²⁸ Several cases brought before the courts in fact followed a chance spotting in the Low Countries of ships and merchandise of aggressors by the damaged party some time after the initial incident.²²⁹ If a ship and cargo were taken abroad compensation was even more complicated, and often depended on diplomatic intervention. From the 1570s onwards the States General, often at the instigation of local or provincial authorities, wrote letters of recommendations to ask the rulers of Sweden, Denmark, the German order, England, the Spanish Netherlands, France, Spain, Algeria, Tuscany, and Venice to return ships and merchandise, to free prisoners, or to compensate damages.²³⁰ Dutch merchants obviously benefited most from these interventions, but Portuguese, German, and Flemish traders also relied on it.²³¹ In return for their support, the States General showed a consistent willingness to satisfy requests of foreign rulers.²³²

V.

Despite the combined attempts of merchants and rulers to prevent violence, the person and goods of alien traders in the Low Countries were damaged on many occasions. Between 1350 and 1500 the Hansa was able to force Bruges and the Four Members to compensate losses. However, German boycotts lost their efficacy when Dutch merchants took over control of the Baltic trade in the sixteenth century. Other foreign nations were even less successful in obtaining compensation because their home governments were often engaged in privateering themselves. Individual merchants, neutral traders in particular, could also start legal proceedings to claim compensation but this took a lot of time and critically depended on the presence of a counterparty.

To save the hassle of diplomacy or time-consuming court proceedings, yet not to be left empty handed, foreign merchants could also rely on the market to compensate for damages.²³³ Basically there were three market-based solutions. First, merchants could specify compensation for damages beforehand in the contracts they wrote with other merchants, shipmasters, or carters. For example, in their freight contracts, French merchants exporting wine to the Low Countries, anticipated attacks by English or Spanish privateers.²³⁴ Second, traders could spread risks by sending their cargo in different vessels or wagons, or by engaging in different kinds of trade simultaneously. Third, maritime insurance offered the possibility to shift the financial burden of violence to a third party.

Every merchant was familiar with the principle of putting eggs in more than one basket. In the late thirteenth century already fifteen German merchants contracted with a Dutch shipmaster to export wool from Boston, England – a transaction

brokered by two merchants from Lucca.²³⁵ Hamburg beer exporters to Amsterdam in the second half of the fourteenth century typically shared cargo space (250 tons per ship, on average) with between 5 and 20 other merchants.²³⁶ The obvious advantage of sharing the freight of individual ships was that it limited the damage caused by pirates or natural disaster. Thus, when a wool fleet of three or more ships chartered by Italian merchants, was captured by English pirates in 1457 the damages were divided over all participants according to their share in the total cargo.²³⁷ In 1482 the pirate attack of a Hanseatic ship sailing from Hamburg to Zeeland showed 9 merchants sharing the cargo.²³⁸

Merchants involved in overland trade between the Low Countries, Germany, and Italy also reduced risks by dividing up their cargoes.²³⁹ In Antwerp the merchandise was left in the hands of specialized transporters, who carried the goods in single axle carts to Cologne, or in wide-gauged wagons with a loading capacity of two tons or more, to destinations further afield. Some of these transporters may even have run a regular service between major commercial towns.²⁴⁰ Just like shipmasters, the transporters could not be held liable for criminal assaults or other damages, unless merchants could prove their negligence.²⁴¹

A further means for merchants to compensate losses was to diversify their trade, and balance high-risk ventures with lower risks ones. At first, this may seem an unlikely solution, for operating on different markets required merchants to gather more information, and hence increased costs.²⁴² However, the growth of permanent markets brought alternative investment options closer, and more sophisticated organizational forms allowed merchants to enter new markets at relatively low cost. The Italian *societa*, the Dutch *partenrederij*, and joint-stock companies are but a few examples of contracts that gave merchants the opportunity to participate with small

sums of money in several commercial ventures at a time.²⁴³ Many of the more sophisticated debt and equity contracts originated in the Mediterranean world but German, English, French, Flemish, and Dutch merchants operating in northwestern Europe were quick to take advantage of them.

Often practiced in Dutch trade with Bordeaux and La Rochelle was the *prêt aux aventures*, known as *bodemerij* in Holland, and more generally referred to as the *sea loan*.²⁴⁴ Although the exact specifications differed between individual contracts, the principle idea was that a shipmaster or merchant received a loan, to be repaid only upon the safe arrival of the ship and/or its cargo. The additional advantage was that the sea loan doubled as a means to transfer bullion between markets with a skewed balance of payments – as was often the case between the Atlantic ports of France and the coastal provinces of the Netherlands. German merchants trading in the Low Countries shared in the ownership of Dutch ships, witness an Amsterdam rule that forbade them to do so. In 1511 the confiscation of a German ship in Zierikzee, in Zeeland, shows that one half of the vessel was owned by seven merchants and their companies.²⁴⁵

Yet diversification did not always suffice to reduce risks. Cargoes might simply be too valuable, or destined for markets where potential losses due to warfare or piracy were too high. Besides, shipping goods in vessels that also contained the merchandise of others exposed a trader to increased privateering risks.²⁴⁶ One such incident occurred in the 1480s when a privateer, probably from the Netherlands, seized an English ship carrying goods for English and Florentine merchants. When the case was brought before the Great Council, the foreign merchants were denied their claims for the capture was in accordance with letters of marque against England.

Merchants who did not want to revert to excessive armament to counter these risks, could choose to insure their cargo.²⁴⁷

Maritime insurance originated in Genoa where the first policies were written in the fourteenth century. By 1450 the insurance of both freight and cargo had become common practice for merchants in all the leading commercial centers of the Mediterranean.²⁴⁸ The first evidence for maritime insurance in the Low Countries dates from Bruges where an insurance policy, signed in Seville in 1445, was found.²⁴⁹ In 1458 the insurance market was sufficiently developed enough for a shipowner from La Rochelle to take out insurance with two Spanish merchants, through the intermediation of an Italian merchant banker.²⁵⁰ Although few policies remain before the end of the sixteenth century, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that every merchant in Antwerp in the fifteenth century, and in Amsterdam after 1590, had access to maritime insurance.²⁵¹

Conclusion

The history of foreign merchants trading in the Low Countries between 1250 and 1650 reveals what it takes to effectively protect long-distance trade. A first requirement is the commitment of local authorities to the safety of alien traders within their city walls. The town magistrates of Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam created a local monopoly of violence that allowed them to police the market, persecute criminals, and punish corrupt public officials. As a result foreign merchants did not need fenced premises to protect their person and goods. Admittedly, at some stage Bruges and Antwerp did grant private premises to German, English, and Dutch merchants. However, these were perks to secure the prolonged presence of foreigners. Bruges tried to counter the growth of the Antwerp market in the late fifteenth century,

and the Scheldport reacted to the growth of Amsterdam's Baltic trade in the mid-sixteenth century.

The ports of the Low Countries had much more difficulty protecting merchants outside their city walls. The freedom of the fairs of Flanders and Brabant provided some protection against criminal assaults, but foreign travelers continued to carry arms on roads and rivers. More importantly, the power struggle between towns, provinces, and the central government seriously disrupted trade. Foreign merchants in Bruges were forced to relocate in Antwerp in 1382, 1436, 1484, and 1488. Interior warfare ended with the political unification under Charles V in the first half of the sixteenth century but flared up again in the reign of Philip II. In the first years of the Dutch Revolt the violent threat was so big that many foreign merchants actually left the Low Countries. Only after the fall of Antwerp in 1585, and the Spanish failure to conquer Holland in the second half of the 1580s, Dutch, Flemish, German, Portuguese, and English merchants regrouped in Amsterdam.

However disruptive the forced departure of foreign nations from Bruges and Antwerp, an even bigger threat to alien traders was the involvement of the rulers of the Low Countries in international warfare. Although the sovereigns of Flanders, Brabant, and Holland had committed to the safety of foreign merchants through the issue of safeconducts and the creation of formal exit options, political considerations could outweigh commercial ones. Notably the Burgundian dukes engaged in privateering wars with England, Castile, the German Hansa, and France. To counter foreign attacks on their subjects they even confiscated foreign property in Bruges in the first half of the fifteenth century. Also this violent threat receded under Charles V, whose wars with the House of Valois were mainly fought in southern Europe. But

then the revolt of the United Provinces after 1568 ushered in an almost continuous privateering war against Spain and Portugal.

Despite this high incidence of warfare, the available evidence points to a persistent growth of international trade in the Low Countries. A first explanation for this remarkable concurrence of violence and growth lies in the efficient protection of merchant fleets. From the late thirteenth century onwards, merchants from Italy, Spain, France, England, and the Baltic coasts sailed in convoy to the ports of the Netherlands. The consuls of the *foreign nations* in Bruges may be credited for the disciplining of the sailors but the funding, equipment, and dispatch of the fleets were the responsibility of the home ruler. The difficulty to provide such collective protection is all too clear from Charles V's attempts to organize similar convoys to Spain and Portugal in the early 1550s. The project broke down within three years because the merchants involved— locals and foreigners – refused to pick up the bill for what was to a large extent a military operation against France. The far more successful convoys of the Dutch Republic resembled the earlier foreign fleets in two important ways. On the one hand naval protection was constantly adapted to the needs of long-distance traders. On the other, the Dutch convoys were explicitly meant to protect their own subjects. Foreign traders merely benefited because Amsterdam's market for shipping services allowed them to buy shipping shares or rent cargo space.

Still, convoys did not suffice to secure the sea routes to and from the Low Countries. The privateering wars fought by the Burgundians in the fifteenth century, and the Dutch in the seventeenth century put a premium on devices to compensate neutral traders for damage to their ships and cargo. Disciplining of corsairs with letters of marque only went so far, and therefore the rulers of the Low Countries set up a legal system that allowed disenfranchised merchants to claim damages in case of

wrongful assaults. The remaining sentences of local, provincial, and central courts involved in prize cases from the mid-fifteenth century onwards reveal that foreign merchants did seek compensation through legal proceedings. At the same time, the limited number of lawsuits that remains, suggests that alternative means of compensation must have been more remunerative.

Crucial for foreign merchants trading in the Low Countries was their ability to compensate for damages through the market. Already in the fourteenth century traders from around Europe divided cargo between ships and shared the ownership of merchantmen to spread risks. The ability to manage risks further improved with the growth of permanent markets that allowed merchants to diversify their businesses at relatively low cost. Finally, the introduction of maritime insurance created a means to transfer security risks to third parties. First introduced by Italian or Spanish merchants in Bruges, maritime insurance became widely available in Antwerp and Amsterdam from the sixteenth century onwards. It provided a means for the merchant community at large to compensate for damages.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the protective regime that emerged in the Low Countries between the 13th and 17th centuries was that the *foreign nations* themselves contributed little to the improvement of prevention of violence and compensation for damages. First, their home governments organized naval protection and led peace negotiations or talks about pecuniary compensation. Second, the towns of Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam took local security measures in the joint interest of local and foreign businessmen. Third, naval protection organized by the Dutch Republic originated in Holland's concern for its own merchants and fishermen. Fourth, one may speculate that the establishment of courts to adjudicate prizes may have resulted from the damage done by foreign privateers to traders from the

Netherlands. In the end, only the introduction of maritime insurance may be attributed to Italian or Spanish merchants.

Appendix. A Catalogue of Violence enacted against Foreign Merchants in the Low Countries.

In order to understand how much protection was required for merchants importing and exporting goods from the Low Countries, this Appendix catalogues incidents of organized violence that disrupted the trade of foreign merchants conducting their business in either one of the three ports Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam. The violent episodes are reported chronologically, yet for each conflict the merchants affected, and the years in which trade was disrupted are specified. To discern long-term trends in organized violence, the threat to merchants is analyzed for fifty years' timespans, and expressed as the number of years per 25 years' period in which violence occurred.

A distinction is made for four kinds of violent episodes. Privateering and piracy are printed **boldly**. Confiscations, imprisonment (and incidental taxation) are recorded in *italics*. Boycotts, blockades and trade embargoes are underlined. Other kinds of violence including warfare and assaults are recorded in ordinary font.

Decisions to include a specific year in the table are argued in the text following it. One remark is in place beforehand: in those instances when a particular group of merchants decided to remove itself from a particular city, the year of the removal is taken to be disruptive.

Only data for six groups of foreign merchants are included. Scots and English are taken together; no distinction is made between merchants from the different quarters of the Hansa. These are lumped together under the heading Holy Roman Empire. Merchants from Italian cities are also lumped together. Following the table is a detailed description of the violent episodes that are included in it.

Years in which foreign merchants trading in the Low Countries suffered from violent incidents (13th-17th centuries)

Origin	1250-99	1300-49	1350-99	1350-99	1400-49	1450-99	1500-49	1550-99	1600-49
Holy Roman Empire	<u>1280</u>	<u>1307</u>	<u>1351, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1377, 1380, 1381, 1382, 1383, 1384, 1387, 1388, 1391, 1392, 1393, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399</u>	<u>1351, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1380, 1381, 1382, 1383, 1384, 1387, 1388, 1391, 1392, 1393, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399</u>	<u>1400, 1401, 1402, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, 1407, 1412, 1413, 1415, 1417, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1421, 1427, 1434, 1436, 1438, 1439, 1440, 1441, 1446, 1449</u>	<u>1450, 1452, 1460, 1472, 1484, 1488, 1489</u>	1525, 1542	1550, 1572, 1573, 1574, 1575, 1576, 1577, 1578, 1584, 1585, 1586, 1587	<u>1625, 1626, 1627, 1628, 1629, 1630</u>
British Isles	1270, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1274, 1275 <u>1294, 1295</u>	1336, 1337	<u>1353, 1382, 1387, 1393, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399</u>	<u>1353, 1382, 1387, 1392, 1393, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399</u>	<u>1400, 1401, 1402, 1403, 1410, 1412, 1415, 1436, 1437, 1438, 1439, 1440, 1444</u>	1452, <u>1453, 1455, 1460, 1464, 1467, 1471, 1472, 1480, 1481, 1483, 1484, 1485, 1488, 1489</u>	<u>1501, 1542</u>	1550, <u>1563, 1564, 1568, 1586, 1587</u>	1630
France	<u>1279, 1280</u>	1316, 1317, 1340, 1341	<u>1382, 1387, 1396</u>	<u>1382, 1387, 1396</u>	<u>1436, 1437, 1438, 1439, 1440</u>	1452, 1470, 1471, 1472, 1478, 1479, 1480, 1481, 1482, 1483, 1484, 1485, 1486, 1487, <u>1488, 1489</u>	<u>1521, 1525, 1528, 1536, 1542</u>	1550, <u>1551, 1557, 1576, 1584, 1585, 1586, 1587</u>	1638
Castile & Aragon	<u>1279</u>		<u>1382, 1387</u>	<u>1382, 1387</u>	<u>1419, 1420, 1421, 1422, 1423, 1424, 1425, 1426, 1427, 1428, 1434, 1436, 1437, 1438, 1439, 1440, 1441, 1442, 1443, 1444, 1445, 1446, 1447, 1448, 1449</u>	<u>1452, 1484, 1488, 1489</u>	1542	1551, 1576, 1584, 1585, <u>1586, 1587, 1588</u>	
Portugal			<u>1382</u>	<u>1382</u>		1452, <u>1484, 1488, 1489</u>	1542	1550, 1576, 1584, 1585, <u>1586, 1587, 1588, 1596, 1598, 1599</u>	1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1615, 1616, 1617, 1618, 1619, 1620, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1625, 1626, 1627, 1628, 1629, 1630, 1631, 1632, 1633, 1634, 1635, 1636, 1637, 1638, 1639, 1640, 1641, 1642, 1643, 1644, 1645, 1646, 1647, 1648
Genoa, Venice, Florence			<u>1382</u>	<u>1382</u>	<u>1409, 1415, 1440, 1449</u>	1452, 1459, 1460, <u>1473, 1476, 1484, 1488, 1489</u>	1542	1567, 1576, 1584, 1585, <u>1586, 1587,</u>	

							1588	
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1250-1299

Between 1250 and 1299 three violent episodes damaged the interest of English, German, and Spanish merchants trading in the Low Countries. First, in 1270 there was the default of the English king on a longstanding loan led the Countess of Flanders to seize the ships and goods of English merchants in Flanders. Henry III retaliated with the arrest of Flemish merchants, and the seizure of their vessels and merchandise in England. Besides merchants and shipmasters from England, Holland, and Zeeland fell victim to acts of piracy. As a result of these infringements English wool exports to Flanders stopped between 1270 and 1274 and remained below their normal level until at least 1278. Official restoration of commercial ties followed only in 1285. Since the English king gave licences to English, German, Liégeois, Brabantine, French, Spanish and Italian merchants to export wool to the continent, English and Flemish traders were probably the only ones to suffer, notably between 1270 and 1275.²⁵²

In 1279 the interests of Spanish and southern French merchants in Bruges were harmed by a conflict between Bruges' merchant elite (and town council) and the Count of Flanders, over comital control over weighage and tolls, and comital policy towards the English. To avoid paying too high tariffs in Bruges, the Spanish and French merchants removed their trade to nearby Aardenburg. German merchants followed suit when in 1280 the Count of Flanders granted formal permission for the removal. Between 1280 and 1282 Spaniards, Germans, and French operated from the small port of Aardenburg. They returned only upon the city's acceptance of the rules of taxation laid down by the Count.²⁵³ Also in 1280 two Flemish ships carrying merchandise of French traders were captured by English privateers.

A third conflict that damaged the trade of alien merchants in Bruges was that between France and England beginning in 1294. The Flemish support of France led the King of England to redirect his country's wool export to Dordrecht in 1294. However, the wool could not be sold here and was transhipped to Antwerp, where English merchants received their first privileges in 1296. Until 1298 the English wool trade was concentrated in Antwerp (and Malines) instead.²⁵⁴ The years 1294 and 1295 are considered to have been disruptive.

French attempts to gain control over Flanders, enacted between 1297 and 1304 (and including the famous Battle of the Golden Spurs in 1302) are not included in the catalogue of violence for despite open warfare on land and sea, there is no evidence of violent threats against foreign merchants trading in Bruges.²⁵⁵ The same is true for the social and political upheaval that followed the murder of Floris V, count of Holland in 1296. Although tensions dissipated only after 1305, there is no evidence of disruptions of the trade of Germans who often used Dutch waterways to reach Flanders.

1300-1349

The most important conflict to disrupt the trade of foreign merchants in the Low Countries between 1300 and 1349 was the beginning of the Hundred Years' War between England and France (1337-1453). Already in 1336 support of the Count of Flanders for France in its struggle over Guyenne had brought the English to forbid wool export to Flanders. What followed were confiscations on both sides in 1336 and 1337. To prevent further damage to their commercial and industrial interests the towns of Flanders decided to steer a neutral course in the Anglo-French conflict – a decision that brought the Count of Flanders to leave the county for a period of ten years.²⁵⁶ The defeat of a French warfleet by Flemings near Sluis in 1340 probably caused French merchants to stay away in 1340 and 1341 (when a truce was signed). Other foreign merchants do not seem to have suffered from the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War.

Only in 1346, when the Count in exile was killed at Crécy, and an English warfleet threatened to take Zeeland, various attacks on merchant ships did occur in the North Sea. For the nationality of these ships is unknown, the attacks have not been included in our tabulation.²⁵⁷ Once Bruges sided with the new Count Louis of Male in 1348, the violent threat receded, for the Count during several decades shunned any involvement in the War.²⁵⁸

Besides the Hundred Years' War there was one other international conflict that damaged the commercial interests of foreign merchants in Bruges in the first half of the fourteenth century. In 1316 and 1317 France and Flanders were once again at war. In 1316 four ships from Normandy set on fire by Flemings in Bay of Bourgneuf, while Flemish ships were arrested in Holland, a county that sided with the French (Gilliodts, Inventaire I, 319-320). The damage military campaigns in the South of Flanders and the North of France did to trade is unknown but it is safe to assume that at least French merchants and shipmasters perceived violent threats in 1316 and 1317.

The removal of German merchants to Aardenburg in 1307 was related to local issues, notably moneychanging and weighage. The year of the actual departure is considered disruptive for German trade. There is no evidence for damage done to foreign traders by the Peasant rebellion in Flanders

(1323-1328)²⁵⁹, nor the short war between Brabant and Flanders in 1334.²⁶⁰ In the north, Amsterdam and Deventer were engaged in a commercial conflict that entailed repeated seizures of goods on both sides (1336, 1338, 1346, 1347). Again, violent threats to foreign traders are not recorded.²⁶¹

1350-1399

In 1351 an English corsair who had attacked a ship from Greifswald was arrested in Sluis and executed under pressure of the Hansa. This led to confiscations of German merchandise in England; and England's removal of its wool staple from Antwerp back to England in 1353. The refusal of Bruges and the Count of Flanders to compensate Hanseatic merchants for losses following privateering by English and Spanish corsairs in subsequent years was one of the reasons why the Hansa removed its Kontor to Dordrecht in 1358. For lack of further evidence, for German traders only the year of the initial incident (1351), the two years leading up to their departure, and their removal (1358) are considered to have been disruptive.²⁶²

In the 1350s Antwerp's trade suffered another serious blow after a Flemish fleet (consisting of German ships, confiscated for the occasion) attacked the town twice in 1356 and 1357, and subsequently submitted it to Flemish rule. The Count of Flanders gave staplerights to Malines and effectively curtailed the further growth of the Brabant fairs until the end of its rule in 1405.²⁶³ Throughout this period foreign merchants in Bruges were forbidden to travel to the fairs of Brabant.²⁶⁴ However, the Bruges market was open to the English and German merchants that visited the Scheldt port before 1356, and therefore the Flemish reign over Antwerp is not considered disruptive per se.

Notably the last three decades of the fourteenth century saw many trade disruptions. In 1371 English ships captured a Flemish fleet on the French Coast, though no damage to foreigners in Bruges is recorded.²⁶⁵ The year 1379 marked the beginning of repeated confrontations between England and Flanders, following the latter's renewed siding with France in the Hundred Years' War.²⁶⁶ English and Flemish commerce were damaged on several occasions. In 1381 French pirates pillaged ships and damaged merchants and sailors from Flanders, Germany, Zeeland, Holland and other countries near the Zwyn.²⁶⁷ In 1387 the English attacked a Flemish fleet (which probably included some French, German, and Spanish ships, or carried merchandise owned by merchants from these countries²⁶⁸), allegedly carrying 9,000 tons of wine, from La Rochelle to Sluice. Some ships were destroyed, others carried off to England.²⁶⁹ The Burgundian dukes reacted by banning English traders from Flanders.²⁷⁰

In 1392 and in the years between 1396 and 1403 attacks from pirates from France, Flanders, Zeeland, and Holland, on English merchants and their goods are recorded.²⁷¹ In 1402 and 1403 these pirates also attacked Danish, Scottish and German ships. To force the release of Flemish ships, in 1403 the Duke of Burgundy confiscated English goods and ships in his territories.²⁷² Bruges filed complaints with the Count of Holland, participated in conferences in Antwerp and Ghent in 1401, sent envoys to England, Scotland, and Ireland, and participated in another conference in Sluis in 1402. Finally a truce was reached at a conference with the English king in 1403.²⁷³ The truce was renewed in 1407, 1408, 1411 but also violated on several occasions.²⁷⁴ In 1403 and 1410, the duke of Burgundy confiscated English property in reaction to the capture of Flemish vessels; in 1403 also Scottish goods were seized in Flanders.²⁷⁵ Also in 1412, 1413 and 1415 Flemish privateers captured English ships.²⁷⁶ Other foreigners trading with Flanders also suffered losses

Violent threats in the Low Countries are recorded in 1377, when Bruges attacked the goods of German merchants to prevent their collective departure, and in 1382, when the Count of Flanders ordered all foreign merchants to leave Bruges to try and weaken the revolting Flemish towns. The vast majority of Germans, Catalans, Genoese, Spaniards, Lombards, Scots and Englishmen complied.²⁷⁷ They could resume their trade, however, after the defeat of the Flemish towns at the Battle of Westroseebeke (1382) **Check this.**²⁷⁸ In 1387 German merchants asked Bruges for compensation for damages related to the Flemish involvement in the war between France and England.²⁷⁹ When the city refused this, the Kontor was removed to Dordrecht in 1388 where it remained until 1392. The year 1387 and 1388 are considered disruptive for German trade.

Between 1378 and 1402 trade in the Baltic Sea was disrupted by the Vitalienbrüder, privateers for the dukes of Mecklenburg who turned into outright pirates once their services were no longer needed.²⁸⁰ Attacks on Hanseatic ships returning from the North Sea, or sailing there, appeared throughout this period. From Puhle's detailed account of the history of these pirates, it can be gleaned that major disruptions of German trade occurred in 1380-1381, 1383-1384, and 1391-1397. Attacks in these years also harmed those Germans trading with the Low Countries. For one thing, in 1393, 1394, and 1395 the Count of Holland issued letters of marque that allowed citizens from Amsterdam to recoup losses from citizens of Wismar, Rostock, and Mecklenburg, and from subjects king of Sweden.²⁸¹ For another, in 1398 the Vitalienbrüder shifted their operations to the North Sea, where they were chased and rounded up by a Hamburg fleet shortly after 1400. In addition to this

threat, merchants from Hamburg, Kampen, Saxony and Brandenburg fell victim to Dutch freebooters engaged in war between Holland and Friesland in 1397, 1398 and 1400.²⁸²

Finally, the temporary allegiance of Holland and Zeeland to the Hansa, to fight Denmark between 1367 and 1369 may have been costly to traders, but the conflict was fought primarily in the Baltic area, and merely required a financial contribution from the merchants most directly involved – the Germans.²⁸³ Therefore the episode is not considered disruptive. Likewise there is no evidence that warfare between Holland and Utrecht in the years 1372-1374 disturbed foreign trade.²⁸⁴

One minor incident in the second half of the fourteenth century was the unspecified damage suffered by German merchants in a hostel in Bruges (See appendix B).

1400-1449

In the first half of the fifteenth century violent incidents harmed the trade of almost all foreign merchant communities in the Low Countries. When Castilian corsairs attacked Flemish ships between 1417 and 1421, the Four Members of Flanders responded with the issue of letters of marque allowing Flemish traders to recoup their losses with the taking of Castilian ships.²⁸⁵ In 1421 the council of the Duke of Burgundy issued a charter that set a 5% levy on all sales of merchandise from Galice, Asturia, Old Castille, Biscaye, and Basque – with the explicit exception of Navarra – as compensation for damages done to the Flemish in the past four years.²⁸⁶ Although this measure was meant to replace the letters of marque, new Castilian attacks led to new letters issued in 1423 and 1424.²⁸⁷ New negotiations following a Castilian threat to leave Flanders in 1427, led to the revocation of the levy and the granting of new privileges to the Castilian nation in 1428. A committee was appointed to establish mutual damages.²⁸⁸

In 1438 Philip the Good allowed the Flemish and Italian owners of a ship confiscated in Valencia in 1436, to compensate their loss with the seizure of Catalan and Aragonese property in Flanders.²⁸⁹ Initially the Four Members managed to postpone this measure but fearing its application in the fall of 1439 the Aragonese crown ordered Catalan and Aragonese merchants to prepare for a departure from Burgundian territory. It did not come that far, however, for the Duke instituted a committee that proposed to set a levy of 1.66% on all imports from Aragon instead. The revenue (up to a total value of 1288 pound flemish) was to be collected by the disenfranchised merchants. Following the capture of a Burgundian ship in the Mediterranean in 1440, talks started anew. To put pressure upon the Aragonese crown, its merchants were held shortly by the duke's bailiff in Bruges in 1443. Again talks continued, however, and eventually in 1444 or 1445 the levy was raised to 2.5%, to compensate for 7,000 *saluts* (**exchange rate?**). The levy was repealed in January 1450 after repeated protests of the city of Bruges (afraid that the city would lose its attraction), as well as merchants from Catalunya, Aragon, Venice, Genoa, Florence, Pisa, and Milan.²⁹⁰

German merchants trading with the Low Countries were confronted with piracy, privateering, and warfare on many occasions. Besides the incidents already mentioned above, between 1403 and 1407 English privateers captured various German ships carrying merchandise of traders from Amsterdam.²⁹¹ In 1418 French pirates attacked Hanseatic ships before the Flemish coast.²⁹² In the late 1420s Scottish privateers also attacked German ships.²⁹³ In 1419 a fleet of forty vessels (Hanseats and Flemings) was attacked by Castilians of the coast near La Rochelle.²⁹⁴ With this incident commenced a privateering war between Spain and the Hansa that officially ended only in 1443.²⁹⁵

Meanwhile, between 1426 and 1435 the German Hansa was at war with Denmark, following the Danish introduction of the Sound Toll, payable by all ships passing through. Initially Hanseatic attempts to block the entry to the Baltic sea failed, and German merchants had to revert to the isthmus of Holstein, to continue their trade with the Low Countries. In these years privateers from Holland and Zeeland launched repeated attacks on merchants from the Wendish quarter.²⁹⁶ On one occasion, in 1627, the capture of an Amsterdam ship, first by Danish and then by Hamburg privateers, led to the arrest of Hamburg citizens in Leyden.²⁹⁷ The military campaign of the Hansa was more successful in **(add date)** and the king of Denmark had to agree to the Peace of Vordingborg in 1435.²⁹⁸

The war with Denmark immediately ushered in a new conflict. During the war Dutch ships had taken over the German trade with Scandinavian countries. War broke out between Holland and the Hansa in 1438.²⁹⁹ Lübeck warships sank or captured Dutch merchantmen. The Dutch engaged in privateering and attacked the fleet of Lübeck on at least three occasions. In 1440 a Dutch fleet of 17 or 18 vessels forced its way into the Baltic Sea. The Peace of Copenhagen that was signed in 1441 secured free entry for Dutch ships.

After almost continuous privateering between England and the Burgundian lands in the years between 1395 and 1415, the Burgundian dukes became the ally, and in 1420 even the vassal, of the English king.³⁰⁰ However, in 1435 (Treaty of Arras) the Burgundian dukes sided with France again in its war against England. The Flemish towns did support him but their troops backed off in the siege of

Calais, and returned home precociously. The battle for Calais was lost and English troops began ravaging the Flemish countryside. The war damaged trade because it led to repeated attacks by pirates and privateers in the North Sea. Particularly violent were the years 1436-1440, 1443, 1446, 1449, 1453, 1455, 1457 and 1460.³⁰¹ Besides merchants from England, France, and the Low Countries, Spaniards and Germans were also attacked.³⁰²

Besides these larger conflicts, a number of other incidents occurred. Particularly worrisome for the Hansa was the killing of more than 80 Hanseatic seamen and merchants in Sluis in 1436 by a mob that suspected their support for the English king.³⁰³ While urban revolt continued in Bruges, the German Kontor was temporarily removed to Antwerp. Violent threats to other foreigners during the Bruges Revolt of 1436-1438 are not recorded, however (**check this in Dumolyn**) In 1439 Flemish traders went to Holland to buy goods from ships from Spain, Brittany and other countries, taken by pirates from Holland and Zeeland.³⁰⁴ In 1449 an English fleet captured more than 100 Burgundian and Hanseatic merchantmen off the coast of France. The Burgundians were released but the Hanseatic ships brought to England. Other attacks of Hanseatic ships are recorded for 1439, 1443, and 1457.³⁰⁵ In 1440 the English won the Battle of Sluis with a warfleet of 200 ships. Before the actual battle Genoese galleys had managed to get away but the French fleet was destroyed.³⁰⁶

Finally, violent incidents in the first half of the fifteenth century included the confiscation of the goods of Genoese merchants in Bruges in 1409 by John the Fearless following the betrayal of one of his officers in Genoa.³⁰⁷ In 1415 Scottish pirates captured four foreign ships before the coast of Nieuwpoort with goods belonging to English, Italian and Flemish merchants.³⁰⁸ In 1449 the Venetian nation temporarily moved to Antwerp (**explore this**)

1450-1499

The second half of the fifteenth century was hardly less disturbing for foreign merchants trading in the Low Countries. Particularly harmful was the Flemish Revolt (1477-1492), which led to major trade disruptions in 1484, 1488 and 1489. The revolt ended officially in 1490, but Sluis continued to resist until 1492.³⁰⁹ Damage was done to the entire foreign merchant community for in 1484 Maximilian forced all foreign merchants to temporarily leave Bruges. Although this order was revoked that same year, in 1485 London merchants in Bergen op Zoom still did not want to travel to Bruges in fear of being robbed.³¹⁰ In 1488 all foreign merchants were forced to leave Bruges again. This time it took until 1492 for Bruges to renegotiate the return of the foreign nations. However, foreign trade with the Low Countries was not disturbed after 1489, for alien traders continued their business in Antwerp in the meantime.

Rivalry between England and the German Hansa led to several violent incidents in the second half of the fifteenth century. In 1458 eighteen vessels from Lübeck were taken by the English governor of Calais.³¹¹ Between 1470 and 1473 the War of the Roses led to armed conflict between Holland and England on one side, and the Hansa on the other. The Hansa forced Denmark to close the Sound for all ships from Holland and England, and German privateers attacked Brabantine ships they believed were laden with English goods.³¹² In one of the attacks, in 1473, the Florentine merchant Tomaso Portunari lost a ship carrying at least 40,000 pounds Flemish pounds of merchandise.³¹³

Between 1470 and 1493 warfare between France and Burgundy reduced the import of French grain to a fraction of what it had been before. Military operations (including privateering) and trade embargoes kept French merchants and shipmasters from the ports of the Low Countries in this period.³¹⁴ Attacks of French privateers on ships from England and the Burgundian Netherlands are recorded in 1471, 1472, 1484 and 1485, but probably occurred more often than that.³¹⁵ According to Sicking the Atlantic coast was not safe either between 1478 and 1483, and between 1486 and 1489.³¹⁶ (*Check Coornaert, Doehaerd to find out whether French traders really suffered from violence throughout the entire period.*)

Smaller incidents in the second half of the fifteenth century included the arrest of various English merchants in Hulst in 1453, following English attacks on Flemish ships carrying wine from La Rochelle.³¹⁷ In 1457 three ships laden with wool that belonged to merchants from Lombardy were captured by English pirates.³¹⁸ In 1459 or 1460 a former captain of Burgundian warships that fought in the Black Sea seized Genoese merchandise in Middelburg, to recoup losses from the capture of one of these warships by Genoa in 1445.³¹⁹ In 1476, when Genoese merchants were suspected to support the king of France in his struggle with Charles the Bold, they were temporarily expelled from Bruges.³²⁰ Pirates from Holland attacked English ships in 1480 and 1481. In 1488 the Amsterdam magistrate took hostage several Englishmen in response to a request by local merchants whose ships and goods had been seized by English warships near Calais.³²¹

Again, the effect of violent incidents on trade is not always clear. The Revolt of Ghent between 1450 and 1453 did not lead to infringements on foreign property but Ghent's absence from the

meetings of the Four Members did stall negotiations with the German Hansa about their return to Bruges.³²² Besides, the fact that in 1452 the foreign nations of Bruges, together with the city of Ghent, sent delegates to the Duke of Burgundy in Dendermonde to ask for a six month's truce in the struggle between Ghent and the Duke, suggests that at least in 1452 foreign trade was harmed by the revolt (the year is considered disruptive for all groups of traders).³²³ Overland trade with Germany may have been disrupted by Maximilian's involvement in the succession of the murdered Princebishop of Liège (1482-1493). Violence is recorded in 1482, 1485, and 1490, but there is no evidence for harm done to German traders.³²⁴

1500-1549

The major conflict harming foreign merchants in the Low Countries in the first half of the sixteenth century was the prolonged Habsburg-Valois war. The outbreak of war between the Habsburgs and France led to several announcements of confiscation of French goods in the Low Countries (1521, 1528, 1536, 1542, 1551, 1557). In 1525 French merchants suffered from a limit of 12 set on the number of French ships that was allowed in ports in the Low Countries.³²⁵ Although actual confiscations were limited, and French merchants continued to come to Antwerp, these years can be marked as disruptive for French trade with the Low Countries.³²⁶

The menace to Holland's maritime economy was even greater in the first half of the sixteenth century. Hostilities on land and sea, issuing from both the Habsburg attempt to control the Northern Netherlands, and repeated conflicts with the German Hansa, are recorded in 18 years between 1500 and 1543.³²⁷ In 1540s Antwerp merchants complained about attacks by English, Scottish and French privateers and pirates.³²⁸ However, as far as foreign merchants are concerned, only German traders may have suffered from this violence. However, it is not clear in what years the closure of the Sound by the Hansa—meant to frustrate Dutch trade—also damaged German interests. **(find out what years should be regarded as disruptive.)**³²⁹

Two other incidents should be mentioned. In an attempt to regain the Danish throne, in 1525 Christian II of Denmark fitted out privateers that attacked several Hanseatic ships sailing to the Low Countries.³³⁰ The year 1542 can be identified as one of violent threats for all foreign merchants in Antwerp, for an army from Guelders, led by Maarten van Rossem, threatened to sack Antwerp. In 1543 fortifications were built “for the security of the alien merchants to retain their trade”.³³¹

1550-1599.³³²

Although Charles V generally refrained from violence against foreign merchants, at least once his attempts to root out protestantism posed a real threat to foreign merchant communities. On April 29, 1550, the Emperor issued his Eternal Edict that required all immigrants in the Low Countries to submit a certificate of orthodoxy signed by their parish priest.³³³

In the 1560s England's trade with the Low Countries was hindered for several years. First, war between England and France blocked English cloth imports to Antwerp in 1563 and 1564.³³⁴ The English capture of Spanish ships laden with 4 million guilders' worth of silver, destined for the Low countries, led to the attachment of English ships in Antwerp in 1467, and the subsequent removal of English merchants to Stade near Hamburg in 1468.³³⁵ *[Add data on effects Habsburg-Valois wars. In 1551 French galleons captured several merchantmen returning from Spain, and some twenty hulks sailing to France and Spain to fetch salt; but question is, what damage did French merchants trading with the Low Countries suffer. Sicking, Neptune 254).*

The single most disruptive event in the second half of the sixteenth century was the Dutch Revolt. Between 1568 and 1578 it hit every single group of alien merchants. Trade interruptions included the religious persecution of protestants, and the suppression of any protestant worshipping, especially in 1568-1569, privateering attacks from the watergeuzen between 1568 and 1572, and again between 1574 and 1576³³⁶; the open warfare in Flanders, Brabant, Holland, and the Zeeland estuary between 1572-1576; the violent attack on merchants by unpaid Spanish troops in 1576 (the Spanish Fury). Meanwhile German merchants in Amsterdam suffered from the city's allegiance to the Spanish king between 1572 and 1578.

The years between 1578 and 1584 passed in relative peace both in Antwerp and Amsterdam, with the exception perhaps of the French fury in Antwerp in 1583 – though no attacks on merchants reported reported (**check this**). With the siege of Antwerp in 1584 began a second period of organized violence that harmed the commercial interests of many merchants. In 1584 and 1585 the remaining foreigners in Antwerp could hardly trade due to the siege.

In the second half of the 1580s Italian, Portuguese, and Flemish merchants that had moved to Cologne and Frankfurt, as well as merchants from these areas themselves, had difficulty reaching the Low Countries due to the Spanish occupation of the eastern provinces. Between 1586 and 1589

followed a Spanish trade embargo for merchants from the revolting provinces, that was countered by an English and Dutch embargo on trade with Spain, Portugal, and the Spanish Netherlands. The latter embargo, issued by the Count of Leicester on April 4, 1586, explicitly forbade trade with the enemy for Dutch and foreign merchants.³³⁷ The Spaniards at the time had up to twenty ships at sea attacking the Dutch, according to Leicester.³³⁸ The result of the embargoes was a renewed increase of Dutch privateering in 1586 (partially because it absorbed surplus capital that could not be invested in regular trade), which hit French, Scottish, German, and other foreign merchants, according to a resolution of the States of Holland.³³⁹ However, in 1587 privateering stopped again when the Dutch lifted their embargo.³⁴⁰

In 1598 Philip III launched a new embargo against all Dutch ships to Spain and Portugal, an act that led the Dutch to renew their embargo on trade with the Iberian peninsula, for Dutch and foreign merchants alike.³⁴¹ It is difficult to establish the harm done to Spanish-Dutch trade, or to Dutch trade in general, in the years following the embargo. If anything, the years between 1598 and 1601 were the most disruptive, with more than 20 royal and private Spanish warships engaged in attacks on Dutch vessels – against 10 to 15 ships in the years before and afterwards.³⁴² Between 1595 and 1609 Portuguese merchants only recorded one privateering attack in 1596 and another two in 1599 in deeds of Amsterdam notaries.³⁴³ Merchants from Portugal may not have suffered that much for the embargo was not strictly upheld in Portugal, and their access to Dutch markets was in no way restricted.

In the second half of the sixteenth century Elizabeth I did nothing to suppress the privately run pirate companies that operated a profitable business from various ports in Wales and Cornwall. However, the damage done to ships sailing to and from the Low Countries was limited. Most pirates targeted the coastal trade in the Irish Sea and the Channel.³⁴⁴

1600-1649 Amsterdam

Until 1608 merchants from the Low Countries felt the consequences of the Spanish embargo on Dutch ships. The Twelve Years' Truce (1609-1621) put a temporary stop to warfare but it did not end violent attacks on merchantmen. The demobilisation of the navies of Spain and the Dutch Republic created a surplus of sailors, part of whom engaged in piracy to gain a living. Thus it comes as no surprise that Portuguese merchants recorded many more captures of ships and cargo. Notarial deeds drawn up after such events reveal the minimum number of ships and/or cargo belonging to Portuguese traders, that were taken by pirates and privateers.³⁴⁵ The data shows that from 1608 onwards every year (except 1615) saw the capture of at least one ship by pirates or privateers. In four years more than ten ships were captured: 1596 (1); 1599 (2); 1608 (4); 1609 (1); 1610 (1); 1611 (3); 1612 (3); 1613 (5); 1614 (4); 1616 (4); 1617 (4); 1618 (16); 1619 (5); 1620 (6); Besides this in 1618 and 1619 Portuguese merchants had to deal with the arrest of several of their agents in Portugal by the Spanish Inquisition.³⁴⁶

The resumption of war with Spain led to a renewed embargo, open warfare in the Southern part of the Low Countries, privateering on the North Sea and the Atlantic Coast of France and Spain, and acts of piracy in that same area.³⁴⁷ Portuguese, English and Dutch merchants in Amsterdam suffered less from the embargo than from piracy, privateering, and warfare.³⁴⁸ Between 1621 and 1648 merchantmen sailing to the Dutch Republic had to deal with continuous attacks from Dunkirk pirates. Dutch and Portuguese merchants were hit every year. Most English merchantmen were captured in 1630, and French ships almost exclusively in 1638.³⁴⁹

Furthermore, Italian, Flemish and Dutch merchants trading with the Mediterranean had to deal with Spanish attempts to frustrate trade between Holland, Italy, and the Levant from 1621 onwards. Dutch and German merchants involved in continental trade had to deal with the river blockade between 1625 and 1630. Between 1628 and 1630 Dutch and German merchants in Amsterdam also suffered from military operations in their trade with the Baltic area.

Appendix 2. The motivation, organization, and outcome of collective action of German merchants in Bruges, 1250-1500

Date	Motivation	Action taken	German principals	Outcome
1252-1253	Official establishment in Flanders; establishment of fenced community near Damme	Talks	Merchants from Hamburg and Lübeck	Initial privileges, but no separate premises
1280-1282	Bruges refuses to apply toll and weighage tariffs agreed upon by Count of Flanders.	Removal to Aerdenburg, following initiative of Spanish (and possibly French) merchants	Official from Lübeck, also on behalf of eight other towns, supported by Flemish Count	internal disciplining by <i>procureurs</i> ; trade with foreigners through brokers allowed
1305	Disagreement about Bruges monetary regime and the weighage of goods	Talks, with threat to leave	Officials from Lübeck	None
1307-1309	Disagreement about Bruges monetary regime and the weighage of goods	Removal to Aerdenburg, together with Spanish merchants	Officials from Lübeck and Dortmund, supported by Flemish Count	consular jurisdiction. <i>Concession</i> : German staple fixed <i>in Bruges</i>
1351	English attack on German ship; weighage	Talks and permission from Hansetag for Kontor to leave; threat not executed.	German <i>Kontor</i> in Bruges, without consulting Lübeck	new weighage facility
1357	Bruges' staple rights; higher tolls, brokerage, and wine excise; confiscation of German vessels for military purposes; denial of preferential debts over Bruges' citizens; display of goods limited to Mondays in urban vending locations (Cologne)	Mediation between Bruges and German <i>Kontor</i>	Officials from Lübeck and Cologne, independently	None
1358-1360	Bruges' staple rights; higher tolls, brokerage, and wine excise; confiscation of German vessels for military purposes; denial of preferential debts over Bruges' citizens; display of goods limited to Mondays in urban vending locations (Cologne)	German boycott of trade with Flanders; Removal of <i>Kontor</i> to Dordrecht	Lübeck and Greifswald carrying out decisions of the <i>Hansetag</i>	4,111 Pnd Flemish paid by Bruges. ³⁵⁰ Privileges apply to all of Flanders; Count cannot recall privileges; Germans may arrest robbers inside and outside Flanders; Retail trade allowed; Sales allowed every day; Exemption from Bruges' stapleright (1323); Brokers cannot own goods they purvey; Suretyship of Bruges for debts of hostellers (proved unenforceable later); several minor amendments regarding brokerage, tolls, lading of ships. <i>Implicit concession</i> : tolls on re-exports.
1377	Bruges refused liability for hostellers; refused refusal to punish those that had agressed and injured Germans; tax levied on imported codfish; interdiction to import Hamburg beer; bad quality of certain cloth sold to Germans	Failed attempt to leave Bruges collectively	Bruges Kontor without notifying Hanse	Count of Flanders found out and confiscated German goods.
1383	Confiscation of German goods in 1377; Trade disruption due to revolt of Flemish towns against Count; In 1382 Count forced temporary removal of all foreigners to Antwerp	Talks with Count of Holland about removal to Dordrecht	Hansetag	Hanse declines invitation

1388-1392	Confiscation of German goods in 1377; other damages in following years, including Flemish capture of German ship on the Zwin	German boycott of trade with Flanders; Removal of <i>Kontor</i> to Dordrecht	Hansetag, led by Lübeck officials	11,100 Pnd. Flemish paid by Count & Four Members. ³⁵¹ Confirmation of old privileges; Public penance by Bruges citizens
1397	Damage done in local hostel	Talks with Bruges		107 Pnd. Flemish paid by Bruges
1405	Attack by pirates from Nieuwpoort	Talks with Four Members		703 Pnd. Flemish paid by Four Members
1428	Repeated conflicts between Hansa and towns in Holland	Threat to boycott trade with Flanders	Bruges Kontor, with envoys from Hansa	None
1430	Damage done by local moneychanger	Talks with Bruges		267 Pnd. Flemish paid by Bruges
1431-2	Scottish pirates' attack	Talks with Bruges and Four Members		2,151 ³⁵² Pnd. Flemish paid by Bruges and Four Members
1434-1435	Repeated attacks by privateers from Zeeland	Talks with Bruges and Four Members		None
1437-1438	In 1436 up to 80 Germans killed in Sluis; social unrest following revolt of Bruges (1436-1438) against Count	German stoppage of grain imports, to acquire right to move with other foreigners to Antwerp.	Hanse	8,000 Pnd. Flemish, promised by Four Members; not paid.
1438	Two German hostellers attacked	Talks		108 Pnd. Flemish paid by Bruges
1448	Hanseatic towns wish to organize formal German staple in Bruges	Talks with Bruges	Hanse	None
1451	Hanseatic towns wish to organize formal German staple in Bruges (internal dissension between merchants from Prussia, Cologne, and Lübeck)	Boycott of Flanders. Removal to Deventer	Hanse	None
1452-1457	Hanseatic towns wish to organize formal German staple in Bruges (internal dissension between merchants from Prussia, Cologne, and Lübeck)	Additional boycott of Brabant fairs (1453). Removal to Utrecht to be closer to Amsterdam; Intensive talks with Burgundian duke and Bruges since 1456	Hanse	Duke of Burgundy names committee of 'notables' to look into conflicts between him and the Hansa; Bruges grants the Hansa the right to build new premises; 2,000 Pnd. Flemish (of 1438 promise) paid by Four Members ³⁵³
1498	Piracy; Hanseatic refusal to comply with verdict of Great Council regarding the restitution of the value of the good loaded in a Florentine galley	Talks	Hanse	2,000 Pnd. Flemish paid to Hansa by Bruges for damage by pirates + 16,000 pounds Flemish to pay off the Florentine owners of ship that had been captured by Hansa in 1473

Sources: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 58, 64-65; 127-128; III, 411, 244, 246, 257-259, 523, 524; V, 10, 12-13, 201, 402 406-407; VI, 410-457; Dollinger, *Hanse*, 85-91; 99-102; Poeck, "Kontorverlegung", *passim*; Stützel, "Privilegien", *passim*; Paviot, *Politique navale*, 235; Mallett, *Florentine galleys*, 101-102

Endnotes

¹ The author would like to thank Jessica Dijkman, Regina Grafe, Roger de Peuter, and Louis Sicking for valuable comments and suggestions.

² See for example: Spufford, *Profit and Power*, 115-127; For the safety situation in the Mediterranean: Horden and Purcell, *Corrupting Sea*, 154-159; Braudel, *Middellandse Zee*, dl. I, hfdst 5; dl II, hfdst 7; also: Alberto Tenenti, *Naufraages, corsairs et assurance maritimes à Venice* (Paris 1959), cited in Braudel. Tenenti onderzocht meer dan duizend gevallen van schipbreuk, entering door kapers en ongelukken met meer of minder schade (laatste: 660 stuks) die door verzekeraars gerapporteerd werden aan twee notarissen. Dit gebruiken om te laten zien hoe verzekeringswezen in Venetie werkte.

³ Cf. on the difference between piraterij en kaapvaart: Braudel, *Mediterranee*, II, hfdst 7, p. 508-535

⁴ North***, following Lane

⁵ Check Spufford; Braudel; Gelderblom, *Governance*;

⁶ Cf. on delegation of authority Gelderblom & Grafe

⁷ Local rulers in Flanders and Brabant coordinated the actions of the Flemish and Brabantine hansas in England and Champagne in the twelfth and thirteenth century. In the fourteenth century, rulers in Venice and Barcelona organized galley fleets. Indeed the actions of the German Hansa were coordinated between the magistrates of the participating towns (cf. *infra*)

⁸ Note that there existed also permanent markets that did not originate in fairs.

⁹ On the growing ability of rulers to secure the safety of merchants at least in their own territories J. Bernard, "Trade and Finance in the Middle Ages 900-1500", in: C. Cipolla (ed.), *The Fontana Economic History of Europe, 1. The Middle Ages* (London/Glasgow 1972), 274-338(p. 314-315). On the ability of early modern rulers to pursue pirates: Pérotin-Dumon, "Pirate".

¹⁰ Lopez & Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, 303-305; North & Thomas, *Rise, North, Structure and Change*;

¹¹ Note that, although the micro-economic work on fairs and merchant guilds models the benefits of these institutions as pecuniary awards, the quest for compensation is not considered the principal rationale of their creation. Greif (1989) does include rewards in his model of Mahgribi traders but these merely consist of the value of future transactions; and so does the model of merchant guilds he developed with Milgrom and Weingast (1994). Compare also Dessi and Ogilvie, who model the merchant guild as a rent-seeking institution. Yet, although the outcome of their model is the transfer of funds to merchant communities, these transfers are in no way related to damage done to the traders. Quite the opposite, in their view they often constituted super-normal rents that favoured a small group to the detriment of the economy at large.

¹² D. North, "Institutions, transaction costs, and the rise of merchant empires", in: J.D. Tracy (ed.), *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, 28-29

¹³ One very optimistic account of the benefits of state formation is that of Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe* (Routledge: London 2002), who argues that the rise of fiscal-military states in the sixteenth and seventeenth century implied greater efficiency in the organization of violence and hence lower costs for the protection against confiscations, social unrest, privateering, piracy, and outright warfare. (2-3, 214-215).

¹⁴ Early measurement of the cost of convoys protecting merchantmen includes Venice for the sixteenth century (Lane etc) and the Dutch Republic (De Jong, *Staat van Oorlog*). For England: what should I cite. On insurance rates: Spooner; Venetian work; Van Nieuwkerk; The work of legal claims against privateers has never been concerned with the cost issue in the first place: what can I cite? Note that more data is available for freight rates in various parts of Europe (North for England; Van Tielhof for the Dutch Republic; other examples?). But although insurance premiums, at least for the hull of the ship, were included in the rate paid by freighters, there is no work to my knowledge that tries to separate the two components. Cite review article on Lane's work. Lane himself was all too aware that protection costs are very hard to measure. First, these costs are often shared between merchants, or shifted to a third party. Second, money spent on violence cannot be spent on profitable trade, and thus creates opportunity costs that may be even higher. Third, high costs paid for protection do not necessarily imply inefficiency. The long-term effect of securing entry to a market may outstrip immediate costs, including the opportunity costs of 'onttrekken van middelen aan' profitable investment. Cf. for example Colbert's costly campaign to chase Dutch traders from the Carribean. In the short run this may have negatively influenced French national income. In the long run it secured high returns for French Atlantic traders. The example is Frederic Lane's ("National wealth").

¹⁵ The problematic relationship between protection and economic growth was first detailed by Lane, "National wealth", 374-375, and "Economic meaning". The present debate is between Israel and Braudel; Cf. Grafe, *War* **Check:** Meriam Bullard et al. On F. Lane in *Speculum* 2004 (jan). Lane is important for his theory of protection, focus on importance of rule of law, the benefits of warfare, and

the different propensities to invest productively. p102-103: growth inducing characteristics of Venice very similar to those of Dutch Republic; 104 Cheap protection is important for democratisation of trade. Cites publication of Lane on double entry bookkeeping (footnote 53). Lane.... Protection for one group of merchants may be conceived as an attack on the economic interests of other, witness the string of reprisals that could ensue from a relatively minor infringement, privateering wars, or the 'tenuitvoerlegging' van navigation acts.

¹⁶ This preying by protecters, or the exaction of tribute as it is termed by Lane, can take all kinds of forms, including high taxation, arbitrary confiscations, defaults on loans, and currency debasements. Lane, "Economic Consequences", 414-418, 422, 424-425; On debasements, see also Herman Van der Wee and Theo Peeters, 'Un modèle dynamique de croissance interséculaire du commerce mondial (XIIIe-XVIIIe siècles),' *Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations*, 25 (1970), 100-28 (cited in Munro on NIE). Ook nog opzoeken van Munro: John H. Munro, 'Industrial Transformations in the North-west European Textile Trades, c.1290 - c.1340: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis?', in Bruce M.S. Campbell, ed., *Before the Black Death: Studies in 'Crisis' of the Early Fourteenth Century* (Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 110 - 48. (zijn woorden: This essay, an application of both the Van der Wee-Peeters model (1970) and of the North-Thomas transactions cost model (1973, 1984-5), analyzes the impact of warfare, taxation, and protection costs upon the changing structure of the international textiles trades in the half-century before the Hundred Years' War and the Black Death.)

¹⁷ The suggestion is Avner Greif's (1989, 1993, 2000), who argued that collective action by more or less informal coalitions of merchants could organize sufficient protection to sustain long-distance trade.

¹⁸ On the combination of institutions: Ehrenberg, Lopez, Braudel, Jeannin, and more recently Murray & Hunt, and Spufford; Cf. also the many monographs that exist on particular merchant communities. For Italy: Engels, Brulez; For Germany: Dietz, Kellenbenz, Thimme. For the Low Countries: DeSmedt, Goris, and more recently Harreld, and Gelderblom. For Russia: Wijnroks. For England***; For France: Butel;. Yet systematic explorations of the combined use of institutions to protect trade are rare. Cf. Gelderblom, Governance; and Gelderblom & Grafe, "Towards a Comparative Analysis"

¹⁹ We laten dus meer structurele verbeteringen, zoals de beschrijving van de belangrijkste handelroutes in het Itinéraire de Bruges, buiten beschouwing (Cf. spufford). Also, moneylenders like Cahorsins and Lombards, present in the Low Countries from at least the 14th century onwards, are excluded from the present analysis. Due to the controversial nature of their activities these pawnbrokers required more protection than ordinary traders – protection they received in exchange for financial support to the local government (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, IX, 66; Cf. Botticini, "Tale of Benevolent rulers" for a similar political economy in medieval Italy).

²⁰ For a comprehensive account of the history of the *pandocheion* of late antiquity, the *funduq* of the muslim world, and the *fondaco* in Christian ports (with extensive references to the older literature), see Olivia Remie Constable, *Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World. Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003.

²¹ Note however that the *Fondaco dei Tedeschi* was in fact exceptional, not only because of its late creation, but also because most alien merchants in Italian towns lived among the locals by then. In the sixteenth century premises in Mediterranean ports that were referred to as *fondaco* typically were public market places without facilities to sleep and eat.

²² On Russia: Veluwenkamp, *Archangel*. In 1462 the king of France granted privileges to merchants from Flanders, Brabant, Zeeland, and Holland that included the right "to have a house in Rochelle or in whatever place they wish in our kingdom". In this house "those of the nation could stay and retreat their person and goods, and conduct their business", provided the principal occupant was a local citizen who would take proper care of the premises (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, V, 427). **Check Drost to see whether such a house was ever occupied by merchants from the Low Countries, in any of the French commercial towns.** Smaller enclosed settlements were found in the rural surroundings of Scania, in southern Sweden, where fishermen and merchants from Germany and the Low countries occupied small lodges to cure and sell herring.

²³ Cf. for the protection in Novgorod, the grant of privilege to German merchants by the king of Novgorod in 1229: G. F. Sartorius, ed., *Urkundliche Geschichte des Ursprunges der Deutschen Hanse*, J. M. Lappenberg, rev., (Hamburg, 1830), Vol. II, p. 29; reprinted in Roy C. Cave & Herbert H. Coulson, eds., *A Source Book for Medieval Economic History*, (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1936; reprint ed., New York: Biblio & Tannen, 1965), pp. 225-231 (Consulted from the *Internet Medieval Sourcebook*, June 26, 2005: <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1229novgorod-germans.html>)

²⁴ Håpke, *Entwicklung*, 112; Rößner, *Hansische*, 44-46; Vandewalle, 'Vreemde naties', 28,30;

²⁵ On the one hand the city enforced rules regarding the liability of hostellers for damages done to, or by their clients (cf. chapter 4). On the other, it was laid down in the privileges of foreign nations that the city would protect merchants who rented houses from sudden rent increases (Stabel, *Vreemde kooplieden*, 94; Cf. for example the privileges of the German Hansa in 1359: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 48)

²⁶ Cf. chapter 1.

²⁷ Rößner, *Hansische*, 226-239; Van Houtte, “Herbergwesen”; Greve, “Bedeutung”, Greve

²⁸ In 1415 onwards, the city took over the exploitation of a *Wulhuus* voor de weighage and storage of wool from a local feudal lord. Although the latter retained the right to charge users, the city controlled the tariffs, and more importantly for our present purpose, allowed local and foreign traders alike to bypass the woolhouse and cater for weighage and storage themselves (Gilliodts, *Inventaire*, V, 212-313). Several entries in the city’s financial administration show that the premises were guarded during the night and regularly repaired to guarantee a proper and dry storage of ‘vachten’ and wool (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, V, 73, 210-211). For several products the display of goods by wholesale merchants in the *hallen* was limited to a few days per week only, in order to protect local retailers. In 1470 Charles the Bold confirmed a *keure* of 1304 to this effect. This *keure* also forbade any retail trade by alien traders. (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, VI, 9-11). In 1488 the city of Bruges laid down its demands to Maximilian in a letter, that, among other things, specified that alien merchants would be allowed to participate in retail trade, but only in the local halls (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, VI, 307). Unfortunately details on the occupants of Bruges’ *hallen* date from 1630 only (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, IV, 161-164).

²⁹ Peter Stabel, “Kooplieden in de stad”, in: André van de Walle, red., *Hanzekooplui en Medicibankiers. Brugge, wisselmarkt van Europese culturen*, Brugge: Stichting Kunstboek 2002, 85-96, at 92-94; Idem, *Gewenste vreemdeling****.

³⁰ The earliest dates for which the existence of these nation houses can be ascertained are 1377 (Lucca); 1397 (Venice), 1399 (Genoa), 1396 (Aragon/Catalunya), 1405 (Germany). In the late fifteenth century, merchants from England (***) , Scotland (1470) and Castile (1483) also had a nation house; Van de Walle, “Vreemde naties”, 32-39; On the Germans: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, V, 326 (1405). Meanwhile very little is known about the economic functions of these nation houses. References to the houses of Florentine, Venetian, and Genoese merchants in Bruges as *loges* in the sixteenth century (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, VIII, 490, 491, 494, 516) could indicate that they were used to negotiate deals as well. For in Italian towns the *loggia* was used as a vending location in the preindustrial period (Constable, *Housing*). Indeed the Genoese nation house was referred to as *logia inferiorj januensi* already in 1451 (Ibidem, V, 357), and it was used for cloth sales (Saeyhalle) after the Genoese merchants had moved to Antwerp in the early 16th century (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, VIII, 12).

³¹ When Bruges gave the Germans upon their return from Deventer? In 1457, the premises to built the house, mention was made only of a consulat and ‘comptoir’. (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, VI, 286-287)

³² In 1467 the Hansa had been granted a new privilege in Antwerp; in 1378 the city supplied them with a warehouse at the grain market (Dollinger, *Hanse*, 371).

³³ Rößner, *Hansische*, 71, 84, 94; For a similar policy in neighboring Bergen op Zoom: Sloomans, *Paas- en Koudemarkten*, I, 305-317.

³⁴ For Bergen op Zoom: Sloomans, *Paas- en Koudemarkten*, I, 308-309, 317-318, 353-384

³⁵ Tegenprestatie van de kooplieden was dat zij zich vooraf vastlegden op een bepaalde huurperiode en de huur volledig zouden voldoen, ook als ze de stad eerder verliepen (Prims, *Geschiedenis*, 2-II, 96

³⁶ Antwerpse Costumen 1582, LIX (“Van hueringhe”), especially articles 5, 6, and 20; In a different section of the Costumen it was determined that a house could not be repossessed while the two fairs were in motion, in order to protect the visiting merchants who used it for accommodation, storage, or sales (Antwerpse Costumen 1582, XXXIV, 27)

³⁷ Soly, *Urbanisme*, 224; Desmedt II, 131-132, 144-146, 155-157 **check these references**. Schlugleit, “Predikheerenpand”.

³⁸ The caption below a painting of the Leghuut reads: “The Groote Leghuut *belonging to this city*, lodging for hidebuyers from Amsterdam, merchants also, 1567” (translation and italics OCG). Though it should be noted that at least one Amsterdam merchant served as *ouderman* of the Leghuut suggesting that daily operations may have been supervised by the Dutch (Gelderblom, *Zuid-Nederlandse*, 84-85);

³⁹ Schlugleit; Soly; Gelderblom

⁴⁰ Van Tielhof, *Hollandse graanhandel*; Gelderblom, *From Antwerp*.

⁴¹ Harreld, *High-Germans*.

⁴² In the late fifteenth century German merchants stayed with three or four hostellers in Amsterdam (Wijnman, ‘Herberg’, and Rößner, *Hansische*, 104-105). Around 1560 in the Warmoesstraat (the principal commercial street) alone worked 15 to 20 hostellers (Kistemaker, *Warmoesstraat*; Wijnman, ‘Herberg’, 61-62)

⁴³ In 1586 the city offered the Bethanien convent for accomodation (**add reference**). When negotiations were reopened in 1598 the town showed the Courtmasters around the convents of St. Catherina and St. Mary, as possible facilities for “housing, yard, and church” Van Dillen, *Bronnen Bedrijfsleven*, I, nr. 938 (1 July 1598)

⁴⁴ Amsterdam sources already contain numerous references to warehouses (*spijkers*) in use from the mid-sixteenth century onwards: S.A.C. Dudok van Heel, “Vroege brouwerijen aan de Amstel in de vijftiende en zestiende eeuw”, *Jaarboek Amstelodamum* 82 (1990), 23-74; and Idem, “Een grote concentratie van zeepzieders aan het Damrak. Amsterdamse zeepziederijen in de 16^e en vroege 17^e eeuw”, *Jaarboek Amstelodamum*, 83 (1991), 45-112. In the seventeenth century the number of warehouses grew rapidly, a development that has not attracted any scholarly interest except for art historians who have studied the construction of some of the more public warehouses of the Dutch East India Company, Amsterdam’s Admiralty, and various civic institutions (orphanages, etc.): Magda Révész-Alexander, *Die Alten Lagerhäuser Amsterdam. Eine Kunstgeschichtliche Studie*, 2nd. Edition, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff 1954. For the ownership of warehouses by Portuguese merchants in Amsterdam, cf. *Studia Rosenthaliana*, nr. 340, 356.

⁴⁵ The right is established in the second oldest town ordinance of Bruges (1281): Stützel, “Privilegien”, 47, citing Gilliodts-van Severen, *Coutumes I*, 245 (**check this**), and in the mid-fourteenth century it was repeated in privileges of merchants from Germany and Kampen: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 50,79. Cf. on the rights of English merchants to carry arms in Brabant in 1296: Prims, *Geschiedenis*, II-2. **Check this in De Smedt**

⁴⁶ “vuulle meysins noch andere gheboufte niet en verkeere, noch hare onnuttichede en bedriven also zy dies langhe tyd ghewoene hebben gezin.” Gilliodts-van Severen, *Cartulaire*, 88-89

⁴⁷ The forbidden weapons were “hooftwapenen ofte andre ongheoorloofde wapenen, als glavyen, pycken, goegen, halebaerden, haxen, hameren, loodin plompen, praessche messen, zweerden, bazelaren, coustillen, handhaexkin, dagghen, danof de lemmeren langhere zyn danne drie palmen, plommeen, bedect of onbedect...” (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, VI, 352)

⁴⁸ *Costumen 1545*, title II, art 1. “Nobody in the city of Antwerp may carry a murderweapon, unless he was arriving or leaving the city from overland or oversea...; hostellers who, when asked, did not inform their guests about this rule had to pay the fine that was otherwise payable by the weapon’s owner. The additional specification of the duty of hostellers to inform their guests (and notify the authorities in case guests did carry their arms; art 18) makes it clear that the rule must have applied to merchants as well. Nota bene: wel was het burgers met de verplichting te dienen in de civic guard toegestaan om een wapenuitrusting in huis te hebben. (cf for a reference to this practice *Costumen 1545*, title XIII art.10; Also *Costumen 1582*, title XLI, art 101)

⁴⁹ Boomgaard, *Misdaad*, 212

⁵⁰ In Flemish towns the first restriction of the carrying of arms in the marketplace date back to the late twelfth century: R. van Uytven, “Stadsgeschiedenis in het Noorden en Zuiden”, in AGN 2 Haarlem: Fibula-van Dishoeck 1982, pp. 188-253, at 216. In 1304 Bruges set rules to prevent abuse of weapons: Stützel, “Privilegien”, 47, cites L.A. Warnkönig, *Flandrische Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte bis zum Jahre 1305*, 3 Teile, Tübingen 1835-1842, Teil 2, 119-127 (**explore this reference**)

⁵¹ The mention in 1334: Gilliodts-van Severen, *inventaire*, VII, 562-563. In 1335 the city accounts read “Wouter Pietersz, schoutheete van Brucghe over sine pine ende over sine coste van dat hi achterwaerde de brucghemaerct met sinene gheselschepe, beede bi daghe ende bi nachte: 12 pounds flemish” (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, IV, 199). In 1411 town expenditure included payments for the guards that were present overnight at the market (ter maerct), where they were there to act immediately upon any disturbances that might arise (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, IV, 178; cf. also VI, 36).

⁵² For example, in the privileges granted to English merchants by the Duke of Brabant in 1296: “sauve trepas ke touche perte de vie ou de membre” (Prims, *Geschiedenis*, II-2, 98). Cf. also the German privileges: Stützel, “Privilegien”.

⁵³ In the privileges of the German Hansa, and inhabitants of Kampen, in 1359 and 1360 respectively, it was specified that if thieves or murderers were caught in the act, they could be held until justice was done (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 52-53, 77-82; Cf. also the separate confirmation of this clause in a letter sent by the Count of Flanders to the Hanseatic diet in Lübeck in 1360: *Inventaire*, IV, 292). In Antwerp, citizens and residents (the latter *de jure* including foreign merchants) would not be prosecuted if they killed a thief (m/w) in their house or on their property between dusk and dawn,

unless they had had the strength and the opportunity to chase the thief from their property. In that case prosecution would follow (*Antwerpse Costumen* 1545, title I, Art. 21). Also, if a thief (man or woman) was caught red-handed, the rightful owner of the property had the right to take it from the thief with force, or simply repossess it in case the thief fled leaving behind the goods. There was no obligation to bring the goods to the authorities first, but one was required to notify the authorities within 24 hours about what had ‘zich voorgedaan’, who the thief was, and what goods were concerned (*Antwerpse Costumen* 1545, title I, Art. 23)

⁵⁴ Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, IV, 258, 261-262.

⁵⁵ (RSH 202/482, 02-09-1577) An investigation and similar exemplary punishment was requested for otherwise unspecified excesses reported by the Scottish ambassador in 1602. (RSH 46/52, 12 February and 16 March 1602). When a Danish captain in the service of the States General attacked a party of envoys, among whom the Venetian ambassador, between Woudrichem and Heusden, the case was taken to the Council of State. RSH 133/145, 18-06-1627; RSH 143/156, 25-06-1627

⁵⁶ In 1428 Castilian merchants in Bruges were promised the same rights as local citizens in case their goods were stolen (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, VI, 498). In 1484 Amsterdam held out the prospect of repossession, a fine, and disciplinary punishment to all men and women buying stolen goods: “nyemant, wye hy zy, tzy man off wijff, en moet copen enyge gheroofde goeden, uptie verbuernisse van thyen pondt ende die goeden, die zy ghecoft sullen hebben. Ende voirt up sulke correxeye alst gerecht dairff doen sal, nae uutwysinge de wilcore, die dairoff is.” Breen, *Rechtsbronnen*, p.212 (9 jan 1484). In Antwerp a merchant who happened upon his stolen goods had to ask the authorities to seize them. However, as a man of honour he could swear the merchandise was his property (or in his lawful possession), for it to be returned to him straight away. This rule even applied to merchandise traded on the Brabant fairs, to goods traded by second-hand clothes dealers, goods sold at public auctions, and money and goods that had been given to public authorities (for whatever reason): *Antwerpse Costumen* 1545, title I, Art. 22; cf. also Title II, art 46; *Antwerpse Costumen* 1570, title XV; *Antwerpse Costumen* 1582, title LVIII, art. 1).

⁵⁷ Although representatives of the foreign nations could of course plea for their members, as the Portuguese consul did after Portuguese merchant Lyonel Rodrigues had killed a soldier in 1567 (Goris, *Etude*, 44)

⁵⁸ Dollinger, *Hanse*, 68, 71

⁵⁹ After 1309 there are very few recorded complaints of foreign merchants about arbitrary or hostile behaviour by the town magistrates of Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam. One incident occurred in 1323 when the Count of Flanders called Bruges to account for the seizure of ship with goods belonging to Portuguese and Castilian merchants in Zwin. However, the city rebutted that the ship actually was French and had been seized by Flemish sailors near Calais (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, 341-342). Cf. also complaints filed by Scottish merchants with the secretary of the Hofraad of the Burgundian dukes about their treatment by the aldermen of Bruges. [*Check what this was about*] Van Rompaey, *Grote Raad*, 190. Otherwise the recorded sentences of the Great Council of Malines (1470-1550) and the Court of Holland (1580-1632) reveal no lawsuits pitching foreign merchants against the town magistrates of Bruges, Antwerp, or Amsterdam (Smidt, *Chronologische Lijsten*; *Sententien Hof van Holland*).

⁶⁰ Boone/Prak, *Big and Little Tradition*.

⁶¹ Appendix A

⁶² For Amsterdam, see the assaults on one Remonstrant leader (Kloek)

⁶³ H. Soly, “Introduction. Charles V and his time”, in: H. Soly, ed. *Charles V and his time. 1500-1558*. (Antwerpen: Mercatorfonds 1999), at 18: “Antwerp property developer Gilbert van Schoonbeke secured the de facto monopoly of beer production in the metropolis by giving the emperor a share in the annual profit of his breweries when the middle classes rose against this.” W. Blockmans, “Contracting Monarchies”, in: H. Soly, ed. *Charles V and his time. 1500-1558*. (Antwerpen: Mercatorfonds 1999), 227-284, at 270-271

⁶⁴ On the Hansa: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 48-51; Stützel, “Privilegien”. Similar promises in the privileges for the inhabitants of Kampen in 1360: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 77-82, articles 4,5, 15, 21. On the Castilian privileges of 1366: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 135, privileges of 1366, articles 5, 28, 29, 33, 34, 35. Cf. also rules regarding the weighage of goods in their privileges of 1348 and 1428: (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 130, and IV(?) 499.

⁶⁵ Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, V, 561

⁶⁶ Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, V, 397-399

⁶⁷ On the responsibilities and salaries of legal officials in Antwerp: *Antwerpse Costumen* (1532); On the organization of both the legal and commercial professions in Amsterdam: *Handtvesten* (1639), 139-

224, 281-337. Note, however, that in the turmoil of the Dutch Revolt the States General still promised Merchant Adventurers that tax collectors would not hinder their trade (RSG 1579)

⁶⁸ R. van Uytven, “Stadsgeschiedenis in het Noorden en Zuiden”, in AGN 2 Haarlem: Fibula-van Dishoeck 1982, pp. 188-253, at 223

⁶⁹ Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, III, 460)

⁷⁰ Blockmans, *Volksvertegenwoordiging*, 331)

⁷¹ Cf. appendix 2

⁷² De Smidt *Sententien, 1470-1550*: In 1470 English and German merchants obtained the lifting of an attachment of English cloth by the waterbailiff of Sluis. In 1494 the bailiff of Rotterdam had to pay damages to Spanish merchants for goods he had seized. In 1502 Scottish merchants asked for the return of their merchandise, stored in the house of the bailiff of Dunkirque. Besides these cases, the Great Council heard three cases regarding the seizure of goods following the non-payment of tolls by foreign merchants in 1509, 1513, 1517; and one similar case related to the stapleright for wines in Middelburg. The first three cases may or may not involve abuses of the baillifs, but surely the latter four cases do not relate to misbehaviour of public officials at all. Our analysis of cases Flemish and English merchants brought before the Court of Holland between 1580 and 1632 does not show a single complaint about public officers (Hof van Holland, *Sententien*). NB Check the following case (is it included in my review of the Great Council): English merchants in Antwerp brought custom officials to court for the excessive violence they used in pursuit of ships that had not paid tolls (Thielemans, *Bourgogne*, 249) with references to Unger, *Tol van Iersekeroord en Smit, Handel op Engeland*. *check this

⁷³ Find examples.

⁷⁴ Compare the wars that ushered in the decline of the Champagne fairs in the late thirteenth century (Munro). Cf. also the conflicts between Italian city states that endangered merchants traveling to the fairs of the Po delta: Gerhard Rösch, “Die Italienischen Messen im 13. Jahrhundert”, in: Peter Johanek und Heinz Stoob, eds., *Europäische Messen und Märktsysteme in Mittelalter und Neuzeit*. Köln: Böhlau 1996, 35-56, at 53

⁷⁵ In 1421 a merchant from London was allowed “to travel with five armoured men, swords, and other weapons” through Holland and Zeeland, its towns and villages. (Van Mieris, *Charterboek*, p. 594). Note also the improvements of the safety on the road from Antwerp to Cologne after the duke of Brabant gained control over Limburg in 1288 (Prims, *Geschiedenis*, 2-2, 110-111).

⁷⁶ Antwerp Customs 1582, title XLIX; In addition, anyone breaking the freedom of the fair would lose the right to protection – a rulle that seems to have been designed for merchants wrongfully seizing the goods of fellow traders. It should be noted that the principles described here is only formulated in the Antwerp customs of 1609 (title IV), pp. 48-50. Obviously there were a few exceptions and further specifications of these general rules. Local citizens were also excepted from the freedom of the fairs, but their rights were sufficiently protected by the towns own rules for contracting and sanctioning.

⁷⁷ In 1398 the city of Antwerp sent letters and envoys to Guelders(?) to secure the return of merchandise stolen from the carts of Cologne merchants traveling to Antwerp. Still, it took two years to get the goods back (Prims, *Geschiedenis*, V-1, 142-144). For other examples from the second half of the fourteenth century: Prims, *Geschiedenis*, V-1, 123-124. In the sixteenth century, when four transporters on their way to Antwerp were robbed from the merchandise they carried for South-German merchants, the local noblemen was quick to track and arrest the party of robbers. The episode is recounted in Harreld, *High Germans*, 110. Cf. also the extensive survey of criminal assaults on visitors of the fairs of Bergen op Zoom in the fifteenth and sixteenth century compiled by Slootmans, *Paas- en Koudemarkten*. In 1527 Bergse stadsbestuur contacted the duke of Guelders to support claims of Hanseatic merchants whose goods had been arrested in Coevorden. Slootmans, *Paas- en Koudemarkten*, I, 92-93

⁷⁸ Cf. decline of fairs of Champagne in late 13th century.

⁷⁹ For example, London merchants in Bergen did not want to travel to Bruges to fetch their merchandise in 1485, in fear of being robbed. They receive safeconduct from Maximilian and Philip (Slootmans, I, 139)

⁸⁰ Prims, *Geschiedenis*, V-1, 129, 164-165. In 1515 the other city hosting the Brabant fairs, Bergen op Zoom, hired a captain and several soldiers to “secure and convoy” the visitors of the fair. (Slootmans, I, 12).

⁸¹ Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, III, 458, 462-463; Paviot, *Politique navale*, 249.

⁸² In 1423 the towns of Holland asked the Count of Holland for an armed escort to accompany its merchants to the fairs of Antwerp (F. Van Mieris, *Groot Charterboek der graaven van Holland en Zeeland en heeren van Friesland deel IV* (Leiden 1756), 677-678).

⁸³ The initial safeconducts extended by Count William II to merchants from Hamburg and Lübeck in 1243 was repeatedly confirmed in 1245, 1249, 1253, and 1266, and as early as 1252 extended to include traders from the Mark of Brandenburg, and the German cities of Bremen, Stade, Dortmund, and Soest (D.E.H. de Boer, “Florerend vanuit de delta. De handelsbetrekkingen van Holland en Zeeland in de tweede helft van de dertiende eeuw”, in: D.E.H. de Boer, E.H.P. Cordfunke and H. Sarfatij, eds. *Wi Florens. De Hollandse graaf Floris V in de samenleving van de dertiende eeuw*, Utrecht: Matrijs 1996, 126-152, at 132-133). In further attempts to try and divert part of the German trade from Flanders to their own territories in the 1260s and 1270s the rulers of Zeeland and Holland issued several more safe-conducts in combination with grants of separate jurisdiction, and favourable toll tariffs, to merchants from Hamburg and several towns bordering the river IJssel. Cf. A.C.F. Koch, J.G. Kruisheer, J.W.J. Burgers, and J. Sparreboom, *Oorkondenboek van Holland en Zeeland tot 1299* (’s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff 1970): 1266, Viscount of Zeeland to merchants from Hamburg and the Elbe (nr. 1422); 1276-1278, Count of Holland to merchants from Kampen, Zwolle, Deventer, and Wilsum (nr. 1754); Hamburg (nr. 1801) and Deventer (nr. 1829). Overigens suggereert onderzoek van Smit (Opkomst, 2-3, 25-27) naar dat pogingen weinig succesvol waren en dat alle Duitsers met uitzondering van de Hamburgers, tot eind veertiende eeuw overzee naar Vlaanderen reisden.

⁸⁴ For reciprocity implied in German privileges of 1253: Stützel, “Privilegien”, 57. For safe-conducts negotiated between Holland, Zeeland, and England in the second half of the 13th century, cf. De Boer, “Florerend”, 129, 147; The new privileges of Portuguese merchants in 1438 where laid down in a treaty between Burgundy and Portugal on the occasion of the marriage of Philip the Good and Isabella (**add reference**). Reciprocity was not always immediate, however. While French merchants received their first privileges in Flanders in 1262, merchants from Flanders, Brabant, Holland, and Zeeland received a similar set of privileges from Louis XI only in 1462: Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 123. In the second half of the 14th century Amsterdam tried to secure the safety of its merchants abroad. A treaty signed between the king of Sweden, the cities of Amsterdam and Enkhuizen, and the island of Wieringen, stipulated that Dutch shipmasters were allowed to salvage their own ships (or commission locals to do it for them), and to go on land with their rifles in Denmark and Scania. In the mid-fifteenth century (1443) Amsterdam secured the safety of its merchants in Norway in a similar way. After revisions in 1452 and 1453 the guarantees were extended to include all subjects of the Burgundian dukes. Noordkerk, *Handvesten*, I, chapter 19, 51-61.

⁸⁵ Cf. for the role of Bruges and other towns in the organization of Flemish trade with England and France since the 11th century: Van Werveke in HgB1***; Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 94-97. The direct involvement of the Flemish towns can be traced in the privileges of merchants from La Rochelle and Saint-Jean d’Angély (1331), Nuremburg (1362), Castile (1366, 1428) England (1408), Portugal (1411), Scotland (1427), and Germany (1307/9, 1359/60, 1438, 1457). Stützel, “Privilegien”; Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 108; Blockmans, *Volksvertegenwoordiging*, 481-483; Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 139; IV, 495-500). In later years the initiative seems to have shifted to the central government and the foreign merchants themselves. When Charles the Bold renewed the privileges of the Venetians in 1467 consultations with his Great Council and the city of Bruges were mentioned, but there is no sign of any initiative from the side of the Flemish towns. For example, the request for new privileges seems to have been made by the Venetians themselves, represented by the legal scholar Antoine Dandolo (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, 559-560).

⁸⁶ The first privileges of almost all foreign nations in the Low Countries included a general safeconduct for merchants and their goods. The earliest agreement between Cologne and Flanders dates from 1178 (Boerner/Ritschl, 206); In 1253 all German traders in Flanders were promised protection of their person and goods throughout the county (Boerner/Ritschl, 206; Stützel, “Privilegien”, 57). In 1262 followed safeconducts for French wine traders. According to Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 107, the privileges the Countess of Flanders granted to merchants from La Rochelle, Saint-Jean d’Angély, and Niort based in the seaport of Gravelines, effectively applied to all French merchants in Flanders. Additional privileges granted to merchants from La Rochelle and Saint-Jean d’Angély in 1331 in Damme – by then the principal emporium for French wine – seem to have been limited to the citizens of these two towns. Shortly before 1300 merchants from England received a safeconducts from the rulers of Flanders, Brabant, Holland, and Zeeland. Cf. for the Castilians the oldest ‘lettre de franchise’, that included the curtailment of reprisals that did not concern their own debts and wrongdoing (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 130). Several rulers decided to issue general safeconduct to all merchants visiting their territories. King of England in his well-known carta mercatoria of 1303 gave a general safeconduct to all merchants visiting his territories. In 1492 Amsterdam’s burgomasters referred to a then already old privilege of the Count of Holland that stipulated that all ships sailing to

and from Amsterdam were “free, safe, and protected” Breen, *Rechtsbronnen*, (ergens tussen p. 262 en 275) 1492, 20 aug’.

⁸⁷ General formulation of the freeing of the Strandrecht already in first privileges of German merchants in 1253. Later amplified (wit rules regarding the ‘bewing’ van unclaimed goods by the waterbailiff, and the ‘bergloon’ in 1360 (Stützel, “Privilegien”, 59). In the privileges for merchants from La Rochelle and Saint-Jean d’Angély in 1331 the Count of Flanders waived his ‘droit d’epave’, except for any remains of ships that perished with ‘man and muis’ (Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 108) Following the Great Privilege of 1477 Bruges laid down in its customs that merchants were entitled to salvaging all their goods from ships wrecked on the Flemish coast (Privilège de Bruges, octroyé par Marie de Bourgogne, 13 mars 1477; Art 26; Gilliodts-van Severen, *Coutumes*, vol II, pp. 72-109). Duitsers in Holland in de 13de eeuw al verzekering kregen dat goods would be returned to them (De Boer, “Florierend”, 132.) In 1348 Louis of Male, count of Flanders, confirmed the customary right of Castilians (upheld since the reign of Count Robert **check date**) to reposses salvaged goods, provided they compensated those who salvaged them according to the law of Bruges (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 131). The Castilian privileges also included a promise that local were expected foreigners to help salvage the goods. De voorwaarde of the production of a title of ownership also in privileges to Venetians: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, 562-563; Note that rules regarding the salvage of cargoes lost were not typical for the Low Countries. They also were an important element of the privileges extended by the French king to merchants from the Low Countries in 1462 (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, V, 428), as well as of the privileges secured by Amsterdam for its merchants in Scandinavia: A treaty signed between the king of Sweden, the citey of Amsterdam and Enkhuizen, and the island of Wieringhen, stipulated that their shipmasters were allowed to salvage, or do salvage their own ships, and land with their rifles (met haer gheweer aen landt moghen komen) in Denmark and Scania (Noordkerk, *Handvesten*, I, chapter 19, 51-61)

⁸⁸ Gold bijvoorbeeld niet in Engeland. Wat overigens niet betekende dat de English king did not seize goods of foreigners on many occasions: Wedemeyer Moore, p. 159.

⁸⁹ Indirect evidence for continued criminal assaults throughout Flanders until at least the end of the fifteenth century are the many ordinances issued by the Four Members (1413, 1415, 1533, 1441, 1445, 1448, 1467), and the central government (1498). Each of the Members was expected to enforce these rules in its territory (Blockmans, *Volksvertegenwoordiging*, 460-462).

⁹⁰ If German merchandise was stolen and sent abroad, the Flemish town where the theft had occurred was held responsible for the retrieval – unless the theft had occurred during a fair (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 53). However, a German merchant or his proxy (another member of the *Kontor*) were allowed to apprehend a robber that had fled Flanders and then returned in the County, and hand him over to the local authorities (provided they had been unable to get a conviction outside Flanders). In addition they were allowed to apprehend robbers caught in the act of stealing anywhere in Flanders. Stützel, “Privilegien”, 34-35. Cf. also Appendix 2.

⁹¹ “le duc autorisera ses officiers à saisir les biens et marchandises des habitants des villes ou chateaux ou les objets volés auront été conduits”. Voor geweld gepleegd door Fransen tegen de Hanze werd een aparte maatregel getroffen, omdat Vlaanderen nog altijd een fief van de French king was. De towns of Flanders zouden niet verantwoordelijk gesteld worden voor brigandage and murder committed by subjects of the French kings, for the latter himself secured the safety of the Germans vis-à-vis his own subjects. However, the German merchants and the Three members retained the right to prosecute the criminals in Flanders. The clauses are mentioned in both the Flemish version and the French version of the new privileges of 1392. Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, III, 224-228 (charter of Philip le Hardi, in latin), 232 (in Flemish) and I.L.A. Diegerick, *Inventaire analytique et chronologique des chartes et documents appartenant aux Archives de la Ville d’Ypres*, (Bruges: Vandecasteele-Werbrouck 1854), II, p. 268-271 (confirmation by Three Members, in French).

⁹² Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, III, 524

⁹³ Boone and Prak***

⁹⁴ Cf. for examples fines to visitors of Antwerp in 1389 and Bergen op Zoom in 1401: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, IV, 158, 201).

⁹⁵ Slootmans, I, 121-123

⁹⁶ Germans, Catalans, Genoese, Spaniards, Lombards, Scots and Englishmen were unwilling to contribute to the revolt of the Flemish towns against the Count, and followed the order to leave the city. They returned within a few months, however, after the defeat of the Flemish army at Westrosebeke. Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, IV, 311; Prims, *Geschiedenis*, V-1, 99; Dollinger, *Hanse*, 101

⁹⁷ Van Rompaey, *Grote Raad*, 85-86

⁹⁸ Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 13; refers to A. Janse, *Grenzen aan de Macht*; Sicking, *Neptune*, 291-292

- ⁹⁹ Paviot, *Politique navale*, 233-234; Check Niemeijer over handelsoorlog met Dordrecht 1442-1445
- ¹⁰⁰ Sicking, *Neptune*, 290-301; Cf. also: Tracy, Holland (nog nazoeken); Israel, Dutch Republic, 34, 49.
- ¹⁰¹ Goris, *Etude*, p. 5.
- ¹⁰² The episode is recounted in: Mulder, *Twee verhandelingen*, 7-12; and Marnef, *Antwerpen*, 119
- ¹⁰³ Notably ordinances dating from 1521, 1540 and 1544 (Thijs, Minderheden); Note that already in 1490 the Bishop of Cambrai had guaranteed the citizens of Antwerp to be spared the Inquisition Goris, *Etude*, 546. Juist door de steun van de stad, hoefden kooplieden niet zelfstandig op te treden. Thus, Portugese consuls dienden overigens slechts 1 keer een rekest in in 1532 om te protesteren tegen de arrestatie van kooplieden omwille van hun geloof (Goris, *Etude*, 43)
- ¹⁰⁴ “eenighsins te beletten in onze voorsz. Landen de behoorlicke coopmanschappe ende contracten tusschen den vreemden coopliden ende onze onderzaten, nochte dat sy niet vrijelicken en souden moghen disponeren van heuren goeden na den ghescreven rechten ende costume van der plaetse respectivelicken” (Mulder, *Twee verhandelingen*, 12)
- ¹⁰⁵ Mulder, *Twee verhandelingen*, 12; and Marnef, *Antwerpen*, 119; Further evidence for the commitment of the city to the interests of the foreign merchant community dates from 1562 when Philip II designated Antwerp as the seat for a new bishopric.¹⁰⁵ The town magistrate wrote to Margaretha of Parma that it feared alien merchants would leave for Rouen or Hamburg if the Emperor would do this. Shortly afterwards the city sent envoys to Spain to ask Philip II to abandon the idea. The catholic sovereign was unimpressed at first, but then in 1563 revoked the plan, to revigourate it only after the appointment of the Duke of Alva. Mulder, *Twee verhandelingen*, 49-53
- ¹⁰⁶ Gelderblom, *Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden*, 71-72.
- ¹⁰⁷ Foreign merchant communities contributed more than 75,000 guilders, or 17.5% of the loan that totaled 430,000 guilders. One merchant from Spain paid 90 guilders, a merchant from Florence paid 1,000 guilders; several merchants from Andalusia paid 3,100 guilders in all; the Milanese made a contribution of 10,000 guilders, the Portuguese 12,000 guilders, the Lucchese 20,000 guilders, and finally the Genoese 30,000 guilders. (Van den Brande, *Register van Leeninghe*)
- ¹⁰⁸ Add references to resolutions of States General regarding assaults on Genoese, Spanish, French, and English merchants between 1570 and 1590.
- ¹⁰⁹ Gelderblom, *Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden*; Gelderblom, “From Antwerp to Amsterdam”
- ¹¹⁰ Cf for example the reluctance of Antwerp merchants to travel back home in the 1590s: Gelderblom, *Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden*. Cf. also a request for compensation by an Amsterdam merchant following the theft of his merchandise by a party of ‘ruiters’ in Germany: RSG 1610, nr. 751
- ¹¹¹ In 1580 the States General asked the cities of Nijmegen and Grave to secure that merchants and shipmasters can safely pass these cities on the Meuse (RSG 1580, 180); In 1610 when neighboring Cleves was involved in a power struggle between competing princes, the States General issued various letters to merchants trading with Germany, asking these rulers to protect them against robberies by military troops, and other assaults. (RSG 1610, 61, 140). To secure their throughfare, in December 1612 merchants from Dordrecht received letters of recommendation for a number of rulers in the German lands (RSG 1612, nr. 1337).
- ¹¹² In 1570 the central government determined that cities had to pay for protection against pirates on inland waterways (RSH 28-07-1570). However, in 1596 Dordrecht asked for protection against robbers on the rivers and if it could not be granted, it would retain some of the revenues of the ‘convoyen’ The States of Holland objected to the latter suggestion, (RSH 595/625, 2 and 21 December 1596.) but three years later it seems that protection of the rivers was at least partly paid for by the States of Holland through taxation of internal trade. This is clear from a request by the Merchant Adventurers in 1599 to reduce the *convoyen*, because of “the apparent opening of the Rhine” RSH 234/253, 9 and 12 June 1599.
- ¹¹³ In 1570, in reply to a request by the States of Holland, the central government determined that cities had to pay for protection against pirates on inland waterways (RSH 28-07-1570). Nog inpassen: attempts to free landtrade from local tolls initially levied to finance warfare, and other tolls that damage trade, by means of letters to responsible rulers RSG 7, p. 470, 4763-474, 1591
- ¹¹⁴ RSG 1605, 490. In 1596 Admiralty of Rotterdam complained that soldiers of the States General attacked merchants with valid passports on the Meuse, and asked for more warships on the river against such *stroomrovers*. (RSG 1596, p. 184-185). In 1600 the States General agreed to an escort of cavalry for the Amsterdam merchants traveling in convoy to Germany. (RSG 1600, p. 340). Also RSG 1597, pp. 535-536;
- ¹¹⁵ Detailed in Kernkamp, *Handel op de Vijand*; For the period 1621-1636: Jonathan I. Israel, “The States General and the Strategic Regulation of Dutch River Trade, 1621-1636”, BMGN 95-3 (1980), 461-491

¹¹⁶ It is telling that Holland, and Amsterdam in particular, in 1626 and the first half of 1627 went against the desires of many inland towns in its support for a continued river blockade. (Israel, “States General”, 473-477)

¹¹⁷ In many cases a business operation like many others. Genoese merchants combined trade with privateering, and hence did not hesitate to attack ships of other nations. On various occasions, Italian and Spanish merchants filed charges against the Genoese in the local court. (Stabel 2001: 7-8) The town records of Bergen op Zoom show merchantmen of visiting foreigners falling victim to pirates from England, France, Portugal and Holland (Slootmans, I, 94-113). In The colonial expansion proved lucrative to European rovers operating from the Canaries, the Azores, and later also the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. (Pérotin-Dumon, *Pirate*, 211) Dutch merchants and shipmasters did not hesitate to engage in piracy and privateering either. Indeed, in Amsterdam the hunt for prizes was organized like any other commercial venture. Cf. for example the participation of the Walloon merchant Pieter Denijs, otherwise active as beer brewer, civet trader, and general wholesale merchant, in at least 11 shipping companies that privateered between 1622 and 1632: ACA Notarial Archives 258/349, 24 January 1623; NA 221/9v, 30 May 1623; NA 717/459, 28 June 1623; NA 717/627, 19 August 1623; NA 719/219, 18 June 1625; NA 721/319, 17 September 1627; ; NA 723/436, 5 January 1629; NA 725/299, 6 August 1631; NA 26/416, 05 August 1632; At least one ship sailed on ‘free bounty’; six others had official letters of marque. Three of the latter ships made no profit for their owners because the shipmasters had not respected its commission, and damaged several ‘free ships’, after which the Admiralty had repossessed their prizes. (NA 719/219, 18 June 1625; NA 725/299, 6 August 1631)

¹¹⁸ On the preference for peace, see the following episode: p. op of na 15 mei 1493: ”Alsoe op ghisteren mit openen mandamenten gepubliceert es pays ende vrede tuschen den Roemschen coning, hertoge Philips, onsen erfachtigen here, zijn genaden zoen, an deen zyde ende den coninck van Vranckrijk an dander zyde, twelck een sake es, dienende totten gemeenen welvaren, omme alle comanscheppen ende neringen voirtganck te hebben” **Er wordt een processie gehouden van het heilig sacrament (hostie in kostbare reliekhouders onder baldakijn gedragen door priester). Zeer belangrijk: alleen bij zeer bijzondere gelegenheden Vgl. over processies: H. Roodenburg, *Onder Censuur*, 65-70: processies bedoeld om eendracht en sociale orde te bevestigen en versterken.**

¹¹⁹ Spufford, Power, 19; Van Houtte, *Geschiedenis*, 173; On land routes used for wine trade with France: Craeybeckx, *Grand commerce*, 54-67, 74-76

¹²⁰ Horden and Purcell, *Corrupting Sea*, 157; On the Italian galleys: Häpke, *Weltmarkt*, 157; Vandewalle, ‘Vreemde naties’, 27-30; Henn, “Entfaltung”, 53; Stabel***; Hamburg beer traders sailed in admiralty to Amsterdam in 1352. On November 7, 1352, 25 ships carrying 7,490 tons of beer, arrived together. Six smaller fleets arriving in the same year counted between 3 and 18 ships. Smit, *Opkomst*, 46; On convoys from Burgos and Seville: Sicking, Neptune,

¹²¹ **(Check Lane, Stabel, Heers)**

¹²² The older literature on the Venetian galley system is summarized in Mallet, *Florentine galleys*, 17n.

¹²³ The fleet system in Florence operated between 1421 and 1480. Just like in Venice the actual operation of the communal fleets was mostly auctioned off to private entrepreneurs, who made their money from charging freighters for the cargo space they hired. Yet the state-appointed *Consoli del Mare* in Florence supervised the building and equipment of the galleys, set the rules for their operations, decided on who was to hire cargo space, and determined departure time and sailing routes. Michael E. Mallett, *The Florentine Galleys in the Fifteenth Century*, Oxford University Press: London 1967, 17-22, 82-103. Cf. also W.B. Watson, “The Structure of the Florentine Galley Trade with Flanders and England in the Fifteenth Century, *BTFG* 39 (1961), 1073-1091 **(vervolg van artikel in volgend nummer BTFG)**

¹²⁴ The oldest privileges Bruges granted to the “admiral, merchants, shipmasters, and sailors, subjects of the king of Castille” contained no specifications with regard to the organization of convoys but did establish the right of Castilian admirals to settle conflicts that arose between shipmasters and their crew. (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 130-132) The same was true for the more extensive set of privileges granted to the Castilians in 1366: several articles concerning the repairs of ships were added but nothing with regard to the organization of admiralties or convoys (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 132-139). Catalan merchants seem

¹²⁵ The following is based on Puhle, *Vitalienbrüder*.

¹²⁶ Cf. also Smit, *Opkomst*, 145-146, for ships sailing in convoy between Prussia and Holland

¹²⁷ Nadat Pruisen duideijk had gemaakt niet mee te willen doen, trok ook Amsterdam haar toezegging enkele koggen te leveren in: Smit, *Opkomst*, 147-148

¹²⁸ Although repeatedly asked for help in 1398 and 1399, the Four Members of Flanders did not provide any naval support for these expeditions. Paviot, *Politique navale*, 236.

¹²⁹ In the 1380s Flanders' involvement in the Hundred Years War led to attacks on English and French ships Cf. for example the capture of English goods and ships in 1371, 1382, 1411 (Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, II, 188-227; III, 281-285; IV, 61; IX, 11); English merchants were banned altogether from Bruges in 1387 (Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, III, 95-96); The ensuing reprisals also hit ships and merchants from other countries. Cf. for damage to merchants from Germany and Spain in 1387: Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, III, 96; And to damage to merchants from Brittany: Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, III, 454.

¹³⁰ Attacks by privateers and pirates are recorded for 55 years in this period. Cf. Appendix A

¹³¹ The Burgundian ships were released but the Hanseatic ones were brought to England: Thielemans, Bourgogne, 336; **Check Sneller and Unger, Bronnen, nr 182**; In the last decades of the fourteenth century convoys of Flemish (and probably also French and Spanish) ships carrying salt and wine were attacked by English ships twice (1371, 1387). In 1419 one fleet of 40 vessels sailing from Flanders to France was captured by Castilians: Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 115-117. For attacks on individual Hanseatic ships: Thielemans, 337-338.

¹³² De Boer, "Florerend", 143-144; Cf. also the letter written to the English king by the Count of Holland in the interest of a subject whose ship had been arrested in Lynn in 1279 (De Boer, "Florerend", 129). After another incident, the same shipmaster appeared before a royal court in England in 1294, where he was asked to produce a declaration of his damages, signed by the Count of Holland. (De Boer, "Florerend", 130).

¹³³ (Gilliodts, Inventaire, IX, 14)

¹³⁴ Letters of marques in Bruges town registers: 1418, 1423, 1424. Gilliodts, Coutumes, I, 466-472; Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, IV, 379, 381, 494;

¹³⁵ Navarra was explicitly excluded from the tax. Gilliodts-van Severen, Cartulaire, 23; Inventaire IV 495-496

¹³⁶ Gilliodts-van Severen, Cartulaire, 26

¹³⁷ In 1440 when talks with the Aragones consuls in Bruges failed to produce a result, the Duke set a levy of 1.66% on all imports from Aragon to be collected by the disenfranchised merchants. Paviot, *Politique navale*, 214. Five years later the levy was raised to 2.5% following the capture of a Burgundian ship in the Mediterranean.

¹³⁸ Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, IV, 494, 496, 497. Paviot, *Politique navale*, 217

¹³⁹ Paviot, *Politique navale*, 213-215; Add reference to Gilliodt-van Severen

¹⁴⁰ Blockmans, Bruges and France, 207

¹⁴¹ The magistrates of Flanders' major towns regularly met since the late twelfth century. Initially seven towns participated in the *ledenvergaderingen* but after 1304 only Bruges, Ghent and Ypres remained. From 1310 onwards the *Brugse Vrije* (Free Quarter of Bruges) incidentally participated. The *Vrije*, representing Bruges' immediate hinterland, became a regular Member in 1382, and was formally recognized as such in 1437. (Blockmans, *Volksvertegenwoordiging*, 128-131). For their participation in foreign politics, see Blockmans' analysis of the role played by the Three Members in bilateral and multilateral contacts between 1400 and 1500 (Blockmans, *Volksvertegenwoordiging*, 170-192), and his analysis of their political goals (*ibidem*, 303)

¹⁴² In 1450 or 1451 an ambassador of Aragon ate with the consul and merchants of Catalunya, the burgomasters and notables of Bruges Gilliodts-van Severen, Cartulaire, 531; On diplomatic ties with Castile: Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, IV 380-381; V, 9

¹⁴³ Cf appendix B.

¹⁴⁴ Bruges filed complaints with the Count of Holland, participated in conferences in Antwerp and Ghent in 1401, sent envoys to England, Scotland, and Ireland, and participated in another conference in Sluis in 1402. Finally a truce was reached at a conference with the English king in 1403 (**klopt het jaartal**). The diplomatic efforts are recounted in: Blockmans*** Additional evidence on the envoys in: Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, III, 466-469, 494-496, 502-505, 511-512; IX, 12). Note that the Flemish towns shared in the costs of the diplomatic missions: Gilliodts-van Severen, inventaire, IX, 13). Truce was renewed in 1407, 1408, 1411. In 1426 Henry VI, king of England, signed letters of patents, guaranteeing Flemish safety against taking of their ships (Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, IV, 483-484). Further truces were negotiated in 1439 and 1489 (Gilliodts-van Severen, inventaire, I, 355; III, 524-534; IV, 37-42, 61, 70-74; V, 190-193; VI, 316-328).

¹⁴⁵ In return for the prolongation of an Anglo-Flemish truce in 1407 Bruges stepped up its contribution to the Burgundian treasury (Blockmans & Prevenier, *Promised lands*, 48-50). In 1414 a major financial contribution of Bruges to the Burgundian war effort led the Duke to formally commit to the prevention of arrests of the movable and immovable property of all citizens, regardless their whereabouts or the

location of the property. Baillifs and other ducal officials were expected to enforce this rule. Gilliodts-van Severen van Severen, *Coutumes*, I, 475-478 (30 september 1414)

¹⁴⁶ Stützel, "Privilegien", 56

¹⁴⁷ Asaert, "Scheepvaart", 63. In 1348 Louis of Male allowed Castilian traders a similar period to liquidate their affairs in case he repealed their privilege. The term was extended to three months in 1366: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 132. In 1359 English traders were granted a 60 days period to leave with all their goods in case of war between Flanders and England (Nicholas, *English trade*, 24, citing Gilliodts-van Severen 1904, 226-232). In 1360 the new German privileges stipulated a term of 120 days: Stützel, "Privilegien", 56.

¹⁴⁸ In 1384 Portugese merchants had been granted the liberty to import and export goods by Philip the Bold. (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, III, 15). In 1387 Philip the Bold gave them "les libertés dont les autres étrangers jouissent en Flandre". Explicit mention was made of a period of 3 months to pack their belongings in case of 'guerres, contens ou discensions'. (Ibid., 104-105). In 1389 Philip the Bold allowed Arragonese merchants 50 days (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Cartulaire*, 20); The period was somewhat shortened in later years. Forty days were granted to Arragonese merchants by John of Burgundy in 1414 (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Cartulaire*, 22). Genoese merchants were granted eight months in 1395 (Stützel, "Privilegien", 56n, citing Gilliodts-van Severen, *Etaple I*, 469), and Venetian merchants no less than 18 months in 1467 (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, V, 563; In addition, in 1398 merchants from Berwick were granted 3 months: Stützel, "Privilegien", 56n, citing Gilliodts-van Severen, *Etaple I*, 483; In 1428 the Castilian nation was given a year to leave Flanders in case the Duke or his successors had officially announced a change or revocation of their privileges Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, IV, 499.

¹⁴⁹ A treaty signed between Burgundy and then still independent Holland and Zeeland in 1414 stipulated that either party should issue letters of marque to privateers in future conflicts. In the treaty it was determined that damages before October 24th, 1412, were considered not to have been inflicted, that damages since then had to be compensated within the next year, and that any future damages would be severely punished. A committee of four men would be appointed in case of disputes. Note that the validity of the treaty was made dependent on its signing by the Four Members of Flanders and the towns of Haarlem, Amsterdam, Middelburg, and Zierikzee (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Coutumes*, I, 466-472.). On letters of marque issued by Burgundian dukes in 1436: Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 120. Note that the princes of Europe had already pledged their commitment to the protection of neutral traders in the thirteenth century. For example a treaty between the king of France and the Count of Holland, signed in 1296, determined that neither party would attack 'marchaanz sanz armes' (De Boer, "Florerend", 136). In 1394 Richard II of England signed an edict that "in het vooruitzicht stellen" legal proceedings and harsh punishment in case reprisals were directed against third parties. In the sixteenth century legal scholars in Spain and Portugal started writing treatises on the *freedom of the sea* (Roelofsen, *Studies*, 42). In the seventeenth century still only a very narrow definition of neutrality was applied: "the presence of any cargo of enemy provenance rendered both carrier and payload wholly forfeit, whether or not such goods were loaded in an enemy port." Stradling, *Armada*, 206

¹⁵⁰ Blockmans, 1477, p. 137; translation by Sicking, *Neptune*, 421; emphasis mine; The new privileges of Bruges, issuing directly from the Grand Privilege of Mary of Burgundy, also stated that reprisals were only allowed against defaulters, and that the person and goods of merchants of Flanders should not be attacked for reason of conflict between other countries: Gilliodts-van Severen, *Coutumes*, I, 466-472. Cf. also a similar rule laid down in the Magnus Intercursus (1296) between England and Burgundy (Desmedt, *Engelse natie*, pp. 101-102)

¹⁵¹ Bruges issued letters of marque against Castilians on at least four occasions in the 1420s and 1450s. For example, between 1458 and 1462 Amsterdam and Middelburg were involved in legal proceedings following the arrest in Arnemuiden of ships and merchandise of merchants from Danzig, following infringements on the property of Amsterdam merchants in the Polish port. Middelburg had released some of the property which led Amsterdam to formally apply for *letters of marque* with the Duke of Burgundy. The letters were 'verleend' and eventually Middelburg had to allow the Amsterdam traders to recuperate their losses. The court proceeding are recounted in Van Rompaey, *Grote Raad*, 282. Even after the offices of stadholder and Admiral were united in the person of Maximilian of Burgundy, the provision that the Court of Holland could issue such letters in the absence of the stadholder, secured the province's ability to wage a privateering war without the explicit consent of the Emperor. (Sicking, *Neptune*, 423-426, 430-431) Amsterdam allowed attacks on ships from Lübeck and five other Wendish towns in 1477. Privateers had to have written permission from Amsterdam's town magistrate, they had to bring back their bounty to the city, and they should leave unharmed all other eastern merchants and shipmasters (Breen, *Rechtsbronnen*, p. 120, 26 maart 1477). Amsterdam and other towns in Holland

were engaged in privateering against Hanseatic, English and French vessels until the 1520s. (Sicking, Neptune, 41, 207-241, 243).

¹⁵² The same was true for several attachments by the rulers of the Low Countries that did not issue from warfare. For example in 1270 the Countess of Flanders seized the ships and goods of English merchants, to compensate for the default of the English king on a longstanding debt, Henry III retaliated with the seizure of Flemish vessels and merchandise (Asaert, "Scheepvaart", 54). In 1377 Bruges' town magistrate attached German goods after it learned that the Germans were planning to leave the city in protest of the city's refusal assume liability for debts of local moneychangers (Appendix B). In 1443 and again in 1444 the Duchess of Burgundy, Isabelle of Portugal held up the Florentine galleys for the Florentine Republic still owed interest on its Monte shares to her brother. (Mallett, Florentine galleys, 88-89). In 1448 the Florentine fleet was detained in Sluis by Portuguese merchants who claimed 45 casks of sugar laden in the galleys (Ibidem, 91).

¹⁵³ . In 1393 the houses (or parts thereof) of English merchants were confiscated. Gilliodts-van Severen-van Severen, Inventaire, III, 281-285. In 1403 and 1410 the Burgundian duke seized English ships and goods to obtain the release of Flemish ships captured by English privateers (Paviot, *Politique Navale*, 202)

¹⁵⁴ Scottish goods were attached in 1403. Paviot, *Politique navale*, 228

¹⁵⁵ Paviot, *Politique navale*, 236.

¹⁵⁶ In 1438 and 1439 Philip the Good allowed the Flemish and Italian owners of a ship confiscated in Valencia, to compensate their loss with the seizure of Catalan and Aragonese property in Flanders. Paviot, *Politique navale*, 213. Again in 1443 and 1444 the goods of Aragonese merchants were arrested, following attacks on Burgundian owned ships in the Mediterranean (Watson, "Structure", 1088)

¹⁵⁷ In 1409 John the Fearless arrested the goods of Genoese merchants in Bruges following the betrayal of a governor and former marshall of the Burgundian duke in Genoa (Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, IV, 342n; Van Rompaey, *Grote Raad*, 189). In 1476 Genoese merchants suspected to support the king of France in his struggle with Charles the Bold, were expelled from Bruges rather than arrested (Goris, *Etude*, 75)

¹⁵⁸ Castilians were even able to prevent confiscations by threatening to leave in 1420 and 1427 (Paviot, *Politique navale*, 216-217). In 1409 the States of Flanders requested John the Fearless to release the Genoese merchants, and provide them with an additional safeconduct for one year. Given the further silence on the subject in the sources this is presumable what happened. (Gilliodts-van Severen, inventaire, IV, 342n). Additional evidence for the Bruges' interference can be found in 1432, when Bruges sent several envoys to the Duke of Burgundy to ask for the release of five Genoese merchants that had been captured for reasons unknown while travelling to Antwerp's fairs (Gilliodts-van Severen, inventaire, V, 9)

¹⁵⁹ In the Ordinance on Navigation of 1550 every privateer without a letter of marque would be considered a pirate before the law (Sicking, Neptune, 428)

¹⁶⁰ Sicking, Neptune, 244, 249. Confiscations were announced in 1521, 1528, 1536, 1542, 1551, and 1557; On Antwerp's contributions to Charles V finances: Braudel, *Emprunts*.

¹⁶¹ Antwerp's local customs explicitly required the ruler to respect the property of alien merchants. *Costumen 1545*, p. 293-294 (TITEL IX., nr. 54): "Item, vremde ingesetene, cooplieden der stad van Antwerpen (als voere huyshoudende ende residerende), syn vry ende moeghen bliven woonende inder stad, nyet tegenstaende eenighe orloghe die teghen den hertoghe ende syn landen oft ondersaten opstaen soude moegen; maer, alst den hertoghe belieft, dan mach hy hen die stad doen verbieden, ende nae tverbot (hen byden hertoghe gedaen) hebben sy noch drie maenden tyts lanck, om binnen dien tyde vry ende veylichlyck met heuren goeden ende familien te vertreckene, sonder binnen die drye maenden in persooone oft goeden gecommert te moeghen wordene, ten waere voer hen selfs eyghen schulden oft misdaet.

¹⁶² An exhaustive analysis of the published resolutions of the Estates of Holland for the years 1574-1655 reveals one case of confiscations related to military or political conflicts: In 1620 goods of merchants from Spanish Netherlands were arrested following arrests of merchandise from men of the Dutch Republic by the Archduke: RSH 124/132, 09-07-1620

¹⁶³ Asaert, "Scheepvaart", 63; Vlaamse schippers op Frankrijk volgden het voorbeeld van de vreemdelingen en begonnen in admiraalschap – dat wil zeggen gezamenlijk, maar zonder begeleiding van warships - te varen op La Rochelle in de tweede helft van de 14de eeuw. Vanaf 1382 onder vlag van de graaf, zonder dat deze echter middelen ter beschikking stelde voor bewapening of escorte. Opvallend is wel dat toezicht op de gezamenlijke vaart geschiedde door de waterbaljuw van Sluis, een functionaris met vergelijkbare bevoegdheden als die van de consuls van de vreemde naties: (Sicking,

Zeemacht, 21). Maar Vlamingen niet in staat merchant marine te beschermen. Probleem was dat bereidheid van steden to pool resources to protect foreign ships was limited. Daarom kwamen Vlaamse kuststeden kwamen wel al in vijftiende eeuw tot incidentele samenwerking om de haringvloot te beveiligen maar geen navy to offer protection (Sicking***; cf. also Blockmans, *Volkvertegenwoordiging*, 450-454)

¹⁶⁴ When Amsterdam in 1441 did not want to pay its share of 8,000 pound Flemish in the costs of Holland's war with the Hansa, after three years a solution was found in the levying of a toll in Danzig for a period of thirty years (Knevel, *Vijfde Stad*, 374-5)

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Breen, *rechtsbronnen*. p. 128-129, for the institution and the tariffs of the "pontgeld om schepen van oorlog te zee te financieren om kooplieden en vissers te beschermen tegen de koning van Frankrijk en de zijnen." (18 April 1478). The responsibility of local hostellers and their wives to inform shipmasters about the *pontgeld*, and direct them to the local receivers, suggests locals and foreigners shared in the financial burden. Breen, *Rechtsbronnen*, 132

¹⁶⁶ Breen, *Rechtsbronnen*, 437; According to Van Bochove *Lastgeld ingevoerd in 16de eeuw* (TSEG): **Nakijken:** P.A. Meilink, *Rekening van het lastgeld in Amsterdam, Waterland en het noorderkwartier van Holland in 1507*, in: BMHG 44, 1923, S. 187.

¹⁶⁷ Sicking, *Neptune*, 255-256. For example, in 1528 the States of Holland required merchantmen to sail "by societeit" to prevent being taken (RSH 76, 07-05-1528).

¹⁶⁸ In the 1530s the central government had failed to provide structural protection tot the herring fleet (700 vessels) of the Low Countries. Sicking (*Neptune*, 132-204) spells out the difficulties in the creation of effective protection for the fishery fleet. First, protection as such was not easy. Herring busses were small vessels that could be armed but were to slow to come to the rescue of fellow fishermen. Besides, once at sea the busses spread out to maximize their catch. Second, fishermen wanted to minimize the financial burden of protection. Their preference therefore was for diplomatic solutions like truces with enemy states or letters of safe-conduct. When fishermen perceived dangers to be relatively small, they were unwilling to pay *lastgeld* to fund convoys, and even if they did the charge was too low to bring out enough navy vessels, so that individual provinces or the central state had to contribute as well. If military protection was possible, fishermen sometimes refused to contribute because the central ruler was unwilling to commit to payment of losses that occurred after all. Third, the government had only limited means to force protection upon the fishermen. For example, the government lacked the resources to enforce its bans on sailing without escort. The admiralty did not have the political leverage to force individual towns and provinces into contributing to protection of the herring fleet. Indeed, in Holland the authority of the Admiralty was only recognized when the admiral Maximilian of Burgundy was named stadtholder of that very province in 1547. Finally, the fact that the province with the largest herring fleet, Holland (with up to 400 buses), ran the smallest risks of their ships being captured by French pirates and navy vessels, further frustrated attempts to organize 'national' protection.

¹⁶⁹ Sicking, *Neptune* 251-253. Charles' V first ordinance did not require foreign merchants to arm their vessels and sail in convoy, not even when using Dutch or Spanish ships. However, within a year the rules were changed and all alien merchants and their agents had to comply with the protective measures: G. Asaert, "Scheepsbezit en havens" in MGN, I, 180-205

¹⁷⁰ Castilian merchants in Antwerp no longer wantend to be controled by the Castilian nation in Bruges. The latter, operating as an agent of the Consulado of Burgos, had been responsible for the organization, and protection of the wool fleet. The Antwerp Castilians wanted to create a new nation that included merchants from Biscaye, Navarra, Aragon, and Catalunya. As a result, warships that laid waiting for several months in 1551 were demobilized. Sicking, *Neptune*, 261-273

¹⁷¹ The following is based on: Sicking, *Neptune*, 256-259.

¹⁷² (Sicking 284-5)

¹⁷³ G. Asaert, "Scheepsbezit en havens" in MGN, I, 180-205; Gijsbers.

¹⁷⁴ A.P. van Vliet, "Foundation, organization and effects of the Dutch navy (1568-1648), in: Marco van der Hoeven, ed. *Exercise of Arms. Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648* (Brill: Leiden 1998), 153-172;

¹⁷⁵ *Noordkerk*, *Handvesten I*, chapters 15 and 16

¹⁷⁶ *Gelijke monniken, gelijke kappen: Engelsen en Schotten in jaren 1580 geen korting op convoien en licenten toegestaan: toont rationale behind protective regime.*

¹⁷⁷ De Jong, "Staet van Oorlog", 35-39; The scrutiny of the States General as naval policy maker can be gleaned from its resolutions. Cf. for example RSG 1597, pp. 534-534 (29-12-1597). Cf. also its close monitoring of the constantly changing requirements for the protection of European and colonial trade during the Twelve Years' Truce. On the Guinea trade: RSG 1610, nrs. 968, 1095, 1202, 1209, 1362).

On Germany: RSG 1610, nrs. 233, 268, 499; On the Levant: RSG 1611, nr. 924; On ships returning from East India: RSG 1614, nr. 628; On shipping in the North Sea: RSG, 1614, nr. 290; On Russia: RSG 1617, nr. 804. In 1617 the growing threat of Barbarian pirates on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar required a full revision of protective measures for all southbound merchantmen (including VOC ships), and the cancellation of projected operations in the Baltic Sea: RSG 1617, nrs. 442, 633, 717, 734, 875, 882, 908, 971, 983, 1084, 1093, 1149, 1869.

¹⁷⁸ RSG 1618, nrs. 1869, 2079, 2084, 2167, 2174, 2383, 2383, 2579, 2586, 2590, 2606, 2785, 2808, 3035, 3288, 3290, 3475, 3605, 3816; Amsterdam may have played a leading role in planning the affair. In April 1618 had Amsterdam already asked the States of Holland to propose to the States General to send warships to fight pirates in the Mediterranean (RSH 94/591, 09-04-1618; cf also RSH 351/834, 10-11-1618. In 1631 the Amsterdam based Direction of the Levant Trade initiated a plan for the States General to make a similar joint effort, this time with Venice, France, England, and the Hansa, to either force the Spanish king to do something about the pirates of Barbaria and Tunesia, or mount a naval expedition themselves to get rid of them. RSH 61/69, 08-04-1631. The innovation here was the joint effort to protect trade. The Dutch Republic and England had already engaged in joint naval operations against Spain in 1596 – and would do so again between 1626 and 1630. (Alain Wijffels and Ivo van Loo, “Zealand Privateering and the Anglo-Spanish Peace Treaty of 1630”, in: B.C.M. Jacobs and E.C. Coppens, *Een Rijk Gerecht. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. Mr. P.L. Nève*, Nijmegen: Gerard Noodt Instituut 1998, 635-673, at 635-636

¹⁷⁹ Gijsbers; Van Tielhof.

¹⁸⁰ Notably in 1605 privateering became a very profitable business proposition in which dozens if not hundreds of merchants from the Dutch Republic invested money. Even English privateers received letters of marque from the States General. Also the VOC was engaged in privateering, capturing at least 30 Portuguese carracks in the first decade of the seventeenth century (Van Loo, “Kaapvaart”, 355)

¹⁸¹ In the 1620s Annual damages in the Brazil trade alone amounted to 1 or 2 million guilders Van Loo, “Kaapvaart”, 362; Compare the far more modest total return of 760,000 guilders in the years 1598-1609 (Van Loo, “Organising”, 83)

¹⁸² Stradling, *Armada*, 212, refers to hundreds of neutral vessels being brought to Dunkirk. Part of them was returned, but if sufficient proof for the neutrality of the ship was lacking, they were sold as a prize.

¹⁸³ In 1578 the States General, waarin toen overigens ook nog Vlaanderen en Brabant vertegenwoordigd waren, issued a passport and safeconduct to all merchants of the Spanish nation in Bruges (and other cities). The only proviso was that the States General reserved the right of reprisals in case the property of its own subjects was attacked (RSG 1578, 498). Possibly, this was a concession to the northern provinces dat were Spanje vijandig gezind. In any case, in the same year the States General ask his excellency (probably William of Orange) to write letters to Holland and Zeeland to have them permit free passage to all merchants, without any imposition on their merchandise (RSG 1578, 497) Nog opzoeken: brief WvO aan Brugge mbt sauvegarde spaanse natie, 1577, en brief aan Antwerpen 1582(?) mbt Portugese natie. Obviously, the safeconduct for the Spaniards in Bruges quickly lost its meaning once that city was occupied by Habsburg troops. In 1584 The States of Holland approve of the privilege and safeconduct of the Portuguese nation of 1577 (in Brussels) and 1581 (in Amsterdam!) (RSH 624/683, 11-10-1584; RSH 705/772, 12-11-1584, also 24-11-1584 (certification of the safeconduct by Antwerp)). However, already in 1581 the States had discussed the safeconduct that would give the Portuguese nation the freedom of ‘een ingebooren’. (RSH 286/654, 16-06-1581). In the same year the States General reached an additional agreement with the Portuguese merchants about their pepper trade. (RSH 704/771, 22-11-1584). To retain the Portuguese merchants’ trade Antwerp countered the Dutch agreements with a new privilege for the Portuguese nation in 1584 (RSH 717/786, 24-11-1584). In 1619 all towns of Holland were allowed to decide themselves if and how to accommodate the ‘Hebrew nation’. RSH 287/1161, 13 December 1619. In 1591 the States of Holland agreed to accommodate the English nation in Holland with the same privileges it had enjoyed in Brabant – something Zeeland hoped to achieve as well. This very resolution suggests by the way that by then the English still remained on and off in Brabant. RSH 425/808, 17-08-1591. A first concept of the agreement with the Merchant Adventurers had been drafted in 1586 already (RSH 453/521, 10-10-1586. In 1598 the Merchant Adventurers asked the States General to ratify earlier privileges granted by the sovereigns of the Low Countries, in particular Philip of Burgundy (the Magnus Intercursus of 1496). To support their claim they also handed over the privileges previously received from Stade and Middelburg. The States General bleek bereid de bepalingen van de magnus intercursus voor het grootste deel over te nemen. They granted the English a consular jurisdiction in cases “between and about” the members of the “Societeit”, ensured the ownership of goods stranded on the Dutch coast,

and waived their liability for debts incurred or crimes committed by their agents. With the proviso that merchants would be responsible in case they stood surety, or were themselves involved in the transaction. Further privileges included that their wills will be respected regarding property in England and the Republic, although the execution of real estate (including mortgages) of deceased merchants will be done according to the customs of the land it is in. To be sure, the larger part of the privileges concerned the monitoring of agents and the enforcement of contracts (including the important English concession to sign contracts according to Dutch customary law)– issues that are dealt with in other chapters. (rSG 1598, 335-341); later in the year further negotiations on customs: 345-346). Het geheel van bepalingen werd wrs. als “saulfconduict” gearresteerd: zie Groot Placcaetboek I, 750ff check this; ook weer onderhandeligen over customs in 1599: RSG 1599, p. 778-9, 789, 804-805. Thus, in 1612 a group of Greek merchants from Cyprus who wanted to export cotton and other merchandise to the Dutch Republic were promised a treatment similar to that of “other friends and allies” (RSG 1612, 634).

¹⁸⁴ On various occasions imminent danger from enemy ships led the States of Holland to order Dutch merchantmen to remain in their ports: RSH 397/465, 14-06-1575; SH 85/706, 18-03-1587. In 1620 the States of Holland asked the Admiralties to advert the merchants and shipmasters to trade ‘soberly’ on Spain (RSH 187/198, 26-08-1620; Cf. also RSH 36/356, 09-03-1621). Occasionally the States explicitly warned for pirates that had attacked foreign ships, or were hiring men to do so (RSH 415/434, 12-12-1598; RSH 228/1014, 12-09-1609).

¹⁸⁵ In 1595 the States of Holland wrote to the king of Poland, and other rulers in the Baltic area, to revoke letters of marque he had issued at the request of several men from Pommeren (RSH406/467, 13-09-1595). For similar reasons they wrote to the king of Denmark, asking for the lifting of obstructions of the trade with Russia (RSH 387/429, 03-09-1597). Shortly before the resumption of the war with Spain, between 1618 and 1620, the Dutch Republic made diplomatic efforts to secure the support or at least the neutrality of Denmark, the German Hansa, and Venice (RSH 302/792, 16-10-1618; RSH 189/1071, 29-07-1619; RSH 138/147, 14-07-1620)

¹⁸⁶ Van Loo, “Kaapvaart”, 351. In the first years of the Revolt the States of Holland already tried to stop pirate attacks on merchantmen from countries not involved in the war with Spain (RSH 131/752, 05-10-1572; RSH 182/206, 22-10-1576).

¹⁸⁷ Van Loo, “Kaapvaart”, 358-361; In 1606 all letters of marque (“commissien”) that had been issued before were revoked (RSH 175/925, 27 June and 8 July 1606). Additional placards were issued to forbid piracy, to punish excesses, and to repair damages done by pirates (RSH 193/945, 19 July 1606; 332/1099, 21 November and 5 December 1606)

¹⁸⁸ In 1604 the surety was 4,000 guilders. Van Loo, “Kaapvaart”, 361; I.J. van Loo, “Organising and Financing Zeeland Privateering, 1598-1609”, *Leidschrift* 13-2 (1998), 67-95, at 72

¹⁸⁹ Note that Grotius’ reasoning was firmly rooted in classical texts and the writings of several Spanish authors: Roelofsen, *Studies*, 41-72, 86-87; Pérotin-Dumon, “Pirate”, 202, 205

¹⁹⁰ Clearly, the incidence of violence is not an ideal for the impact warfare, piracy, and corruption had on trade. For one thing, Horden and Purcell (*Corrupting Sea*, 154-159) rightly argue against Braudel, among others, that the incidence of piracy in the Mediterranean also points to the thriving trade these pirates were able to prey upon.

¹⁹¹ Since at least the tenth century, merchants could use community responsibility to enforce contracts. If one merchant cheated another, the disenfranchised trader could seize the property of any one member of the community of the cheater (Greif). To be sure, this community responsibility was always used in addition to individual legal proceedings and through bilateral agreements it was curtailed from the very moment it was applied. Boerner and Ritschl.

¹⁹² In 1545 Antwerp still allowed its own citizens to confiscate the goods of strangers if their fellow countrymen had stolen, seized, pawned, or otherwise taken from them. *Coutumes de la ville d’Anvers, dites Antiquissimae, d’après un manuscrit reposant aux Archives de la ville d’Anvers [1545]*, url: <http://www.kulak.ac.be/facult/rechten/Monballyu/Rechtlagelanden/Brabantsrecht/antwerpen/antiquissimae.html>; title IX, art. 18: “Item, poorters van Antwerpen (diens goeden buyten lants gepandt, gerooft, gearresteert, genomen oft veronrecht worden) moegen wederomme arresteren, commeren ende houden de goeden vanden heere, wethouderen ende ondersaten vanden steden oft plaetsen daer sy gecommert, gearresteert oft beschadicht syn, ende hen schade oft verlies daer ane verhalen; ende ingevalle sy egheen sufficiente goeden ende personen (vander plaetsen daer sy beschadicht syn) alhier en cunnen gevinden oft gecrygen om hen schade daer ane te verhalene, soe moeghen sy commeren alle andere goeden ende personen vanden lande daer hen die schade gedaen is ende oft sy nyemant van dien lande en consten gecrigen, moegen arresteren de naeste gesetene van dien lande, tot dat sy van heure schade ende verliese syn voldaeen; welcke alsoe gearresteerde den poorteren hen schade ende verlies vergelden moeten, behoudelick hen verhael opte ghene die de schade gedaen hebben.

¹⁹³ Breen, *Rechtsbronnen*, 237-238

¹⁹⁴ In 1510 Holland, Antwerp, and Zierikzee got permission to exact compensation for damages of more than 100,000 guilders resulting from the capture of 11 merchantmen by a Lübeck fleet (Sicking, *neptune*, 207-241).

¹⁹⁵ In 1609 the city of Antwerp still specified in its customs regarding the fairs that “During the market, and while traveling to and from the market; all merchants and their goods will remain free from letters of (counter) marque and reprisal, arrest or the like, issued by the duke against any person or nation. If war breaks out during the market, those who are in Antwerp are free to leave with their person and goods”(Antwerpse costumen 1609, title IV)

¹⁹⁶ In 1468 Great Council confirms freedom of the fair in 1468: opheffing van een beslag in 1468 verkregen door een Franse koopman wiens goederen na vertrek van de Antwerpse jaarmarkt in beslag genomen waren. De Grote Raad lijkt in deze de marktvrijheid van Antwerpen zwaarder te hebben laten wegen dan een door de Hertog ondertekende cedula die het beslag toestond. Van Rompaey, *Grote Raad*, 402. Around the same year the Great Council approved of the arrest of Scottish vessels to compensate for the capture of a Dutch ship on the Scottish coast Van Rompaey, *Grote Raad*, 282. Between 1470 and 1550 the Great Council ruled seven times in cases that involved the seizure of goods of foreign residents of the Low Countries for violence committed by their fellow countrymen De Smidt, *Sententien*, I, p. 110 (1475), 227 (1489); 277 (1494); 382 (1503); *Sententien*, II, p. 203 (1518); 337 (1524); *Sententien* III, p. 12 (1531). One of these sentences (1494) even involved a proactive measure of representatives of the king of Scotland who protested against letters of marque given to Hanseatic merchants who claimed to have their goods taken by Scottish privateers. The king’s representatives referred to their old privileges protecting Scottish goods from any reprisals in the Burgundian lands. The case was suspended for further examination of the letters of marque

¹⁹⁷ Once, in 1377, the Count of Flanders foiled a German attempt to leave. The goods of all members of the Kontor, who had not consulted the Hansa about their plans, were attached. Reason for German action was refusal of Bruges to be liable for its hostellers, refusal to ‘châtier des agressions et blessures’, and several commercial issues: tax on imported codfish, interdiction to import Hamburg beer, bad quality of certain cloth (Dollinger, *Hanse*, 99; cf also Gilliodts, *Inventaire*, 307).

¹⁹⁸ Helaas kunnen deze kosten niet berekend worden. Wel is bekend hoeveel het vertrek van de Hanze in 1451 de stad Brugge kostte. Bewaard gebleven stadsrekeningen van Brugge laten zien dat de stad tijdens de afwezigheid van de Hanze tussen 1452 en 1458 niet minder dan 500 ponden vlaams uitgaf aan reiskosten, maaltijden, drukwerk, uitkering op rentebrieven namens de Hanze, en andere kosten gemoeid met haar pogingen om de Hanze tot terugkeer te bewegen. (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, V, 409-418); Niet meegerekend met de onkosten zijn reizen van envoys waarbij (bij vertrek) alleen het tarief en (het geschatte) aantal dagen werd opgeschreven. Daarnaast betaalde de stad nog 600 ponden vlaams aan de hertog voor zijn toestemming voor het verlenen van nieuwe privileges, 2,000 pond voor het Brugse aandeel in een nog openstaande schadevergoeding uit 1438, 574 voor de onteigening van een huis t.b.v. de uitbreiding van de Hanseatic premises in Bruges. En 430 ponden vlaams voor de afhandeling van diverse rechtszaken in Parijs, waaronder ook zaken met betrekking tot Duitsers, Spaniards, and other nations. In totaal dus een bedrag van meer dan 4000 ponden vlaams (Gilliodts, *Inventaire*, V, 409-418)

¹⁹⁹ In 1379 and 1380 the diet of the Hansa recorded various incidents, especially following the struggle of Gent with the Count of Flanders, but no action was taken. (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, IV, 307-312)

²⁰⁰ The nine pages with complaints from individual members and merchants from specific towns, were filed in October 1358 (Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, II, 36-45; Dollinger, *La Hanse*, 85-91)

²⁰¹ on the condition that it dropped all other claims, including that for the erection of a chapel. Gilliodts, *Inventaire*, III, 244-260

²⁰² Awarded 8,000 Flemish pounds, wat overigens werd omgeslagen over heel Vlaanderen, zodat Brugge slechts 500 hoefde te betalen (Dollinger, *Hanse*, 368; Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, 257)

²⁰³ In 1307 Spanish merchants moved to Aardenburg together with the Germans. However, there is no evidence that the Spaniards at this time formed a merchant guild. Other removals included the Genoese to London, the Venetians to Antwerp in 1449, 1452, and 1459. Scots that left for Middelburg in 1467.

²⁰⁴ Paviot, *Politique navale*, 216

²⁰⁵ Gilliodts-van Severen, *Coutumes*, I, 466-472.).

²⁰⁶ Hanze was pas succesvol in het verkrijgen van pecuniary compensation, after the German Kontor was formally submitted to the rule of the Hanseatic diet led by Lübeck in 1356. Strength of Hansa increased once the diet of cities, led by Lübeck, came to control the actions of the different stations of the Hansa in Flanders, England, Norway, and Russia. Bruges was the first in 1356, then followed

Novgorod in 1361, Bergen in 1365, and London, probably in 1374 (Dollinger, Hanse, 86-88). Cf. for the role of the Hansa in the negotiations of 1358: Dollinger, Hanse, 89-90. Also the new privileges and compensation that were agreed upon in 1392, were preceded by several years of negotiations between officials from Bruges and Lübeck (Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, III, 209-221. In 1438 ambassadors from 'Oostland' were present at talks in Bruges (Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, V, 199). Zij het dat ook hier controle niet volledig was. For example in 1392 the Hansa could not but accept that merchants continued their export of ambre to Bruges, and their visits of Brabant fairs and Malines. At the same time Kampen continued its trade with Bruges. (Dollinger, Hanse, 99-102; Roesner, Hansische, 63)

²⁰⁷ Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, II, 45-46

²⁰⁸ Poeck, "Kontorverlegung", 41-43, 47-49

²⁰⁹ Dollinger, 89. The city's account books reveal three payments of damages to the German Hansa In 1357-1358 the four man strong delegation of Bruges was given 1800 pound flemish when it left for Lubeck (Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, II, 58). In 1359-1360 two merchants representing the German traders received 1547 pound flemish for an outstanding claim on the Bruges citizen Laureins van der Buerze, and for Scottish merchandise that had been arrested on their behalf by the city of Bruges (Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, II, 65); In 1360-1361 another merchant, representing the German towns, received 559 pound flemish, as part of the damages awarded by Flanders to the Hansa (Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, II, 65). Dollinger, Hanse, 90, mentioned an otherwise unspecified amount of 155 pounds payable by both Bruges and Ypres. In 1365 the hansa formally relieved Bruges of its suretyship for the 1500 Ecu payable by the Count of Flanders (Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, II 127-128).

²¹⁰ Roesner, p. 71-72; Cf. also Appendix B.

²¹¹ Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, 402

²¹² The case is recounted in considerable detail in Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, VI, 410-457. For more recent scholarship on the capture: Mallett, *Florentine galleys*, 98-102, who sets the value of ship and cargo at 30,000 florins. Check Florence Edler-De Roover, "A Prize of War; a painting of Fifteenth Century Merchants", Bulletin of Business Historical Society, XIX (1945): In 1496 the Great council awarded damages of 6,000 florins d'or (voor het schip) + 48.000 guilders" (voor de lading) payable by the German Hansa for capture in 1473 of one of two Florentine galleys operated by Tommaso Portinari, agent of the Medici Bankers in Bruges. The San Matteo carried textiles and alum, as well as Hans Memling's *Last Judgement*. In 1473 duke of Burgundy had allowed the seizure of Hanseatic goods but 'a cause du trepas du duc Charles' German goods were only attached in 1492, when the aldermen of the Kontor sojourned in Antwerp. (It is worth noting that the Duke of Burgundy might not have been a neutral party in the conflict, for he was in fact the owner of both Florentine galleys, while he also relied heavily on Portinari to fund his war expenses) When the Germans did not pay the case was brought before the Great Council. Hansa refused to pay, and in 1497 threatened to leave Bruges for good. Finally town paid 16,000 pound flemish to Portunari. Bruges was even prepared to pay an extra 2000 ponden vlaams for damage done by pirates to Hansa.

²¹³ Pace Dollinger (Hanse, 349), Blockmans & Prevenier***, and others, who stress the importance of Burgundian unification for the reduced efficiency of collective action by the Hansa. The growing unity would have limited the possibilities to temporarily remove the staple to territories under a different rule. However, the removals of all merchants to Antwerp in 1484 and 1488, the removal of the German Kontor to Antwerp in 1553, and especially the repeated removal of the Court of Merchant Adventurers to Stade in Germany, Middelburg, Delft, Dordrecht, and Rotterdam, suggests that urban autonomy was big enough to guarantee foreign merchants a better, or at least different treatment in other ports. Note also that in the fifteenth and early sixteenth century the Merchant Adventurers used the competition between Bergen op Zoom and Antwerp to secure a most favourable treatment by both towns "they dryve the townshippes, by feere of theyre withdrawing and absentyng, to reforme their wronges" (Desmedt, Engelse natie, I, 96-98)

²¹⁴ Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, IV, 268.

²¹⁵ Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire, ??, 164-165.

²¹⁶ When in 1438 privateers from Amsterdam during the war with the Hansa attacked a Danish vessel laden with Norwegian goods for Bremen and Deventer, the shipmaster brought them to court. The Hof van Holland decide in his favour and gave the shipmaster letters of marque to seek compensation from the citizens of Amsterdam (Carasso-Kok en Verkerk, "Eenheid" 212-213)

²¹⁷ Van Rompaey, *Grote Raad*, 282

²¹⁸ A shipmaster from Zeeland who had captured a ship from Brittany was brought before the waterbailiff of Sluis in 1432 (Paviot, Politique navale, 219)

²¹⁹ English and Italian merchants contest seizures before the local court of Bruges in 1459 (Thielemans, *Bourgogne*, 264)

²²⁰ In Holland the authority of the admiralty was not recognized, however, and prize cases continued to be adjudicated by the Court of Holland. Roelofsen, *Studies*, 7. In 1560 the legal functions of the Admiralty of Veere devolved to the Court of Flanders (Sicking, *Neptune*, 442-443).

²²¹ Sicking/Van Rhee; Out of 34 prize cases brought before the Admiralty of Veere between 1537 and 1559, 25 involved merchants from countries not at war with the Habsburgs. Sicking, *Neptune*, 440-441, 445. Cf. Roelofson, Study in the history of international law (diverse prize cases brought before the Grote Raad) Proviso: Overigens niet alleen belangrijk voor kooplieden wier schip of goederen beschadigd waren maar ook voor kooplieden die er – terecht of niet – van beschuldigd werden zich schuldig gemaakt te hebben aan privateering, of die gestolen waren hadden gekocht

²²² Between 1470 and 1550 foreign merchants were involved in 21 cases related to privateering brought before the Great Council of Malines. Seventeen sentences were pronounced between 1470 and 1500, only one between 1500 and 1539 (in 1537 to be precise; an appeal to a verdict by the Court of Holland), and another three in the 1540s. The three latter cases all were appeals to verdicts by the Admiralty of Veere (De Smidt, *Sententien*, passim). The first two contested seizures of ships and their merchandise among the sentences of the Great Council, date from 1472: De Smidt, *Geëxtendeerde Sententien*, 44-45, 52; In ieder geval 5 van de 17 cases die dienden waren appeals to local or provincial courts (cf spreadsheet); Als piraterij werd vastgesteld zal het criminal case geworden zijn: slechts een geval van kennelijke piracy dat door de Grote Raad werd veroordeeld: De Smidt, *Sententien*, II, p. 534 (4 February 1531). Besides several cases involving confiscation by government officials. In 1525 maakte een Castiliaanse koopman een process aanhangend bij de Grote Raad, nadat zijn schip en lading genomen waren door een lieutenant van de Admiraal (Slootmans, I, Paas- en Koudemarkten, 11)

²²³ Roelofsen, *Studies*, pp. XXII-XXIII; Sicking, *Neptune*, 432. The efforts of the Dutch government in the seventeenth century to construct a unequivocal prize law is evident not only from the publications of Hugo Grotius but also from the legal advices he and other lawyers wrote for the court of Holland. Cf. for example *Holl. Consult.* I, 488; II, 305; IV, 160

²²⁴ The Court of Holland played no role whatsoever. Besides eight contested insurance contracts, between 1582 and 1630, the sentences of the Hof van Holland relating to Flemish and English merchants in Amsterdam contain only two cases involving the payment of damages after the capture of a ship by pirates before the flemish coast: HvH *Sententien*, 1610/37, fiche 621*; 1624/209, fiche 666*; In 1586 it was left to the Admiralty to reach an agreement with an English merchants regarding two of his ships that had been taken by a Dutch privateer (RSH 20/22, 15-01-1586)

²²⁵ Bruges ruled that the Germans had to testify that four packages with cloth belonged to them, the Spaniard would return them and receive 40 pound flemish (200 couronnes à 4 s. gr. Pièce) in return. (Gilliodts, *Coutume* I, p. 467)

²²⁶ In 1600 foreign merchants with a conflict about mutual arrests of property were allowed to appear in first instance before the High Court (RSG 11, 339-340; 12, 613) In 1613 the States General determined that a case concerning the seizure of Candian wine by Turkish corsairs, owned and insured by Amsterdam merchants, is brought before the High Court instead of the local court of Hoorn. (RSG 1613, 11)

²²⁷ Cued by a letter of recommendation by the Dutch ambassador in England, Caron, States General in 1612 asked the High Court to quickly proceed with a trial of some of London's leading merchants for the High Court (RSG 1612, 800)

²²⁸ Stradling, *Armada*, 210-211; Wijffels and Van Loo, "Zealand Privateering", 652-653

²²⁹ For example, in 1472 three English 'carvelen' had taken the ship of Janne Brecht to the English port of Newcastle. The shipmaster's attempts to seek justice in England had failed but then a few years later he spotted one of the 'carvelen' in Veere, held it under arrest, and sued the new owners – a group of English merchants – for damages before the Great Council. (Sentence 11 June 1479; Smidt, *Sententien*, I, p. 156). In another case, Scottish merchants residing in Veere were only able to start legal proceedings against English privateers who in 1533 had captured the merchandise they were carrying in a ship from Flushing, after a ship of one of the owners of the privateering ship moored in Zealand two years later (the case is reconstructed in Roelofsen, *Studies*, pp. XIX-XXIII). Cf. also the claim before the Great Council of the English merchant Thomas Medwel against Mahieu van der Helle and others. The latter had bought the former's ship and merchandise in Dunkirque, knowing it had been taken by pirates. (Sentence 12 Feb 1479; De Smidt, *Sententien*, I, p. 152).

²³⁰ The instructions of the ambassadors and consuls of the Dutch Republic also reveal a permanent concern for the interests of merchants living in the Low Countries. *Resolutions*, passim.

²³¹ Suffice it here to cite several individual recommendations that involved foreign merchants: Support for Portuguese merchants RSG 1610, nr. 1358; RSG 1615, nr. 1551; RSG 1618, nrs. 3634, 3635; RSG 1620, 419; Support for a German merchant: RSG 1611, nr. 300; Support for Flemish merchants: RSG 1610, nr. 751; RSG 1610, nrs. 1065, 1411n, 1536; RSG 1611, nr. 613; RSG 1617, nrs. 964, 1610, 1763; RSG 1618, nrs. 2799, 3549, 3835, 4001. On Amsterdams support, for example, RSG 1600, pp. 329-330; 1610, nr. 41; RSG 1618, nr. 2292. For diplomacy by States of Holland: RSH 55/622, 19-03-1579; RSH 475/863, 09-09-1581; RSH 20-11-1585; RSH 175/193, 17-07-1627; RSH 163/786, 25-11-1626. States of Holland asked diplomats to look into the lawfulness of capture of Dutch ships: This happened twice with letters given out by the authorities of Genoa, in 1639 (RSH 175/435, 16-09-1639; also 210/474, 18-10-1639, and 214/479, 21-10-1639), and again in 1642 (RSH 119/521, 08-05-1642). And once letters given by the English authorities: RSH 299/718, 25-11-1642. The Dutch sources do not allow an evaluation of the validity of the Dutch complaints.

²³² Already in 1577 goods wrongfully taken from merchants from befriended nations were returned by the Admiralties (RSH 11/258, 11-01-1577). In 1589 the States General decided to return to an Italian merchant, resident in Sweden, a ship laden with grain. The ship had been captured by the Admiralty. The Italian merchant, Jehan Baptista Pelligrini, had sought the support of the Polish king, and probably in order not to upset the king, the States General decided in favour, even though, as stipulated in the letter to the king, the Italian merchant should have produced sufficient evidence to support his claim, and appear before court in the Low Countries, just like any other merchant should (RSG 1589, 633-634).

Cite French case to show problems of diplomacy,

²³³ North, D., "Institutions, transaction costs, and the rise of merchant empires", in: J.D. Tracy (ed.), *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, 28-29

²³⁴ Possibility of attacks by the 'enemy' mentioned in 1471, by the English in 1474, and by the Spanish in 1496 : Drost, Documents, I, nrs. 2,3, 50, 51, 57:

²³⁵ De Boer, "Florerend", 130-131.

²³⁶ Smit, Opkomst, p. 47-48, 91-92

²³⁷ Slootmans, I, 99-100; Slootmans reports a similar division of losses in 1446 (pp. 97-98)

²³⁸ Slootmans, I, 107-108; The cargo of two German vessels attacked by Scottish pirates in 1516, belonged to eight merchants (Idem, p. 111-112)

²³⁹ Harreld, High Germans, 125

²⁴⁰ Harreld, *High Germans*, 120-121, 123-124; Find other references to this regular service. Further evidence for the regular character of transportation services lies in the number of shipments from Antwerp to various German cities between April 1543 and September 1445: Cologne, 2360; Frankfurt, 804; Nuremberg, 1288; and Augsburg, 346 (Harreld, High Germans, 129)

²⁴¹ Cf. for example a judgment passed by the local court of Bergen, ordering two drivers (voerlieden) from Weert to compensate a merchant for 55 fustians that were stolen in Maaseik on a trip from Cologne to Bergen. The drivers in turn promised to try and get compensation from the town of Maaseik (Slootmans, I, 121)

²⁴² Other options would be product innovation or the exploration of new markets. The theoretical attributes of these solutions are similar to those of diversification however.

²⁴³ Explore a bit further what was done about this in the Middle Ages **Murray-hunt, 60-63 samenvatting medieval risk management.**

²⁴⁴ On sea loans in the trade with France: M.A. Drost, ed. Documents pour servir à l'histoire du commerce des Pays-Bas avec la France jusqu'à 1585, Vol. I Actes Notariés de la Rochelle 1423-1585, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff 1984; and M.A. Drost, ed. Documents pour servir à l'histoire du commerce des Pays-Bas avec la France jusqu'à 1585, Vol. II Actes Notariés de la Bordeaux 1470-1520, 's-Gravenhage: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis 1989.

²⁴⁵ Slootmans, I, 110, 118

²⁴⁶ (Sentence, 6 February 1489; De Smidt, Sententien, I, p. 223

²⁴⁷ Een alternatief voor insurance was de verkoop van schadeclaims. Een voorbeeld is de seizure van een partij munten in 1475, waarbij de benadeelde Amsterdammer het recht op het geld verkoopt aan een ander. However, initial seizure vond plaats onder toezien van schout en schepenen, zodat dit waarschijnlijk geen bewijs is voor het bestaan van een markt voor schadeclaims (Slootmans, I, 120)

²⁴⁸ Horden and Purcell, *Corrupting Sea*, 157

²⁴⁹ Gilliodts-van Severen, *Inventaire*, V, 276; French traders shipping wine from La Rochelle to the Low Countries insured several ships, with or without cargo, in 1537 (Drost, Documents, II, 45, 47, 49, 52). Further evidence for insurance taken out in Antwerp and Middelburg in 1563 (Drost, Documents, II, 141, 145, 149, 156). From 1566 dates an insurance contract signed in La Rochelle but drafted

according to the customs of Antwerp (Drost, Documents, II, nr. 262) A shipment of wine from La Rochelle to Crotoy in Picardy was insured as early as 1489 (Drost, Documents, II, nrs. 12,13)

²⁵⁰ Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 112-113

²⁵¹ Note that Charles V was uncomfortable with maritime insurance, for these contracts by definition implied a loss for either one of the parties. This indeed was one of the motives behind the Maritime Ordinance of 1550: merchants should be forced to arm their ships and sail in admiralty or convoys, in order to remove the incentive to buy insurance policies (Sicking, Neptune, 250-251) In one of its meetings in 1622 the States of Holland considered forbidding insurance of enemy merchandise (RSH 79/700, 28 April 1622). However, there is no evidence for this measure ever having been taken.

²⁵² Asaert, *Scheepvaart*, 54. H.P.H. Jansen, “Handel en Nijverheid, 1000-1300”, in AGN 2 Haarlem: Fibula-van Dishoeck 1982, pp. 148-186, at 174; De Boer, “Florerend”, 143

²⁵³ Poeck, “Kontorverlegung”, 34; Dollinger, *La Hanse*, 67-68; M. Vandermaesen, “Vlaanderen en Henegouwen onder het Huis van Dampierre”, in: in AGN 2 Haarlem: Fibula-van Dishoeck 1982, pp.399-440

²⁵⁴ H.P.H. Jansen, “Handel en Nijverheid, 1000-1300”, in AGN 2 Haarlem: Fibula-van Dishoeck 1982, pp. 148-186, at 174-175

²⁵⁵ Cf. on this conflict: Blockmans, *Bruges and France*, 207

²⁵⁶ Blockmans, *Bruges and France*, 207

²⁵⁷ **Check, then add:** Roseboom, 5, confiscation of Scottish goods in flanders in 1347

²⁵⁸ *Vandermaesen, 430-440*

²⁵⁹ Blockmans, *Bruges and France*, 207

²⁶⁰ Vandermaesen, 424-425

²⁶¹ *Smit, Opkomst, 70-71*. The same holds for mutual seizures of goods in 1368 (Ibidem, 126)

²⁶² , *La Hanse*, 85-91

²⁶³ rims, *Geschiedenis, V-1*, 11-80, 132-133

²⁶⁴ Merchants who did visit after all were liable to fines: cf. for examples fines to visitors of Antwerp in 1389 and Bergen op Zoom in 1401 (Gilliodts, *Inventaire, IV*, 158, 201)

²⁶⁵ Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 114

²⁶⁶ Blockmans, *Volkvertegenwoordiging*, 482; **Check Thielemans**

²⁶⁷ Following complaints of the Hansa and the Count of Flanders the King of France orders his baillifs and justices to punish the ‘écumeurs de mer’ and restitute the goods and merchandise. Additional measure: [French ‘croiseur’ were required to keep alive at least two or three sailors so that these surviving foreigners could testify about the nationality of the captured ship.](#) (Gilliodts, *inventiare, II*, 471-473)

²⁶⁸ Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 117

²⁶⁹ Asaert, “*Scheepvaart*”, 64; Craeybeckx, *Grand Commerce*, 116-117, raised doubts about the amount of wine captured.

²⁷⁰ There were also plans to mount an invasion of England but despite an extensive loan from Bruges, and a fleet set up in Damme, the plans did not materialize (Gilliodts, *Inventaire, III*, 96-101).

²⁷¹ Gilliodts, *Coutumes, I*, 466-472; On captures of English merchantmen by the Flemish: Paviot, *Politique navale*, 224-226; An attack on a Dutch ship carrying herring, eel, and other goods for English merchants is recorded in 1392: Van der Laan, *Oorkondenboek*, 382

²⁷² Paviot, *Politique navale*, 202

²⁷³ Action taken after several Flemish ships were seized in Brest and Brittany, is described in detail in: Gilliodts, *Inventaire, III*, 453-467:

²⁷⁴ Gilliodts, *Inventaire, III*, 524-534 ; *IV*, 37-42, 61, 70-74, 138. For Flemish attacks on Scots in 1412: Dollinger, *Hanse*, 368

²⁷⁵ Paviot, *Politique navale*, 202, 228

²⁷⁶ Paviot, *Politique navale*, 224-226.

²⁷⁷ Gilliodts, *Inventaire, IV*, 311; Prims, *Geschiedenis, V-1*, 99; Vandermaesen, 435-44

²⁷⁸ Social unrest lasted until 1384 when the new count, Philip the Bold of Burgundy, offered amnesty to Ghent in exchange for its withdrawal of support for England

²⁷⁹ Gilliodts, *inventaire, III*, 96

²⁸⁰ Puhle, *Vitalienbrüder*

²⁸¹ Van der Laan, *Oorkondenboek*, 420, 430-431, 435, 437, 444, 459, 464

²⁸² **Smit, Opkomst, 163- 177**

²⁸³ (Dollinger, *Hanse*, 91-96)

²⁸⁴ Smit, *Opkomst*, 126

- ²⁸⁵ Gilliodts, Inventaire, IV, 379, 381, 494; Paviot, Politique Navale, 216-217
- ²⁸⁶ Gilliodts, Cartulaire, 23; Inventaire IV 495-496; The Four Members of Bruges were to use the revenues to pay the costs of their diplomatic efforts, and award damages to individual victims of the corsairs (Gilliodts, Cartulaire, 26)
- ²⁸⁷ Gilliodts, Inventaire, IV 494; Gilliodts, Coutumes, I, 466-472; The letters of marque were only suspended in 1428, and after negotiations with the Castilians in the same year the levy was abolished in the new privilege of the Castilian merchants in 1428 (Gilliodts, Inventaire, IV, 494, 497), apparently because “quilz sen sont en grant partie retraizet abstenuz”, the reason for the new privilege, mentioned in the first paragraph of the charter (p. 496)
- ²⁸⁸ Paviot, Politique navale, 217
- ²⁸⁹ Paviot, Politique navale, 213
- ²⁹⁰ Watson, “Structure”, 1088; Paviot, Politique navale, 214-215
- ²⁹¹ Though most goods were given back because Holland at the time was an ally of the English king: Smit, Opkomst, 188-189
- ²⁹² Gilliodts, Inventaire, IV, 377-378;
- ²⁹³ In 1430, after having signed a treaty with Scotland, Bruges promised to pay German merchants about three quarters of the total damages done to them by Scottish privateers (Gilliodts, Inventaire, V, 12-13)
- ²⁹⁴ Dollinger, Hanse, 318; Gilliodts, Inventaire, IV, 379; Paviot, Politique navale, 216
- ²⁹⁵ Dollinger, Hanse, 318, 479-481
- ²⁹⁶ Paviot, Politique navale, 235-238
- ²⁹⁷ Paviot, Politique navale, 236.
- ²⁹⁸ (Dollinger, Hanse, 364-365)
- ²⁹⁹ In name this was a Burgundian enterprise but it was entirely financed and organized by the towns of Holland. Blockmans & Prevenier, Promised lands, 93-94; citing Spading, Paviot.
- ³⁰⁰ Paviot, Politique navale, 220-228
- ³⁰¹ Incidents recorded in: Thielemans, 261, 340-342; Sloomans, Paas- en Koudemarkten, I, 96-99, 101, 113; Gilliodts, Inventaire, V, 380; Paviot, Politique navale, 218 226-228; **Dollinger, hanse, 373-374**
- ³⁰² The disruption of French trade is suggested by the confirmation of the 1331 privileges in 1439: Craeybeckx, Grand Commerce, 110. Six Castilian ships were taken by Flemish and Dutch privateers in 1439 (Paviot, Politique navale, 218)
- ³⁰³ Thielemans, Bourgogne, 85
- ³⁰⁴ To prevent political conflict the Duke Philip instructed all his legal officers to harshly punish these buyers (Gilliodts, Inventaire, V, 197-198)
- ³⁰⁵ (Thielemans, 337-338)
- ³⁰⁶ M. Sanderson, Sea Battles, A Reference Guide
- ³⁰⁷ Gilliodts, Inventaire, IV, 342n; Van Rompaey, *Grote Raad*, 189
- ³⁰⁸ (Gilliodts, Inventaire, IV, 334-335)
- ³⁰⁹ Sicking, Neptune, 65
- ³¹⁰ The merchants received a safeconduct from Maximilian and Philip to get them to travel (Sloomans, I, 139)
- ³¹¹ Dollinger, Hanse, 373
- ³¹² Dollinger, Hanse, 378-379; Sloomans, I, 103-105; One ship from England on its way to Bergen op Zoom was attacked by a Hamburg privateer but turned out to be chartered by the city of Hamburg. The principals of the privateering captain indemnified the city (Sloomans I, 106)
- ³¹³ Gilliodts, Inventaire, VI, 410-457
- ³¹⁴ Van Tielhof, Hollandse Graanhandel, 19-21; Blockmans/Prevenier, 181-182
- ³¹⁵ Sicking, Neptune, 65; Sloomans, I, 104, 106, 136
- ³¹⁶ Sicking, Neptune, 65
- ³¹⁷ Sloomans, I, 99
- ³¹⁸ Sloomans, I, 99-100; Sloomans reports a similar division of losses in 1446 (pp. 97-98)
- ³¹⁹ Paviot, Politique navale, 215-216
- ³²⁰ Goris, Etude, 75
- ³²¹ Breen, *Rechtsbronnen*, 237-238
- ³²² Blockmans, *Volkvertegenwoordig*, 251
- ³²³ Van Rompaey, *Grote Raad*, 85-86
- ³²⁴ Sloomans, I, 120-124
- ³²⁵ Sicking, Neptune, 249
- ³²⁶ Sicking, Neptune, 244

- ³²⁷ Sicking, *Neptune*, 290-301; Cf. also: Tracy, Holland (nog nazoeken); Israel, Dutch Republic, 34, 49.
- ³²⁸ Sicking, *Neptune*, 249
- ³²⁹ Sicking, *Neptune*, 239
- ³³⁰ The episode recounted in Sicking, *Neptune*, 219-221
- ³³¹ Goris, *Etude*, p. 5
- ³³² Check, than add: Kaapvaart. Engelsen tegen Spanjaarden, tweede helft 16^e eeuw. Vooral in tweede helft zestiende eeuw: opzoeken bij Stone, *Anatomy* (geciteerd in Braudel, *Midd Zee*, dl 1, hfdst 3, p. 241
- ³³³ The episode is recounted in: Mulder, *Twee verhandelingen*, 7-12; and Marnef, *Antwerpen*, 119
- ³³⁴ Enthoven, *Zeeland*, 18, cites: Te Lintum, Ramsey, Queens' merchants, De Smedt; **Check this.**
- ³³⁵ Read, Queen Elizabeth's seizure,
- ³³⁶ I.J. van Loo, "Kaapvaart, handel en staatsbelang. Het gebruik van kaapvaart als martiem machtsmiddel en vorm van ondernemerschap tijdens de Nederlandse Opstand, 1568-1648", in: *Ondernemers en Bestuurders*, 349-368
- ³³⁷ Van Loo, "Kaapvaart", 354
- ³³⁸ Van Vliet, *Vissers*, 69
- ³³⁹ Printed Resolutions of States of Holland; On French merchants suffered from privateering in 1587, see also J.K. Oudendijk, "Een episode uit het begin van onze `tien jaren", *Bijdragen en mededeelingen van het historisch genootschap, gevestigd te Utrecht*, 72 (1957), 47-70.
- ³⁴⁰ Van Loo, "Kaapvaart", 355
- ³⁴¹ Van Loo, "Kaapvaart", 356
- ³⁴² Van Vliet, *Vissers*, 69-70
- ³⁴³ (SR 10, 61, 92); Evidence for more serious disruptions comes from the number of fishing ships from the Meuse estuary captured by privateers in the years 1596-1601. While between 1585 and 1596 every year only between 1 and 5 ships were captured, this number rose to 11 in 1597, 28 in 1599, 48 in 1600, and 36 in 1601. In following years privateering was back to its pre-1597 level, with the exception of 1606 when 19 ships were taken by privateers.
- ³⁴⁴ D. Mathew, "The Cornish and Welsh Pirates in the Reign of Elizabeth", *English Historical Review* 39 (1924), 337-348
- ³⁴⁵ Sources: SR nrs. 10, 61, 92, 270, 280, 285, 287, 343, 485, 501, 546, 572, 579, 586, 592, 623, 627, 656, 663, 711-713, 777, 842, 1026, 1031, 1113, 1313, 1330, 1417, 1430/1434, 1469, 1473, 1518, 1551, 1571, 1580, 1605, 1625, 1631, 1637, 1664, 1687, 1706, 1720, 1871, 1922, 1958, 1969, 2006, 2085, 2137, 2213, 2259, 2331, 2349, 2401, 2429, 2473, 2526, 2552, 2564, 2565, 2573, 2574, 2585, 2597-2601, 2613, 2644, 2660, 2684, 2685, 2693, 2699, 2706, 2714, 2722, 2723, 2729, 2744, 2764, 2778, 2780, 2789, 2801, 2808, 2831, 2886, 2887, 2905, 290, 2952, 2959, 2978, 2984, 3052, 3086, 3120, 3127, 3177, 3201, 3205, 3214, 3228, 3291, 3385, 3402, 3418, 3428, 3432, 3439, 3462, 3464, 3473, 3481, 3505, 3589, 3590, 3591, 3622, 3628, 2640
- ³⁴⁶ Alvaro Azevedo, SR SR nr. 1615; Alvaro Gommès Bravo, SR nrs. 1553, 1554, 1555, 1739 (Branco) 1810; Diogo Lopes Pinto, SR nrs. 1573, 1585; Florencia Dias, widow of Graviel Alvares, SR nrs. 1774; Francisco de Caceres, SR nrs. 1548, 1594, 1647, 1695, 1754, 1858, 1928; Francisco Nunes Chaves, SR nr. 1865; Juan de Leao in Porto, SR nrs. 1556, 1557 1696, 1731, 2029; Manuel Rodrigues Villareal, SR nr. 1813; Manuel Vaz d'Azevedo, SR nrs. 1967, 2008; Marcus de Gois de Morais, SR nr. 1845, 1873; Pedro Homem, SR nr. 1697; Pero Mendes, SR nrs. 1728, 1759, 1760, 1776, 1937, 1938; Simao Fernandes Franco, SR nr. 1587. Cf. also for goods attached by Spain's fiscal authorities in 1618 en 1619: SR nrs. 1737, 1748, 1751, 1754, 1759, 1760, 1719, 1810, 1833, 1858, 1937, and 1938.
- ³⁴⁷ Van Vliet, *Vissers*, 143
- ³⁴⁸ the embargo was relatively easily circumvented through long-established contacts with traders in North Germany, Southern France and Portugal; Cf. Grafe*** for the limited role of English merchants as intermediaries between Holland and northern Spain)
- ³⁴⁹ Notarial deeds signed by Portuguese merchants between 1621 and 1627 reveal captures of ships in every year between 1621 and 1627 (1621 (14); 1622 (20); 1623 (13); 1624 (8); 1625 (4); 1626 (12); 1627 (60). Sources: cf supra. Evidence for the more general claim can be found in the data collected by A. van Vliet on the total number of merchantmen and fishing ships captured by Dunkirk privateers between 1626 and 1646. (Unlike earlier estimates by Stradling and Baetens, she rightly includes ships recaptured, and ships for which a ransom was paid) Every single year at least 100 ships were captured, with 1632 as the most 'succesfull' year with 350 ships. On average 229 ships were captured – at least half of which were from the Dutch Republic (On the nationalities of the prizes in the 1630s: R.A. Stradling, "The Spanish Dunkirkers, 1621-48: a record of plunder and destruction", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 93-4 (1980), 541-558: 64% was Dutch, almost 20% English (almost all captured in

1630), and another 15% French (mostly captured in 1638); On the provenance of the ships in the 1640s: Roland Baetens, "The Organization and Effects of Flemish Privateering in the Seventeenth Century", *Acta Historiae Neerlandicae. Studies on the history of the Netherlands*, IX Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1976, 48-75; The other ships were mainly French and English, with a few Portuguese as well). Given Van Vliets further estimates of fishing ships from the Meuse Estuary (one of the three principal fishing stations of the United Provinces) captured by privateers between 1622 and 1647 (From 1622 to 1630 an average of 11 per year; between 1631 and 1647 on average 35), it seems safe to say that on average 100 merchantmen per year were captured. A.P. van Vliet, *Vissers en kapers. De zeevisserij vanuit het Maasmondgebied en de Duinkerker kapers (ca. 1580-1648)*, 's-Gravenhage: Stichting Hollandse Historische Reeks 1994, 204-206, 306-319. Cf also: Israel, *Dutch Primacy*.

³⁵⁰ The compensation consisted of 3,911 pounds Flemish paid by Bruges, and 1500 Ecu d'or payable by the Count of Flanders with Bruges standing surety. To convert the Ecu d'Or in pounds Flemish we use the exchange rate set in 1270 by Louis IX: 1 Ecu d'or = ½ livre tournois. Given that in 1360 1 pound Flemish equaled 7.5 Livre tournois, the compensation of the Count of Flanders amounted to 200 pound Flemish. If we use the exchange rate of the mid-fifteenth century instead (1 Ecu d'or = 49 groten Flemish; Paviot, *Politique Navale*, 216), the surety would amount to somewhat over 300 pounds Flemish.

³⁵¹ 5,550 lb was paid in Amsterdam (jour de l'assomption) in exchange for promise of Hansa to return to Flanders. The sum should be paid in full before the end of 1394.

³⁵² This compensation consisted of 751 paid by the Four Members, and 1400 by Bruges

³⁵³ Mentioned in treaty between Hansa and Bruges, signed March 3, 1458; probably ¼ of money due since 1438. Bruges pays its share and stands surety for that of the other Three Members.